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Abstract.
The thesis will contend that there has often been a critical tendency to ignore or 
mask the subtlety and complexity of Bellow's art in order that his work can be tailored 
to accord with preconceived notions about, and/or inchoate responses to, its nature.
This tendency has mainly found fulfillment in critical portrayals of Bellow as either 
a 'humanist' author or, (in more recent times) as its opposite, as a proponent of a 
despairing and negative vision. The thesis will demonstrate that neither position is 
adequate to a proper understanding of Bellow's fiction.
The thesis will show that it is the author's ambiguous narrative technique which 
precludes any classification or categorisation of Bellow's art. Moreover, it is this 
dualistic technique which defines the central characters' relationship not only to the 
writer, but also to the world in which the fictional hero lives. It is the essence of any 
main protagonist of a Bellow novel to find himself in a state of constant contradiction, 
in a condition of unending flux where polarities and paradoxes assail him.
The main body of the text will examine each of Bellow's ten novels in turn, and 
elucidate the primary characteristics of the central figures in order to show that not 
only do they remain unchanged throughout the course of each of the novels (finding 
themselves unable to embrace either a 'humanistic' or an 'anti-humanistic' philosophy), 
but also that this feature constitutes the unifying force in Bellow's fictional canon. And 
it is a feature which means that, paradoxically, the heroes find themselves not trapped 
in stasis, but existing in a complex and artistically vivid situation which is redolent of 
ambiguity.
Over the years, however, the heroes' dilemmas have become more and more focused 
on the contradictions that exist between the spiritual and material planes. The thesis
traces such a development down though the Bellow corpus and culminates in an 
examination of the latest trend iir hrs fictional career, his adoption of the novella form, 
and what this means for the futiift direction of both the author's attention and his art.
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Introduction - Neither a Clean nor a Dirty.
"People who stick labels on you 
are in the gumming business."
Saul Bellow
Saul Bellow is not a neglected writer. Perhaps it might have been better for him if 
he were. For the more ill-judged additions there are to the vast critical industry which 
surrounds his work, the more does his art seem to recede into the background, 
obscured and misrepresented by the haze in which it is enveloped. This tendency 
reaches a nadir in the following:-
Gloria Cronin and Gerhard Bach are currently negotiating a contract [...] for 'text 
and criticism' editions of Herzog and Henderson the Rain King. The proposed 
format of these editions reflects the present need for critical theory applied in 
classroom discourse [...] Possible critical perspectives are: new historicism, 
hermeneutics, cultural (anthropological) criticism, reader-response criticism, 
feminist criticism and deconstructionist criticism [...] This is an exciting new 
venture in Bellow studies ..-1
It is tempting to characterize it more as a depressing new venture in Bellow studies. 
Indeed, it is all the more regrettable that such 'ideas' should come from those who 
avow enthusiasm for the author's work. They should be well aware of the antipathy 
which Bellow reserves for the distorting powers of such doctrinaire thinking:-
The desire to read is itself spoiled by 'cultural interests', and by a frantic desire to 
associate everything with something else and to convert works of art into subjects of 
discourse.2
Moreover >
Art in the twentieth century is more greatly appreciated if it is directly translatable 
into intellectual interests, if it stimulates ideas, if it lends itself to discourse. Because 
intellectuals do not like to suspend themselves in works of the imagination. They 
prefer to talk. Thus they make theology and philosophy out of literature. They make
psychological theory. They make politics.3
One would hope that the earlier criticism is a grotesquely extreme example of 
'discourse' (sounding as it does as if it could have come from the lips of Kenneth 
Trachtenberg, the manic theoretician of More Die o f Heartbreak), but it nevertheless 
offers a clue to the error into which I believe much of the criticism of Saul Bellow 
falls. Intent on extracting whatever accords with their preconceived thesis from what 
can sometimes appear as the mere 'raw material' of the novels, critics often blind 
themselves to the subtleties, ambiguities and indeed blatant contradictions which can 
constitute an absolutely integral feature of the author's artistry and its effects. 
Essentially any attempt to classify or systematize Bellow will result - and has 
resulted -in an imperfect understanding of his craft.
The orthodox critical interpretation, at least for the first two-thirds of his career - 
and in some cases beyond - styles Bellow as a 'humanist'. The good intentions of 
those who hold to this view are not in question. However, the same cannot be said of 
many of their judgements. The first problem with this perspective lies in our 
understanding of the words 'humanist' and 'humanism'.4 The dictionary defines 
'humanism' as a "belief or attitude emphasising common human needs and seeking 
solely rational ways of solving human problems".5 Michael Glenday, an opponent of 
the humanist stance on Bellow, states that "humanism finds its strength in the 
participative and interactive, and contends that the dignity of man and the survival of 
humane sensibility can only be achieved through the social contract. It is this 
humanism which has so often been perceived as a fundamental part of the Bellow 
world."6 Such a perception is crystallised in the view of Malcolm Bradbury, who 
stated, apropos of Bellow being given the Nobel Prize for Literature, that the award 
"meant to recognise that Bellow, in a time when the humanistic development of the
novel form had come under severe questioning, was ready to express and speak for 
its humanistic purposes."7
But the foregoing definitions of 'humanism' , whilst clearly inapplicable to 
Bellow's later novels (for the reasons that their terms of reference neither encompass 
the range of Bellow's art nor do they respond to a fiction where a supposed 
'humanistic' outlook lies outside the domain of the human), are also, I would aver, 
inappropriate with regard to his earlier work. Whether, for instance, either The 
Victim or Seize the Day could in the light of such definitions be characterized as 
evincing a 'humanist' view is extremely debatable. The rendering of character in 
both, as in all of Bellow's novels, is too complex for such strictures, too subtle and to 
prone to fluctuation. The optimistic affirmation which is invariably the bedfellow of 
'humanism' depends for its existence on the 'correct' interpretation of the highly 
ambiguous denouements to the novels - an interpretation fraught with pitfalls. 
Moreover, a further problem for the 'humanist' stance is the quasi-religious element 
which pervades Bellow's canon - the "kind of mysticism"8 to which the author has 
made reference. And finally, the humanist perspective hinges to a large extent on 
whether Bellow ultimately gives full 'endorsement' to the views of his central 
protagonists (views which, in any case, cannot be easily distilled to coincide with any 
philosophy). I shall return to this very point later in this section. In the meantime, it 
should be noted that the author himself has declined to be pigeon-holed in the 
preceding fashion:-
'Humanism' is one of the words which have deservedly fallen into disrepute. I am 
not certain that I would accept your use of it, because I don't actually know what you 
mean by it.9
More recently, some critics have dissented from the humanist interpretation of 
Bellow's work (although some of the humanist critics had beforehand begun to
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despair of the author) John J.Clayton, after comparing Bellow to reactionary 
politicians like Spiro Agnew and George Wallace on the publication of 
Mr.Sammler's Planet, expressed the hope that "Bellow returns to the planet he used 
to share with us"10 - and the "phalanx and phalanstery atmosphere"11 permeating 
Humboldt's Gift led to further consternation). Jonathan Wilson highlights some valid 
points with regard to the humanist approach:-
While it may sound perverse of me to take issue with critics for finding a writer 
'life-affirming', I do so because I believe it is a misreading that has obfuscated 
Bellow's fictive complexity.12
and:-
Bellow's 'best men' are always extremely eccentric or peripherally criminal.13
True enough, but Wilson compromises his thesis somewhat by escorting us up the 
Freudian blind alley (a blind alley because the suggestion that "Bellow's novels [...] 
finally reveal far more to us about their author"14 surely does more damage to 'fictive 
complexity' than anything else), and by the recurrent tone of iconoclasm for its own 
sake (it might also be borne in mind that Bellow's 'worst men' - Tamkin, Gersbach, 
Spangler and the like - all possess redeeming features).
Michael Glenday's study provides the apotheosis of what might be termed the 'anti- 
humanist' position. Glenday's belief is that the novels involve "Bellow's rejection of 
the humanist ethic. His heroes are humanists manque, rejected and defeated by an 
American ethos so inimical to their basic human needs that they are forced to adapt 
various strategies of withdrawal".15 The problem with this argument is that it tends
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to degenerate into a 'seek and ye shall find' operation, where pessimism and 
bleakness can be encountered at almost every turn. One finishes by sounding like 
Nietzsche's 'gloomy prophet', the caricature of Schopenhauer, whose fruits have all 
turned rotten and brown:-
There are surely occasions when optimism can strike us as shallow, as a 
manifestation of weakness rather than strength or mettle.16
Taken in the context of Glenday's thesis, this comment (which I have no doubt 
Bellow would agree with on its own merits) becomes a distorting weapon, obscuring 
many important points with the insistence on creating the current of Weltschmerz 
supposedly running through the novels. In any case, Glenday seems to contradict his 
contention that there is a decline of humanism in Bellow's work, by portraying The 
Victim and The Adventures o f  Augie March, two of the earliest novels, as among the 
bleakest in the canon. In essence, those in the 'anti-humanist' camp ultimately fall 
into the same trap as their humanist counterparts - Bellow's novels simply do not 
conform to rigid prescriptions or formulae. Those in the former school would do 
well to heed Bellow's injunction that "no one should found his nay upon the study of 
literature".17
It will be evident that both the humanist and the anti-humanist views depend to a 
large extent for their existence on the predisposition of the critic. The author, for his 
part, has made several references to the invalidity of both approaches:-
The idiocy of orthodox affirmation and transparent or pointless optimism ought not 
to provoke an equal and opposite reaction.18
and:-
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Pessimism, no less than optimism, can be made into a racket.19
and:-
Nihilists and bien pensants are equally nutty.20
Such comments can lead us to a closer understanding of Bellow's art. Since the 
example of Joseph in Dangling Man, many observers have commented on the 
tendency of the Bellow hero to do just what the title of his first novel suggests - to 
'dangle'. That is to say, the hero appears to be defined by his occupation of the 
middle ground between contradictory forces: rationalism and feeling, flesh and spirit, 
external and internal reality, salvation and despair. I do not dispute the existence of 
this feature for a moment - indeed, I seek to develop and enlarge upon it. The point 
over which I take issue with perhaps the majority of Bellow's critics is over the desire 
to find a closure, a resolution, a definitive ordering of the turmoil in which the 
central protagonists exist. This desire often gravitates, as has been mentioned, in the 
direction of affirmative 'humanism', or in the direction of the pessimistic withdrawal 
of anti-humanism. It is my contention that there is no conclusion to the 'dangling' 
process - no state of grace, no transcendence, not even any despairing retreat. The 
Bellow hero continues in this strange limbo, a state of indeterminacy, which, it must 
be stressed, implies no other associations - it simply is.
I think we can identify two main reasons for this state of affairs. The first lies in 
Bellow's comment about what he sees as the greatest expression of the art of the 
novel :-
Here we see the difference between a didactic novelist like D.H. Lawrence and one 
like Dostoyevsky. When he was writing The Brothers Karamazov and had just ended
the famous conversation betwen Ivan and Alyosha, in which Ivan, despairing of 
justice, offers to return his ticket to God, Dostoyevsky wrote to one of his 
correspondents that he must now attempt, through Father Zossima, to answer Ivan's 
arguments. But he has in advance all but devastated his own position. This, I think, 
is the greatest achievement possible in a novel of ideas. It becomes art when the 
views most opposite to the author's own are allowed to exist in full strength [...] The 
opposites must be free to range themselves against each other, and they must be 
passionately expressed on both sides ...21
Alyosha, of course, comes to reject Ivan's "rebellion", and sides with the 
prescriptions of Father Zossima, whose "pious platitudes" as David Magarshack 
rightly observes, "are never as convincing as Ivan's blasphemies".22 With Bellow, a 
similar, but not identical process takes place. The author certainly gives full rein to 
the representation of polarised ideas. But the Bellow hero is ultimately unable to 
embrace either position - thus the peculiar 'middle ground' in which he finds himself. 
It is my belief that this inability is a direct result of Bellow's singular use of irony - 
the second, interrelated reason for the nature of his art.
As was noted earlier, the question of Bellow's relationship to his central characters 
is one that those on the humanist camp tend to skirt around, since a deeper 
examination would compromise their conclusions. Even the more subtle in this 
group, who can recognise some of the inherent contradictions and paradoxes of the 
Bellow hero (like John J.Clayton), nevertheless decide that these are not enough to 
prevent an acceptance of the 'humanist ideal' by the protagonist. Adherents of the 
contrary viewpoint are alive to the ironic portrayal - but only when it suits the 
purposes of their overall theme (Glenday, for instance, argues the case for an ironic 
portrayal of characters like Augie and Henderson, but sees little of this in the more 
ostensibly negative Sammler). Bellow's use of irony is more intricate. Norman 
Podhoretz, in a hostile review of The Adventures o f  Augie March, comments:-
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Mr.Bellow is no doubt poking fun at his narrator [...] through mimicry, but we are 
supposed to be taking what Augie says very seriously [...] The main effect of the 
mimicry is to give Mr.Bellow an out (he knows what sort of character his narrator 
is),not to qualify our response to Augie in any significant way. This kind of trick we 
are familiar with from Auden's early poetry, in which self-mockery becomes an 
excuse for the self-indulgent refusal to make up his mind23
Podhoretz goes on to accuse Bellow of "standing off with an equivocal neutrality 
very far from the detachment he's after."24 This is a trifle harsh, but it is closer to the 
actuality of Bellow's narrative technique than seen so far. Stephen Tanner brings us 
even closer:-
Treating the big issues with comedy and irony and putting his convictions in the 
mouths of characters who are quirky and often preposterous had allowed Bellow over 
the years to insinuate his ideas and values without having to be directly accountable 
for them to a critical audience that would readily attack them if they were openly 
asserted.25
Whether we would agree with Tanner that Bellow has 'insinuated' his ideas is a 
matter for debate. What Tanner has noticed, however, is what constitutes for me the 
essential feature of the artistry of Bellow - the almost simultaneous endorsement and 
undercutting of the central characters by the author. It is this characterstic, I believe, 
which leads to the lack of closure, which accounts for the 'medial' nature of Bellow's 
heroes. It is a characteristic altogether unlike the ironic portrayal in, say, the tales of 
Poe, wherein the author, by varying degrees of subtlety, exposes the limitations and 
shortcomings of his narrators, demonstrating the untrustworthy nature of their 
rationale, in effect pulling the carpet from under their feet. It is a characteristic 
which has more affinities with the likes of James's narrator of The Bostonians, in that 
the supercilious commentator is himself prone to ridicule. But even then it is not the
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same. The reader of Bellow must be aware of the constant, subtle, and often totally 
unexpected and incongruous shifts in the perspectives in which the central characters 
are held - they are just as likely to be buffoons as heroes, mixing searing insight with 
a host of inconsistencies and contradictions. This technique means that the 
Bellowprotagonists are some of the most complex and difficult to unravel in fiction. 
I said earlier that the Bellow heroes find themselves in the 'middle ground' - this is so. 
And by means of such fluid and ambiguous portrayal of character, the author shows 
that the desideratum of the hero, that which will release him from his 'dangling', is of 
necessity unattainable - and just as false as a surrender to the "cheap mental 
stimulants of Alienation, the cant and rant of pipsqueaks about Inauthenticity and 
Forlomess".26 The heroes may dangle in the middle ground - but they would be 
imprisoned in either of these extremes. Bellow always stops short of absolutes - he 
affirms, but qualifies; he undercuts, but redeems. It is this tendency which makes the 
predicament of the hero both comic and twentieth-century tragic. It is this 
characteristic, which, after fifty years, remains the essential and unchanging feature 
of the Bellow central character. His work displays "a view too complicated to be 
reducible to a philosophical proposition, too dialectical and contradictory to be taken 
as dogma, creed or panacea. Its central feature is, in fact, ambiguity, a recognition of 
elements which may be forever irreconcilable".27 "We may," says Bellow, "be 
somewhere between a false greatness and a false insignificance".28 A salutory 
warning to those in the gumming business.
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Paneling Man - Drowning in Freedom
"Just try giving us, for example, as much independence 
as possible, untie the hands of any one of us, loosen 
our bonds and we [...] I assure you we should all 
immediately beg to go back under discipline."
Dostoyevsky: Notes from underground
"What a Difference between Freedom and Ownness!"
Max Stimer: The Ego and His Own.
Without wishing to seem to be immediately contradicting the assertions made in 
the introductory section, one must say that critics have, for the most part, put on 
protective gloves when dealing with Bellow's first novel, Dangling Man. Wary of 
committing themselves too fully, their path throughout this work has often been a 
cautious and diffident one. This is especially the case on the humanist side of the 
equation, though the phenomenon also manifests itself on the opposing side. If 
nothing else, this is due to the associations implied in the title itself! More properly, 
it is due, first, to the nature and complexity of the portrayal of Joseph, the central 
character and narrator. In the light of the fact that Joseph's narrative takes the form 
of a personal journal (which ran the risk of being deemed too restrictive and limited 
a viewpoint) such a portrayal is testimony to the nascent ability of Bellow. And, 
second, the critics' care is a result of the extremely ambiguous and controversial 
conclusion to the novel (a feature which is, as has been mentioned, common to all of 
Bellow's work). Bearing this tendency of critics in mind, then, it becomes all the 
more surprising to note that the degree of circumspection awarded to Dangling Man 
is not reproduced on anything like this scale in the treatment of later novels. For it 
seems to me that Joseph is the quintessential Bellow hero - perhaps lacking the 
experiences of an Augie, the activity of a Henderson, or simply not as interesting as 
a Sammler or Corde - but he establishes the framework into which all of the later
1
chief characters will fit: that of the nebulous middle-ground. It is just because 
Joseph is such an archetype that critics of any and every persuasion will benefit 
from a spot of'dangling' themselves.
Michael Glenday, in taking issue with those of humanist hue, states that, 
"Dangling Man seems to finish with no [such] affirmation and thereby becomes a 
source of discomfiture to critics bent on such a reading [...] to be dismissed [...] or 
simply ignored altogether."1 This is only a partly valid point. Although one critic of 
this persuasion asseverates that the novel is "clearly not a fictional achievement"2, it 
would be patently unjust to stigmatise all of the commentators who are "bent on 
such a reading." The worst that can be said about these latter is that there appears to 
be a slight inclination on their behalf to attribute any uncomfortable features which 
appear in the novel to Bellow's supposed tentativeness, or even immaturity, 
manifesting themselves as he embarked on his writing career. Far from dismissing 
or ignoring the novel, the response of the "humanist" school has tended to be, as I 
have said, a cagey and ambivalent one (Glenday himself may be familiar with this 
tendency - "But though the cruel irony of the novel's conclusion appears to signal 
Joseph's absolute renegation of that freedom he had formerly prized so highly, the 
pessimism of all this is mitigated by certain factors."3) Thus it is that John J. 
Clayton avers that "Joseph is a humanist"4 and that "he defends traditional 
humanistic values [...] individuality, moral integrity, brotherhood: the individual and 
humanity joined by love."5 Yet this is qualified by the acknowledgement that "his 
humanism is not viable in Chicago, but he tries throughout to sustain it"6 and that 
"Humanism of any traditional kind [...] is insufficient."7 Robert Dutton sees Joseph 
in possession of "an honest and alert mind more nearly allied to the angelic than to 
the demonic"8, and as typifying the Bellow hero, who must "break through to life 
and [...] achieve [their] possibilities [...] without the loss of a moral and intellectual
2
humanism basic to their views of themselves."9 But he recognises that Joseph's 
'dangling' produces a "severe modification of this humanistic self."10 Even Eusebio 
Rodrigues divines that "this modem man dangles precariously, clinging, however, to 
a slim thread of hope and faith in human existence."11 I return to Robert Dutton to 
provide the most accurate summation of the humanist position regarding Dangling 
Man: "There is little doubt that Dangling Man is a story of failure and defeat [...] 
though his [Joseph's] struggle is not without nobility."12 The consensus view 
appears to be that Joseph's humanism derives from his coming to embody a laudable 
stoicism (presaging, incidentally, the potted philosophy of Schlossberg in The 
Victim - a "desperate affirmation", to use John J. Clayton's phrase).
Jonathan Wilson, in opposing the merest hint of a humanist reading, makes a 
couple of telling remarks with regard to the novel:
What Dangling Man and Bellow's other novels seem to insist upon is that a 
choice be made. Paradoxically, they also seem to insist that such a choice is 
impossible to make.13
and>
Bellow's heroes come through some kind of personal crisis, but there is rarely any 
convincing hint that they have broken a pattern.14
I agree with both of these comments. Where I take issue with Wilson's thesis is over 
the implication that the 'dangling' state is necessarily bleak, alienating and life-
denying. Quite the reverse is true: it is the hero's inability to grasp, or succumb to, 
the conflicting tensions which populate his experience that animates Bellow's 
fiction. What Wilson portentously calls Bellow's "static dialectic", a phenomenon 
which, in the opinion of the former, "would appear to fundamentally contradict the
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sense of open-ended human possibility that so many critics have discovered in 
Bellow's fiction"15, in fact describes the very process by which the hero lives - in the 
protean middle-ground experience is manifold, uncertainty and contradiction 
abound - there is nothing 'static' in this environment. Peace or decay, tranquility or 
vegetation can only occur in the realm of certainties. The fact that the hero does not 
seem to go through any change in his 'dangling' state merely reinforces the point 
that, were he to do so, it would be this metamorphosis which would constitute a 
denial of life. The Bellow hero, and there is no better example than Joseph, does 
not, will not, cannot go this way.
Joseph, then, is no disciple of the 'preachers of death'. Yet it would be a mistake 
to accept the humanist interpretation, shaky and hesitant though this may be. For it 
seems to me that Joseph is ill-equipped to be a representative of 'humanism' as 
described, for instance, by Clayton. The ostensible reason for Joseph's 'dangling' is 
the delay in his induction to the army. The major philosophical theme underlying 
the material 'dangling' is the spiritual 'dangling' between freedom and fixity, life and 
death. There is, however, a third sense in which Joseph 'dangles' - in the continual 
and bizarre oscillations in his personality. Keith Opdahl is of the view that "We are 
too conscious of Joseph's self-deception to trust his self-knowledge. The result of 
this confusing shift is [...] we are never sure how to take Joseph's journal entries "16 
The confusion Opdahl cites stems, of course, from what I believe to be the 
outstanding feature of Bellow's style - that curious co-existence of approbation and 
irony, as outlined in my introduction. The lineage of this author/character 
relationship can be traced from the prototype of Joseph down through Bellow's 
corpus (reaching its zenith in the likes of Moses Herzog and Kenneth Trachtenberg). 
The comparison which was made earlier with the ironic style employed in Poe's 
'psychological' tales is in this case doubly illuminating. Both authors make use of
4
only a single perspective. Both subject this perspective to ironic impairment. But 
whereas Poe's demented narrators expose their limitations and inconsistencies to 
such a degree that we can scarcely trust a word they say, Joseph's consciousness is in 
constant flux, shuttling between artless self-examination and penetrative but 
evanescent revelation - and the reader must be aware of both. Either Bellow is 
afraid to commit himself, as Stephen Tanner would have us believe, or, as I prefer to 
view it, the author, being fully in control of his material, is attempting to represent 
artistically both the joyous expectations and the foolish degradations of human 
beings caught between the opposing poles of an impossible ideal and an 
unacceptable despair. Bellow's technique can, as Opdahl notes, muddy the waters 
somewhat - it is designed to do just that - and it is central to an understanding of the 
'dangling' condition, not only of Joseph, but of all Bellow's protagonists.
Joseph's perceptions and meditations on the nature of self and reality, and of 
freedom and constraint are ironically juxtaposed on several important occasions. 
Joseph distinguishes between two versions of his personality - the "Old" self, 
dominant in the days before his call-up and the "New" self which he claims has 
taken over since the ostensible inception of his 'dangling'. To this Old self, 
"amiable, generally takes himself to be well liked",17 the concepts of "common 
humanity"[25], and "colony of the spirit [...] a group whose covenants forbade spite, 
bloodiness and cruelty"[39] seemed natural. His New Self harbours "bitterness and 
spite which eat like acids at my endowment of generosity and goodwill"[l2], Joseph 
avers that he underwent this change less than a year before - but we cannot believe 
that any such process took place at all. For, as Robert Dutton observes,18 Joseph's 
behaviour before the supposed metamorphosis took place violently contradicts his 
self-image. Harry and Minna Servatius's party, at which Joseph divines the true 
nature of the putative members of his 'colony of the spirit' - "we did these things
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without grace or mystery [...] and, relying on drunkenness, assassinated the Gods in 
one another and shrieked in vengefulness and hurt" [46] - takes place "last March" 
before his alleged conversion to the cynical peerer into the "craters o f the spirit" [66]. 
His affair with Kitty, which he claims is "out of character"[l 01], not only undermines 
his avowed emphasis on love (his relationship with his wife is, to say the least, 
changeable), but also further subverts the notion of a recent schism in his 
personality, since the affair began two years previously. Furthermore, the rancorous 
split with the Communist Party occurred several years before (Joseph also 
surreptitiously mentions that he and his best friend Abt were "temporarily estranged 
because of a political matter" while at college[44]). Finally, the "disgraceful fist 
fight"[ 142] between Joseph and his ex-landlord happened "last winter". We are 
forced to the conclusion that Joseph's irritability and paranoia, comprising his 'dark 
side', have always been present, and that the concepts of "Old" and "New" selves are 
redundant (Joseph himself acknowledges the suspicion of an earlier incarnation of 
the 'dark side', recalling the incident in his childhood with the woman who 
compared him with Mephistopheles). None of this proves that Joseph is an 
incorrigible fiend (he admits, for instance, that "the treasons I saw at the Servatius 
party were partly mine"[l47]) but serves to highlight his distance from what he styles 
his "ideal construction"[ 140],
Joseph describes himself as "a person greatly concerned with keeping intact and 
free from encumbrance a sense o f his own being, its importance"[27]. He chafes at 
what he sees as the apparent disregard for him as a person, as a valued being. This 
annoyance is clearly displayed on several occasions, most notably in the incidents 
with ex-comrade Bums ("I have a right to be spoken to. It's the most elementary 
thing in the world"[33]); at Joseph's parents-in-law, where a random chicken feather 
in Joseph's glass of orange juice assumes vast metaphysical significance; and in the
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exchange with the officious bank clerk (Joseph, incidentally, is incautious enough to 
comment that "Abt, more than anyone I have known, has lived continually in need 
of being consequential" [86)]. The point in this case is that Joseph is clearly unable 
to merit such regard, unable properly to sustain his individual freedom. From his 
early suspicions that "I do not know how to use my freedom [...] I have no resources 
- in a word, no character" [12], through to his agonising doubts about whether he has 
a "separate destiny"[168], Joseph flounders helplessly in an existential 'nothingness' - 
that he recognises this to be the case renders his excessive behaviour doubly ironic. 
In any case, Joseph's respect for the inviolability of the self does not, it would seem, 
extend either to the treatment of his wife, Iva, whom he tries relentlessly to regiment 
(and is shocked when she rebels), or to his Albee-esque alter-ego, Vanaker, for 
whom he feels a mixture of loathing and fear. Joseph, failing to manage his 
freedom, reveals his relief in the ironic exuberance of his final entry, written 
immediately prior to his passage into the 'ordered' world of the armed forces:-
I am no longer to be held accountable for myself; I am grateful for that. I am in 
other hands, relieved of self-determination, freedom cancelled.
Hurrah for regular hours!
And for the supervision of the spirit!
Long live regimentation! [ 191]
So much for freedom. This does not, however, mean that "Joseph is joining not only 
the army but the human race"19. Several factors militate against such a conclusion. 
In the first place, it is doubtful whether such a flawed individual would perform any 
better in the generality than in the self. Second, are we to believe that Joseph's 
desire for fraternity, for a 'colony of the spirit' is to be met at a point where the 
human brotherhood is engaged in blowing each other to smithereens? The war, with 
its millions of dead, paradoxically undermines the notions both of brotherhood and 
self. And third, it is difficult to credit that the revulsion occasioned in Joseph's
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consciousness by his friends, relatives and wife will not resurface within this larger 
fellowship. His nightmarish epiphanies will see that it does.
Further examples underline Joseph's confused imperfection. He complains of 
"my inability to read people properly, to recognise the likelihood of baseness in 
them" [78], Yet for one so naive, he is morbidly suspicious, a characteristic 
particularly evinced when, after he has spanked his ill-mannered niece (with whom 
Joseph realises he bears certain affinities), he imputes an outrageous hint of sexual 
suggestiveness to his sister-in-law (when in fact such a hint had existed only in his 
own mind). Similarly, when his mother-in-law innocently mentions that, due to the 
delay in his induction, Joseph has "all the time in the world"[22], the latter becomes 
indignant, suspecting the old woman of all sorts of vicious motives designed to 
disgrace him. In addition to such a disposition, he is made to look foolish when, 
immediately subsequent to a contemplative mood in which he exhorts himself to 
bear"suffering and humiliation[...]with grace, without meanness"[67], he explodes at 
the obnoxious Etta. In all these ways, Joseph's ideal constructions are obscured 
behind the turbulence and volatility of his personality - to cast him, in this light, as a 
representative of even a modified of half-baked humanism would be difficult 
indeed.
The point is, of course, that Joseph's ideals are sincere because they are perforce 
ideals, forever jarring with unaccommodating reality. Between these two extremes 
spins the figure of Joseph. For it must not be forgotten that Joseph fights shy of any 
acceptance of "doctrines of weariness and renunciation."20 Though he is a man 
constantly assailed by portents of Death (the man in the street who suffers a heart 
attack in front of Joseph, his doom-laden dreams, the 'Buster Brown curls' memory, 
the decrepit Christian Science woman), in his 'discussions' with 'the Spirit of
8
Alternatives' (scenes which, one suspects, owe more than a little to Ivan Karamazov 
and his Devil), Joseph explicitly rejects resignation - "You want me to worship the 
anti-life. I'm saying that there are no values outside life. There is nothing outside 
life"[165], Moreover, he finds Goethe's Weltschmerz ultimately repellent - "Goethe's 
heading on the next page was 'Weariness o f Life' [...] Then came the statement: 
'Nothing occasions this weariness more than the recurrence o f the passion of love. 
Deeply disappointed, I put the book down'"[l8/l9]. And he resists the temptation to 
lapse into dogmas of surrender - "I didn't say there was no feeling o f alienation, but 
that we should not make a doctrine of our feeling"[138], Even in the apparently 
downbeat conclusion (which one critic has described as "total failure[...]nakedly 
acknowledged"21), I believe there is no unconditional capitulation. Joseph certainly 
appreciates that "I had not done well alone"[l90], but we have no reason to suppose 
that his induction means renunciation to the countervailing forces of limitation, 
partly because, as argued earlier, of the nature of his personality, but also because 
we have little cause to disbelieve his statement that, "I was willing to be member of 
the army but not a part of it" [133/134], Joseph, it seems, will continue to dangle - for 
he has done so all of his life.
It is significant, in the light of the statement just noticed, that Joseph and the 
'Spirit o f Alternatives' never reach conclusions - as the Spirit says, "I haven't 
answered. I'm not supposed to give answers" [141], For Joseph is destined to 
become the first in a long line of Bellow heroes who exist in "the gap between the 
ideal construction and the real world"[l4i]. In Joseph's case, the gulf is between the 
impossible aims of total freedom, a defined and inviolate self, a human fellowship 
based on love, and an unacceptable reality of stricture, insignificance and 
humiliation (though it should be emphasised that Joseph rejects extreme 
representations of reality - reality, per se, is not "unacceptable" - "Theories of a
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wholly good or a wholly malevolent world strike him as foolish [...] For him the 
world is both and therefore it is neither"[29]). Tantalisingly, Bellow seems to offer a 
clue to provide at least one way of mitigating the 'dangling' process. It comes in the 
form of Joseph's artistic friend, Pearl, who posits the view that "There is only one 
worth-while sort o f work, that o f the imagination"[9l].
Bellow has often touted the power of the creative process in interview and essay:-
What I am saying is that the accounts of human existence given by the modem 
intelligence are very shallow by comparison with those that the imagination is 
capable of giving, and that we should by no means agree to limit imagination by 
committing ourselves to the formulae of modem intelligence.22
It remains for writers and artists to recover what the mling perceptions leave out. 
And this is what the imagination does. It restores what mutilating perception has cut 
away.23
It is Joseph's tragedy, however, that he recognises himself to be an artistically 
talentless man (perhaps typically, though, Bellow gently undercuts in artistic form 
what he has said in prosaic form by having Pearl write later to Joseph to complain 
that he is bored with his environment). Joseph, then, unable or unwilling to meet 
with resolutions or certainties of any kind, remains suspended in limbo - a limbo of 
pained emotions, anxieties, transient joys, hopeless desires - in short, the limbo of 
human life.
Dangling Man has rightly been compared with two works in particular: Sartre's 
Nausea and Dostoyevsky's Notes from Underground24, and the influences, 
particularly of the last named, are fairly apparent. In the case of the former, and 
even though Bellow has often criticised Sartre in print (partly because 
Existentialism constitutes a part of a collective body of "thought" which "taken 
altogether [...] is a huge affliction. Its effects are deadly"25, and partly because of
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the Frenchman's political pronouncements), Joseph does seem to reflect an 
existential fluidity of being (precisely, of course, what he cannot cope with) in his 
quest for self-meaning, and to experience similar bouts of 'nausea' to Roquentin. 
Like the Man from Underground, Joseph is an intellectual festering in a comer, 
conscious of the wretchedness and insignificance of his position (but unlike the Man 
from Underground, he is not fully aware of all the ironic pettiness and folly in his 
character, nor does he derive a perverse pleasure from what knowledge he has). Yet 
there is another interesting comparison to be made. This is with Max Stimer's 
neglected tour de force, The Ego and his Own. Stimer urged complete and 
inflexible self-possession, total independence from any external fetters whatever, be 
those fetters material or philosophical, defined in his concept of "ownness"
Freedom lives only in the realm of dreams! Ownness, on the contrary, is my 
whole being and existence, it is I myself. I am free from what I am rid of, owner of 
what I have in my power or what I control76
Joseph's search for a definition of self, for a means of dealing with freedom, 
might be said to take place on the path towards 'ownness' - but he clearly fails to be 
an 'owner', an 'egoist'. Stimer also foresaw a 'union' of like 'egoists', a notion very 
similar to Joseph's 'colony of the spirit'. Stimer's philosophy, however, is no doubt 
an "ideal construction" - little wonder that Joseph fails to live up to it! Nevertheless, 
I do not wish to make too much of this link, and mention it only as an aside, as I can 
find no reference to Stimer in any of Bellow's utterances (the latter, I think, would 
find Stimer strident and cranky - but no doubt interesting) nor do I wish to be 
accused of doing exactly that which I criticised in my opening remarks, namely 
foisting a hobby horse onto Bellow's fiction! In any case, it seems to me that the 
most important, relevant and profound influence is that of Joseph on Bellow's
11
subsequent central characters. Fifty years on, his precept that "Alternatives, and 
particularly desirable alternatives, grow only on imaginary trees" [84] still holds true.
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Chapter Two
The Victim - Physician, heal thyself!
"...Every man is responsible for everyone, 
only people don't know it. If they knew - 
it would be paradise at once!"
Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov 
A 'victim' is described in the dictionary as follows:
...person or thing injured or destroyed in pursuit of an object, in gratification of a 
passion, etc., or as a result of event or circumstance.1
While this description may be applied to one or two figures in Saul Bellow’s second 
novel, it cannot in all honesty be appropriate with regard to the central character, 
Asa Leventhal; for if Leventhal is a victim- ana he is - his status is due not so much 
to an overweening desire or hubris, nor even to being a helpless pawn in a game of 
chance, but more to the weaknesses and prejudices inherent in his own personality. 
The flaws in the make-up of this most saturnine, least endearing of all Bellow's key 
protagonists are glaringly exposed. In the crushing, jostling, claustrophobic world 
of the novel, a world of "barbaric fellahin",2 Leventhal seems to be a symptom of the 
prevailing chaotic savagery rather than its prey, and an incongruous vehicle for a 
humanist outlook.
Foremost among the features in Leventhal's character which Bellow shows us to 
be self-destructive is the persecution complex the former manifests with regard to 
his race. He displays a hyper-sensitivity in this respect which borders on the 
psychotic. As Michael Glenday correctly points out, "Leventhal is the worst kind of 
Jew who uses his identity in an irresponsible, churlish and damaging way"3. True, 
there are various instances in the novel where Leventhal appears justified in taking 
offence, particularly at the sloppy and gratuitous anti-Semitism of his employer, Mr.
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Beard, or more importantly, at the slimy insinuations and accusations of Allbee, 
Leventhal's mendacious and hypocritical incubus (Allbee, significantly, mirrors 
Leventhal's obsessive touchiness with his own dominant conviction that, "It's really 
as if  the children o f Caliban were running everything"[129]). Even on these 
occasions, however, Leventhal seems all too eager to seize upon the slightest hint of  
a slur. More disturbing are the cases where Leventhal impugns the character of 
others by attributing to them a racial prejudice which is unsubstantiated by any shred 
of evidence. He is certain, for instance, that the mother o f his sister-in-law 
interprets the death of young Mickey as divine retribution for her daughter's having 
married out of the faith - and particularly having done so with a Jew. He conceives 
a furious loathing of the old woman (having already been "tempted to jostle 
her" [53]) which culminates in his virtually ordering his brother to chuck her out into 
the street. Similarly, he unfairly accuses Williston of siding with Allbee because 
Leventhal is a Jew, an accusation made all the more ridiculous since Williston had 
previously helped Leventhal to secure a job. His paranoia is revealed most nakedly 
in the attitude he adopts towards Disraeli, during the exchanges with his Jewish 
acquaintances, prompting one of these latter to declare that he had "never seen such 
an exhibition of ghetto psychology"[223], And Leventhal himself is not above 
indulging in a spot o f racial stereotyping in the other direction, as when he castigates 
Williston for a lack of "Anglo-Saxon fairness...fair play"[80]. But typically, Bellow 
refuses to leave the reader with an unambiguous view, by adding a beautifully 
mischievous rider (which, as far as I am aware, has gone unnoticed). Harkavy, 
Leventhal's Jewish friend, fulminates over what he sees as Leventhal's capitulation 
to Allbee's conspiracy theory that "it's all a Jewish setup...Jews have influence with 
other Jews"[235-236], Later on[256] we are told that Leventhal has managed to get a 
new job - through Harkavy.
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Leventhal's persecution mania is scarcely less powerful on an individual level. He 
displays a masochistic desire to heap blame and guilt upon himself. This tendency 
is first evidenced when he persuades himself that his ill-tempered confrontation with 
Rudiger has led to his (Leventhal's) name being placed on an employment blacklist. 
Leventhal typically slides from an initial pride at having asserted his worth as an 
individual into a morass of self-reproach (The existence of a blacklist is, 
incidentally, a figment of Leventhal's imagination). Further, he comes to believe that 
his sister-in-law holds him responsible for Mickey's death because he had had the 
temerity to send for a specialist to look at the boy (although he does manage to 
defend himself by imputing "a suggestion of distraction or even of madness not very 
securely held in check" [5] to Elena). Most important in the context of the novel, 
though, is Leventhal's gradual subservience to the view that he is in some way 
responsible for Allbee's dismissal from his job, and therefore, his subsequent 
deterioration. The reader is never quite sure how far Leventhal is accountable - 
little wonder, then, that Leventhal, with his morbidly active guilt complex, 
ultimately becomes the marionette of Allbee, acquiescing in the latter's every 
imposition (until the incident with the prostitute), and, one suspects, half revelling in 
the neurasthenic effect that Allbee has upon him. Allbee, it should be noted, here 
reveals his own shameless hypocrisy. For, under the terms of his brutal philosophy 
of chaos, a philosophy that states that "one day we're like full bundles and the next 
we're wrapping paper blowing around the streets"[67], he has no right to expect 
anyone else to feel responsible for his [Allbee's] downfall, since "we do get it in the 
neck for nothing and suffer for nothing"[ 130], Leventhal, astonishingly, recognises 
this incongruity - "there was a wrong, a general wrong. Allbee, on the other hand, 
came along and said 'You!' and that was what was so meaningless" [71] - and yet 
does nothing about it. Much of the humanist case with regard to The Victim rests on
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the assertion that Leventhal comes to embrace a concept of responsibility for his 
fellow man - as we shall see, this is doubtful.
Adding to the catalogue of idiosyncrasies which Leventhal displays is, first, his 
barely suppressed terror at the possibility of inheriting his mother's 'madness'. 
Indeed, "illness, madness and death"[l4i] seem to be his constant companions 
throughout the novel. Allied to this is an overburdening fear of falling back into the 
abyss of failure and becoming one of "the lost, the outcast, the overcome, the 
effaced, the ruined"[16], Second, his inclination towards violence (already 
commented upon with regard to Elena's mother) is repeatedly evinced in his 
encounters with Allbee, actually resulting in physical grappling on two occasions 
(set against the background of the stultifying heat and the thronging masses, this 
disposition actually seems quite understandable). And third, a factor which must 
not be overlooked, his sexual prurience (Leventhal in this respect resembles not only 
Joseph in Dangling Man, but also Josef K in The Trial). Leventhal is somewhat 
preoccupied with the desires of the flesh. He fantasises for one moment that Allbee's 
whore is in fact the caretaker's wife, in whom he seems to have quite an interest. At 
Mickey's funeral, virtually the first thing which arrests Leventhal's attention is 
Elena's figure. And when Allbee makes a lewd comment in an elevator full of 
schoolgirls, the clear implication is that he is lagging away behind Leventhal's 
thoughts. Bearing these features in mind, it strikes the reader as somewhat 
preposterous that Harkavy should upbraid Leventhal thus: "It's almost a sin to be so 
innocent. Get beside yourself, boy, will you?"[78]. Clearly Harkavy allies bad 
judgment to his earlier 'righteous indignation'.
The foregoing examinations of Leventhal's character do not in themselves totally 
preclude a humanist interpretation. But what can immediately be said is that these
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foibles certainly do not reveal a "rational" mind (in accordance with the terms of our 
earlier definition). And if Asa Leventhal is to be awarded the humanist badge of 
honour, such an award is clearly dependent on progress being made in the 
development of his personality, on whether he really is "bom again, into a truer 
vision of reality"4. I shall return to this key point later. In the meantime, it should 
be asked whether humanism, as critics of this persuasion would understand it, is at 
all possible in the world that is presented to the reader of The Victim. Bellow, in an 
essay, has made reference to Kipling's 'decent self':-
This is no longer the sovereign self of the Romantics, but the decent self of Kipling 
whose great satisfaction it is to recognise the existence of a great number of others. 
These numerous others reduce personal significance, and both realism and dignity 
require us to accept this reduction.5
Yet in the often harsh, randomly violent, ferociously compressed environment of 
this novel, wherein millions of congested selves urgently crowd against one another, 
there is little satisfaction to be derived from such a recognition of others - quite the 
opposite -there are so many souls that it becomes a horror to each individual 
confronted by this knowledge. Consequently, each attempts to turn inwards , and in 
Leventhal's case his own lack of self-knowledge causes a 'dangling' state. This 
phenomenon, I think, accounts for the nature of human relationships in The Victim - 
paltry, threadbare and superficial. Neither Elena nor Max, for instance, know the 
name of Leventhal's wife. Leventhal himself has not seen his brother for years. 
Schlossberg, after declaiming for the benefit of Leventhal amongst others (though 
particularly, one suspects, for his own benefit) fails to remember who the latter is on 
their second meeting. And there is a distinctly chilly air to the relations between 
Leventhal and his supposed 'best friend', Harkavy. It seems clear that in this world, 
"common human needs" are, at best, deep-hidden. This is why so much emphasis is 
placed, particularly by humanist critics, on the microcosmical relationship of
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Leventhal to Allbee, on whether the former can move "toward a submergence of 
individuality in a transpersonal anonymous self'6.
Before I address the issues raised in the foregoing passages, I would like to 
devote particular attention to Schlossberg's 'philosophy of the human'. One critic 
has called it "perhaps the central speech of Bellow's fiction"7. There has been an 
overwhelming tendency, if not indeed unanimous agreement, to view Schlossberg as 
the authoritative Bellow mouthpiece. Witness these representative excerpts from 
the old man's address:-
I'll tell you. It's bad to be less than human and it's bad to be more than human. 
What's more than human? [...] We only know what it is to die because some people 
die and, if we make ourselves different from them, maybe we don't have to? Less 
than human is the other side of it [...] This girl Livia in 'The Tigress' [...] She 
commits a murder. What are her feelings? No love, no hate, no fear, no lungs, no 
heart [...] Nothing. You see right away she has no idea what is human because her 
husband's death doesn't mean to her a thing.[l 19]
and:-
More than human, can you have any use for life? Less than human, you don't either 
[...] Have dignity, you understand me? Choose dignity. Nobody knows enough to 
turn it down. [119-120]
Moreover: -
There's a limit to me. But I have to be myself in full. Which is somebody who dies, 
isn't it? [...] I was bom once and I will die once. You want to be two people? More 
than human? Maybe it's because you don't know how to be one. [229]
All well and good. But these passages must not be swallowed whole; for as is his 
wont, Bellow wields a double-edged sword, half serious and half ironic. We are 
told, for instance, that Schlossberg still financially supports his thirty five year-old
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son. How much 'dignity' is involved in this arrangement for either party is unclear. 
Can Schlossberg's son 'be himself in full'? Moreover, Shifcart, the theatrical agent, 
tosses his card to Schlossberg at the end of the latter's oration in almost sardonic 
fashion (Harkavy echoes the sense of theatricality with his cry of "Bravo!"). 
Schlossberg might be viewed as a dignified representative of the 'exactly human' - or 
he might just as well be viewed as a jaded Vaudevillian continually hawking his 
own pompous and hammy self-importance (on the two occasions that the reader 
encounters Schlossberg, he is extolling precisely the same theme). As for his 
philosophy itself, Keith Opdahl and John Clayton respectively speak of "the serenity 
that Schlossberg finds in acceptance of our limited humanity",8 and of "this beauty 
and dignity [which] can be realised only by admitting that you are merely human."9 
I find it difficult to draw the same conclusions. The problem is that Schlossberg's 
philosophy is one of submission, accommodation and, ultimately, stagnation. At 
first sight it may appear that the old man's attack corresponds with the 'middle 
ground' of the typical Bellow hero - but this is not so. This area for the Bellow hero 
is violently changeable and deeply ambiguous - an area of perennial uncertainty. 
For Schlossberg, on the other hand, this is an area of stationary certitude - the realm 
of the 'exactly human'. And, indeed, his stance smacks of smugness and bombastic 
self-congratulation: his 'moderation' equates with a sleepy mediocrity. In essence, 
Schlossberg is in possession of the "virtue that makes small".10 That Schlossberg's 
philosophy is a recipe for decay there can be little doubt, especially if we examine a 
comment of Fernando Molina, cited by Clayton in support of a positive view of 
Schlossberg's theory:-
Only the awareness of one's finitude extricates the person from the endless whirl of 
pleasing himself, taking things lightly and shirking tasks that fill much of everyday 
living.
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Clayton himself goes on to say that "Confrontation of death results in living as an T, 
a particular subject, instead of living as a 'they'; and it results in acknowledging 
yourself as a member of humanity"11 Yet surely it would be correct to point out that 
the opposite could be the case - it is the awareness of death that causes one to 
become sensualist, feckless and indolent. One has only to think of the Decadents, 
best represented in literary form by Des Esseintes in Huysmans' Against Nature - it 
is their sense of the futility of existence and their boredom with the 'exactly human' 
which precipitates their degeneration. There is a similar lack of room for any doubt 
that Bellow is unaware of the limitations of Schlossberg's view - for, as is usual with 
the author, the character of Schlossberg represents a view - not the view. One need 
only look back to Bellow's comment on The Brothers Karamazov, cited in this 
introduction, with regard to 'opposites ranging themselves against each other'. For 
Ivan in this case read Allbee, for Father Zossima read Schlossberg. Compared with 
the uncompromising denunciations of Allbee, Schlossberg's speech can seem vague 
and hokey. Of course, as has been mentioned, Allbee's philosophy is full of holes as 
well, but the point is that Schlossberg's utterances should not be regarded as a 
Bellovian tablet of stone. Incidentally, might we not be justified in pointing out the 
possibility th a t, far from being "not even human"[245], the drained and devitalised 
Allbee whom we encounter at the novel's conclusion, the Allbee who has now 
accepted his limitations - is he not now, in Schlossberg's terms - 'exactly human'?
To return, then, to the crucial question of whether Leventhal's involvement with 
Allbee has proved to be a catalyst which allows the former access to a reconstituted 
perspective both on himself and on the rest of humanity. As was mentioned earlier, 
the reader has to remain sceptical in this regard. For Leventhal to be seen to have 
changed, he must perforce display not only new characteristics in his own make-up, 
but also must provide an effective contrast with the ever-deteriorating Allbee
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(although Allbee avers that he is "enjoying life"[264] at the novel's close, there can 
be no doubt that he is an enervated and withered wreck - he manifests "the decay of 
something that had gone into his appearance of well-being, something 
intimate"[262]). And yet Leventhal and Allbee seem all too similar at the 
culmination of events. Indeed, it is the affinities which exist between the two which 
are stressed throughout The Victim. There are the "duplicate looks" [143] shared by 
the two men. There is the guilt that plays havoc with the emotions o f both - Allbee 
with regard to his dead wife, Leventhal with regard to almost everything! There are 
the conspiracy theories to which both are 'victim': Allbee detects the existence of a 
Jewish cabal, Leventhal convinces himself that there is a guild of newspapermen. 
And there is the bizarre linkage between the two in Allbee's suicide (or murder) 
attempt. In the final meeting of the duo, Leventhal is conscious of a notion that life 
is "a shuffle, all, all accidental and haphazard" [256] whilst Allbee feebly confesses 
that "The world wasn't made exactly for me"[264], But there is, nevertheless, a 
decisive aspect in which they differ. For while Allbee resigns himself to the role of 
'passenger' in life, tamely accepting his part as an inconsequential cog subject to the 
caprices o f Fate (in many ways mirroring the situation of Myron Adler in Dangling 
Man who had "learned [...] to prize convenience [...] to be accommodating", with all 
the "terrible ramifications" that this lesson implies12), Leventhal at least knows 
enough to say that ultimately his notion of submission to a random chaos "was 
wrong" [257], Yet, on the other side of the coin, what Leventhal had seemed to learn 
during the course of the novel appears, by its denouement, to have passed him by - 
or, more accurately, he has apparently failed fully to apprehend the meaning of that 
tentative knowledge which events had given him, and which might have led him to 
change. Leventhal's clumsy steps towards a kind o f fraternity with Max and Phil 
(and on a more general level with Fay, Villani, Mr.Nunez - and Allbee); his 
grudging awarenes of the deficiencies of his own character; his stumbling
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consciousness of his (and others') responsibility to everyone else; his vision of 
piercing lucidity wherein he sees that "everything, everything without exception, 
took place as if  within a single soul or person"[l5l]; these revelations seem transient 
and ephemeral, belonging to an unattainable realm of perfection. Leventhal admits 
as much: "...tomorrow this would be untenable. I won't be able to hold onto it [...] 
Something would prevent it"[l5l]. In essence Leventhal is changeable - but not 
changed. His final, plaintive, unanswered question to Allbee -"Wait a minute, 
what's your idea of who runs things?"[264]- epitomises the confusion and 
indetermination at the core of his being. For the truth is that a man like Leventhal 
finds his natural home in a life of contradiction and irresolution. Whereas the likes 
of Allbee and Schlossberg achieve a large measure of certainty ( but at what cost?), 
it is no exaggeration to say that Leventhal is sustained by his inconclusive responses 
and uncertain comprehension. Even the 'ultimate refuge' for this soul in turmoil - 
"God will help me out" [205] - seems to offer no shelter in the light o f Leventhal's last 
floundering enquiry - though it does offer a hint to the direction that many of the 
subsequent Bellow heroes will attempt to take.
Squeezed between the polarised notions of, on the one hand, the almost mystical 
knowledge required to gain access to the harmonious vision of the 'decent self and, 
on the other, the fear of being swamped in a hyper-Malthusian nightmare, 
Leventhal's "indifferent intelligence" [16] seems so because of his equivocal reactions 
both to the world and his self. His life will continue in the unstable middle-ground, 
the Bellovian realm which admits of both wonderment and dread.
Michael Glenday makes an ingenious, but contrived bid at a reversal of roles in 
the reading of the novel. In this interpretation, it is Leventhal "who succumbs to that 
reality (the dominant reality of American life), who capitulates to its management"
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and ends in a state of "slavery and darkness [...] a pathetic rather than a detestable 
figure".13 There is, in fact, no better way of describing Allbee - Leventhal dangles, 
Allbee capitulates. Moreover, Allbee, in Glenday's opinion, has access to a "more 
profound and authoritative vision [...] which makes his point of view capable of 
carrying the weight o f Bellow's own" and "is given status as one of penetrating and 
true vision".14 This is surely not the case for, as was mentioned earlier, there is no 
such thing as the unimpeachable Bellow view in any o f the novels - Allbee 
represents a view, embodies one sort of vision (incidentally, without wishing to 
labour the point, I would aver that my earlier comments about the predisposition of  
the critic are reinforced by Glenday's view and, indeed, by the previously quoted 
view of Clayton). Most astonishing, though, is the attempt to set Allbee up as a 
purveyor of a "bold triumphalist declaration of human potential and freedom"15. 
This is done on the basis o f Allbee's claim that he can repent and "become a new 
man" [204], Yet clearly he does nothing of the sort - the only difference in his 
philosophy at the novel's close is that it is an insipid and exhausted variation on the 
same theme of bitter and elemental nihilism. Additionally, Allbee's assertion that "I 
know I have a fallen nature. I never pretended to be anything I wasn't"[244], debars 
him from any serious consideration, for this is exactly what he has done, in his 
earlier protestations that he was an aristocrat and a man of honour[l25-l26]. Should 
any doubts about Allbee persist, they will be dispelled by his entanglement with the 
prostitute, following as it does his tearful reminiscences about his beloved wife. 
Essentially Allbee remains an actor and a hypocrite and were it not for his mordant 
sense of humour and bouts of pitiable self-indulgence, we might be tempted to say 
that he proves the exception to the rule about Bellow's 'worst men' possessing 
redeeming qualities.
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What emerges most forcefully from The Victim is the difficulty of establishing 
sincere, meaningful and deep relations between human beings in a stifling, 
oppressive and often forbidding world. Bellow, it seems, felt this too:
I think that when I wrote these early books (Dangling Man and The Victim) I was 
timid [...] In short, I was afraid to let myself go.16
We know, furthermore, that no less than one hundred thousand words of what 
appears to have been a similarly overcast novel were discarded after publication of 
The Victim.11 A clean break with the past looked to have been made. From the 
reticent and sullen Leventhal, Bellow moved on to the gregarious and interactive 
Augie. No one, it seemed, could be more dissimilar to Joseph and Asa - and yet...
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Chapter Three
The Adventures o f Augie March - A Nothing Self.
"And what was the most impractical of choices in sombre, heavy, growling, low­
brow Chicago? Why it was to be the representative of beauty, the interpreter of the 
human heart, the hero of ingenuity, playfulness, personal freedom, generosity and 
love."
Saul Bellow.
"Love - the folly of thinking much of another before one knows anything of oneself."
Ambrose Bierce,
The Enlarged Devil's Dictionary.
Some things remain altogether mystifying. Like, for instance, Bellow's repeatedly 
expressed retrospective misgivings about "the book that made his literary 
reputation".1 On a personal note he felt that he had compromised himself:-
I had just increased my freedom, and like any emancipated plebeian I abused it at 
once.2
I really knew much more about darkness than I let on...I had no excuse for being 
such an ingenu. I felt like doing the ingenu that's all.3
And, in addition to such self-censure, Bellow went on to criticise his main 
character:-
There is a kind of light-hearted equality about the book which is - well, inaccurate. 
It's not really the way it was; it's just the way Augie wanted it to be.4
Such a blue-eyed ingenu and leads such a charmed life. Too much the Sherwood 
Anderson sort of thing: 'Gee whiz, what wonderful people, what a mysterious 
world!' All wrong!5
What is baffling about such statements is that there seems to be little or no 
justification for making them. Taken at face value, the author's comments would 
seem to preclude the kind of interpretation being pursued in this study, namely that
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of the co-existence of sanctioning and debunking in narrative technique which 
results in the perennial 'dangling' condition of the central characters. For clearly, if 
Bellow believes that his representation has erred too greatly on the side of an 
innocent and transparent optimism, an analysis of this sort is doomed to founder. 
Augie himself tells us early on in the novel that he is "too larky and boisterous"6 for 
the cares of the world, and is berated by the hawkish Grandma Lausch for assuming 
that he can "get by with laughing and eating peach pie" [29], Yet it soon becomes 
abundantly clear that alongside Augie's supposed unworldliness there trundles an 
extensive irony - and it is an irony which, for one of the few occasions in the entirety 
of Bellow's writing, often becomes so laborious and ungainly as to grate on the 
endurance of the reader. Moreover, this insight is not the preserve of "a few 
discerning critics"7 The contradictory nature of the eponymous hero is apparent to 
most (Indeed, a critique which takes account of Bellow's ostensible repudiation of 
the ingenuousness of the novel, then claims that "the book ought to be seen as 
Bellow's subtle modification of the picaresque mode so that it can express the 
inauthentic nature of reality in modem times"8 would seem to be even more 
confused than the character of Augie!). Robert Penn Warren, for instance, in a 
contemporary review of the novel, notes that "There is a deep and undercutting 
irony in the wisdom and hope, and a sadness even in Augie's high-heartedness".9 
And John Clayton is "suspicious of Augie's ingenuousness and larkiness and ability 
to slip through".10 Thus the peculiarity of Bellow's harsh comments. Perhaps he 
was indulging his fitful penchant to 'act the goat' with interviewers. More 
significantly it behoves the reader to draw a careful line between Bellow the artist 
and Bellow the interviewee. For while the author's ironic subtlety may well have 
been attenuated, his artistic integrity has not failed him. Bellow's novels are 
inevitably more complex and ambiguous than many of his personal 
pronouncements. Augie is just as much a 'dangler' as Joseph or Leventhal or,
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indeed, any other Bellovian hero. Still, one should not pretend that Bellow's 
comments on The Adventures o f  Augie March can easily be explained away - they 
cannot. All one can do is show how misplaced they are.
Bellow is critical o f his portrayal of Augie as an ingenu. Yet in the very first 
paragraph of the novel Augie states that he is "first to knock, first admitted; 
sometimes an innocent knock, sometimes a not so innocent" [3], So while he can 
claim, apropos o f the story of how a young Abe Lincoln battled through a howling 
gale for four miles to refund three cents to a customer, that "those four miles 
wouldn't have been a hindrance if the right feelings were kindled"[23], he can admit 
in the very same breath that, I could put my heart into a counterfeit too, just as 
easily"[23]. And how true this is - Augie's life is replete with 'counterfeit' activities. 
From his earliest days when, under the tutelage o f Grandma Lausch, he lies about 
his circumstances to the people at the dispensary in order to obtain free glasses for 
his mother, through his varied career as a thief (wherein he steals "coal off the cars, 
clothes from the lines, rubber balls from the dime store and pennies off the 
newsstands"[12], is "party to a robbery"[ll2], steals books from libraries and stores to 
sell them on, and is "engaged in a swindle in Deever's neighbourhood department 
store"[43]), to his involvement with the smuggling o f illegal immigrants across the 
border, Augie stores up a considerable encyclopaedia of criminal experience. 
Augie's assertion that "I lacked the true sense of being a criminal"[45] reveals two 
things about him. First, the reader is left to wonder exactly what does constitute this 
"true sense", since at the close of the novel Augie is again involved in shady 
dealings, this time operating on the black market in post-war Europe. Second, 
however, the reader can recognise an element o f truth in what Augie says. For every 
illegitimate action that Augie performs is as a result o f his being imposed upon by 
"one of those Machiavellis o f small street and neighbourhood"^] which populate his
30
existence and draw him into their schemes - whether it be Grandma Lausch, Stashu 
Kopecs, Joe Gorman, Manny Padilla or Jimmy Klein (paradoxically Augie does not 
actually commit any crime at the behest of swindler-in-chief William Einhom). 
Augie even lazily dumps Sylvester's bills down the sewer to remove the bother o f  
having to distribute them - because everybody else does it. And, o f course, Augie's 
participation in the hidden economy is conducted at the request o f Mintouchian, the 
latest in the long line of dominant influences over Augie. So perhaps Augie may be 
justified in his claim that the "true sense" of criminality is absent in his make-up; his 
actions instead being the result of his malleability in the hands of such manipulative 
personalities. It is just this malleability, however, which illuminates the 
fundamental contradictions of Augie's world.
Tony Tanner observes that "for all the bravado and independence o f his tone, 
Augie in fact is a very passive character, amenable to suggestions and offers, pliant, 
with apparently little momentum of his own."11 Augie himself owns up>
All the influences were lined up waiting for me. I was bom and there they were to 
form me, which is why I tell you more of them than of myself . [43]
and:-
People have been adoptive toward me, as if I were really an orphan. [103] 
and again:-
But first of all there was something adoptional about me [...] something about me 
suggested adoption. And then there were some people who were especially 
adoption-minded. [151]
Nevertheless, when Einhom tells Augie that the latter has "opposition" in him, 
Augie feels entitled to boast:-
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This was the first time that anyone had told me anything like the truth about 
myself. I felt it powerfully. That, as he said, I did have opposition in me, and great 
desire to offer resistance and to say "No!" which was as clear as could be, as definite 
a feeling as a pang of hunger. [117]
Moreover: -
No, I didn't want to be what he called determined. I never had accepted 
determination and wouldn't become what other people wanted to make of me.[i 17]
And although Augie notes that "Einhom had seen this in me. Because he too 
wanted to exert influence"[l 18], Marcus Klein's comment that Augie "[...Jeludes. He 
is not to be caught by the shaping influences. He won't be determined"12 has a 
certain validity. But what is the true nature of this conformity/opposition dialectic? 
That the vagaries of external stimuli have a disproportionate effect on Augie is 
indubitable. Yet his susceptibility to such outside forces seems to depend less on 
their potency than on his own paucity of character. The paradox is that while the 
forces of external experience should act as catalysts for Augie to attempt self- 
discovery, he instead uses them to slough off any notion of autonomy, loses himself 
in others and tries to dodge a concept of responsibility for his self and his actions. 
For if anything should go awry (and things invariably do), Augie can always blame 
the insane designs of the Machiavellis rather than confront his own situation. It 
might be thought that such a view is harsh on Augie, because of course he ultimately 
does always disengage himself from one tangled web after another - yet the very fact 
that he is continually re-engaging himself reinforces the extent to which he is 
dependent on this process for the pattern of his life. Thus it is that in addition to all 
those who had influence on his illegal escapades, he runs through Thea, with her 
plan for the conquest of nature, the grossly materialistic ethos of his brother Simon, 
the 'design for living' of the incongruously seedy millionaire Robey, and (admittedly 
against his will) the psychopathic programme of the crazed 'world-historical
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individual Basteshaw. Yet in fairness to Augie, he belatedly reproaches himself 
with the realisation of what consequences follow from his fluctuating involvements 
- "I couldn't be hurt enough by the fate of other people"[453], His actions damage 
others, as they are prisoners of their dominant idea, whereas Augie, with no fixed 
idea of self, can withdraw with only cuts and bruises. Typically for the Bellow hero, 
though, Augie does not seem to act upon this realisation, as his encounter with the 
old Piedmontese woman whom he tries to fob off shows:-
-People are coming up to me all the time. So why don't you please take this money 
a n d ...
-People! But I am not other people. You should realise that. I am - This is 
happening to me\...
I gave her another hundred lire. [518-19]
So Augie's submission to the multiform dominant influences is quite literally a 
self-defeating act. On the other side of the coin is Augie's "opposition". It is this 
quality which eventually allows Augie to break free of whatever moulding force 
holds sway over him at any given time. Moreover, Augie tells us that his opposition 
has a definite purpose to it, this being first evidenced when he rejects the idea of 
marriage with Friedl Coblin:-
Even at the time I couldn't imagine that I would marry into the Coblin family. [...] 
My mind was already dwelling on a good enough fate. [28]
It resurfaces when he renounces the influence of Mrs. Renling:-
However, I was in a state of removal from all her intentions for me. Why should I
turn into one of these people who didn't know who they themselves were? (!!) And
the unvarnished truth is that it wasn't a fate good enough for me.[l5l]
33
And it appears again in his dealings with Thea:-
I tried to tell her that I had looked all my life for the right thing to do, for a fate 
good enough for me...[318]
and with Simon:-
...Why, sure I'd like to have money too. I didn't say that I had to have a fate good 
enough, and that this came first.[423]
Wasn't it good enough? And to what should you go rather? I wasn't proud of 
myself, believe me, and my stubbomess about a "higher" independent fate.[424]
A noble intention - one shared by Joseph in Dangling Man, who desires a "separate 
destiny" - but an intention which, in Augie's as in Joseph's case, has little prospect of 
being realised. And because Augie's "higher, independent fate" achieves no 
actuality, it is in danger of being viewed in the same light as Joseph's "ideal 
construction" - as an unattainable dream. This being the case, the suspicion grows 
that Augie's "opposition" could be "merely an evasive lack of commitment",13 or 
simply a perverse bloody-mindedness with no clear goal of its own. The closest 
Augie comes to any semblance of a "fate good enough" is in his idea of founding the 
quasi-utopian community wherein he and his family can impart wisdom and 
goodness to deprived children. But as Augie himself later confesses, "my foster 
home and academy dream was [...] one of those featherhead millenarian notions or 
summer butterflies"[516], Augie's fate thus comes to centre on the mystical intuition 
of the "axial lines of life" outlined in a passage which, like Schlossberg's speech in 
The Victim, is often regarded by critics as "official" Bellow:-
'I have a feeling,' I said, 'about the axial lines of life, with respect to which you 
must be straight or else your existence is merely clownery, hiding tragedy [...] When
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striving stops, there they are as a gift [...] Truth, love, peace, bounty, usefulness, 
harmony! And all noise and grates, distortion, chatter, distraction, effort, superfluity 
passed off like something unreal [...]At any time life can come together again and 
man be regenerated [...] the man himself, finite and taped as he is, can still come to 
where the axial lines are. He will be brought into focus. He will live with true joy 
[...] And this is not imaginary stuff, Clem, because I bring my entire life to the 
test'. [454-55]
Bellow, however, makes it quite clear that for Augie the axial lines will remain 
beyond his apprehension.
And since I never have had any place o f rest, it should follow that I have trouble 
being still, and furthermore my hope is based on getting to be still so that the axial 
lines can be found. When striving stops, the truth comes as a gift - bounty, harmony, 
love, and so forth. Maybe I can't take these very things I want. [514]
Incidentally, when juxtaposed with the pronouncements o f the likes o f Robey and 
Basteshaw, there is a hint in Augie's speech o f the rather pitiful Utopianism of the 
two monomaniacs. But the most important point is that Augie cannot grasp the 
desired "higher independent fate" nor can he achieve any lasting understanding 
through the medium of others. A yeamed-for state of grace, a passive 
consciousness, clashes with an ineluctable, yet directionless capacity for physical 
engagement. The result - a 'nothing' self. Negative connotations are not necessarily 
implied by this state of affairs - it simply means that Augie's being is formless, 
protean and forever 'dangling'. Augie's original assertion that "a man's character is 
his fate"[3] proves correct in the sense that his amorphous character means that he 
can never come to a definite "higher independent fate". By the end of the novel, 
Augie realises the mutually dependent nature o f his being and his destiny - "Well, 
then it is obvious that this fate, or what he settles for, is also his character"[514], 
One might be tempted to conclude that Augie has achieved a fair degree o f self- 
knowledge with this realisation, the awareness that the lack of a "good enough fate" 
points up the nebulousness of his essence. Yet he very rapidly undercuts any lasting
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comprehension with the disingenuous declaration that he has embraced a concept of 
"amor fati"[527], For such a notion is totally out o f character for Augie, and the 
reader cannot help but feel that this character will compel Augie to break from his 
current situation (that of his marriage to Stella), and re-engage in further schemes 
down the road, beyond the confines of the novel. But, as was pointed out earlier, 
Augie's 'nothing' self is not necessarily a detrimental or life-denying quality. For 
Augie can see the horror of a "mismanaged effort to live"[533], a botching o f one's 
fate, in the gradual decay of such as Simon and Jimmy, who are in thrall to their 
destinies. Augie, with his intrinsically shapeless character, will not fall victim to 
such slavery.
And so to Augie's travails in love. Bierce's caustic definition used as an epigraph 
for this chapter is particularly appropriate in the light of the above discussion of the 
nature of Augie's self. And it is consistent with his character that the portrayal of 
love should be subjected to a thoroughly rough passage through the medium of his 
adventures. Indeed, it is in this area that Bellow's irony is of that peculiarly unsubtle 
hue which ultimately tends to annoy the reader rather than enrich the novel. For 
there can be little doubt that love is intended to be bracketed under the same 
unfulfillable heading as a "higher independent fate" and the "axial lines". From his 
earlier rejection of Grandma Lausch's sour dogma - "The more you love people the 
more they'll mix you up. A child loves, a person respects. Respect is better than 
love."[9] - Augie spends his time seeking "the right grade of love"[302]. The fact that 
he consistently fails is mostly his own fault. One cannot help but derive the 
impression that Augie's 'love' is ephemeral, shallow and teetering on the brink of 
mendacity. True, Augie, as is his wont, is subject to the schemes of the 
Machiavellis, particularly Thea and Stella, for whom love seems to be a secondary 
consideration. But Augie's responses hardly ennoble him, seeming more like those
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o f the silly child to whom Grandma Lausch alludes. One should not mistake such 
responses as mere ingenuousness on Augie's part, however - for there is at least as 
much self-deception involved. And, of course, it is easy for Augie to accommodate 
such deceit thanks to the formlessness o f his being.
One almost loses count o f the number of occasions where Augie protests that he 
is in 'love'. As a youth he is"sick with love" for Hilda Novinson, claiming that:
Those first times I was in the state o f courtliness, craving pure feeling, and I was 
well stocked, probably by inheritance, in all the materials o f love. [47]
He then falls in love with Esther Fenchel, "down to the poetic threat o f death"[l4l]. 
When Esther's sister Thea informs him that it is she who loves him, Augie at first 
resists, though still allowing himself the luxury of meditating on what could be the 
polymorphous nature of love:-
So for the same desires to meet was a freak occurrence. And to feel them so 
specific, settled on one person, maybe was an unallowable presumption, too pure, 
too special, and a misunderstanding of the real condition o f things.[l46]
Augie later puts this theory into practice, swapping partners with Padilla, "so no 
exclusive feelings would develop"[i9i]. In the midst of his affair with the soon to be 
married Sophie, Thea returns to proclaim her love for Augie. He has no difficulty in 
casting the former aside and instantaneously submitting to "a powerful feeling of 
love"[3l l] for Thea. He has initial doubts about this:-
And then I had a lot o f other notions, such as whether I was in danger of falling in 
love to oblige. Why? Because love was so rare that if  one had it the other should 
capitulate to it? If, for the time, he had nothing more important on? [3 02]
but these are quickly dismissed. Thea, though, for all her faults, pinpoints the truth 
about Augie's love:-
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'You want people to pour love on you and soak it up and swallow it. You can't get 
enough. And when another woman runs after you, you'll go with her. You're so 
happy when somebody begs you to oblige. You can't stand up under flattery!'[317]
Augie is nonplussed by this, claiming that "this jealousy made no sense"[3l7]. But of  
course, with a record like that o f Augie, it makes perfect sense! And Thea is proved 
right when Augie eventually becomes embroiled with Stella (though Thea herself is 
scarcely less culpable due to her involvement with Talavera). Augie makes a feeble 
attempt to excuse his infidelity:-
I suppose if you pass the night with a woman in a deserted mountain place there's 
only one appropriate thing, according to the secret urging of the world. Or not so 
secret [...] I thought that in the crisis that seems to have to occur when a man and a 
woman are thrown together nothing, nothing easy can happen until first one 
difficulty is cleared and it is shown how the man is a man and the woman is a 
woman ...[390]
but he at least has the grace to admit that he "was terribly hot for this woman"[390]. 
Nevertheless, his inconstancy with regard to Thea does seem to provoke shattering 
revelations:-
If I didn't have money or profession or duties, wasn't it so that I could be free, and a 
sincere follower of love? Me, love's servant? I wasn't at all! [401]
My real fault was that I couldn't stay with my purest feelings. [402] 
and>
I wanted simplicity and denied complexity, and in this I was guileful and 
suppressed many patents in my secret heart, and was as devising as anybody 
else. [402]
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While as for me, whoever would give me cover from this mighty free-running 
terror and wild cold of chaos I went to, and therefore to temporary embraces. It 
wasn't very courageous. [403]
But Augie, in keeping with his character, does not take these lessons to heart. On 
his next meeting with Stella he is "humbled in the dust of love, the god Eros holding 
me down with his foot and forcing all kinds of impossible stuff on me"[470], 
Furthermore, Augie can aver that"... I loved her. It was true. I felt I had come to 
the end of my trouble and hankering, and it was conclusive"[474]. Yet we see later 
(in a section o f the novel wherein the irony is particularly blunt) that it is anything 
but conclusive. Mintouchian's view that "love is adultery [...] and expresses 
change"[483], which appears to stem more from his own bitterness over the lack of 
complete trust between him and his wife rather than from any philosophical 
analysis, is reflected right down to the last detail in Stella's confession about 
Cumberland, her apparent 'ex'-lover, even to the point of Stella's conviction (just as 
Mintouchian had outlined) that she had suffered more in guarding the secret than 
Augie has suffered in hearing it. The reader may just have formed the impression by 
now that all is not quite as it should be in the latest March attachment. Indeed, the 
very transitoriness of all o f the "affections" leads one to believe that Augie and 
Stella might not make their golden wedding anniversary.
Further subsidiary examples of the ironic portrayal of love abound. Augie, for 
instance, on no occasion says that he is in love with Lucy Magnus. Yet he does not 
seem to offer much resistance (when does he ever?) to the materialistically-driven 
proposal of Simon that Lucy and Augie be married. Indeed, his indignation and 
outrage at the fact that the discovery of his imbroglio with Mimi has forced the 
cancellation of his proposal suggests that he was only too willing to enter into a 
soulless relationship for the purposes of monetary gain. The marriage of Simon
39
himself provides a chilling insight into a relationship which is at best composed of a 
strained affection and at worst simply a painful toleration based on social and 
material benefit, Simon being by far the more guilty party. In the light of the 
foregoing, it is all the more amazing that when Jimmy relates to Augie the 
circumstances of his miserable and loveless marriage of necessity, Augie should be 
shocked by this cynical view, noting that "this innocence of mine pleased him 
[Jimmy] "[267], For Augie knows all about such marriages! And to round off the list, 
Augie professes to be disgusted at Robey’s "five-marriage education" - yet his "love- 
education" follows a strikingly similar course. It is small wonder that whenever 
Augie tells his friends that he is in "love", they either show a doubting concern or 
manifest a gentle scorn. When Augie addresses the central conundrum of his 
existence - "An independent fate, and love too - what confusion!"[401] -the 
incompatibility of the two in Augie's world is evident. But then Augie does not 
really attain to either - so he ends by having neither. Yet it should not be thought 
that Bellow is attacking the inadequacy of love itself. It must always be emphasised 
that Augie's reduction is nine-tenths comic, and that the novel is anything but a cry 
of despair from the void. And although Augie, as one of Bellow's 'danglers', cannot 
achieve full consummation of his desire for love, nonetheless he refuses to rubbish 
this desire, wholeheartedly concurring with the view of Kayo Obermark that love is 
the great liberator:-
What you are talking about is moha -[...] meaning opposition of the finite. It is the 
Bronx cheer of the conditioning forces. Love is the only answer to moha, being 
infinite. [450]
It is worth noting that, even though such unadulterated love is beyond Augie, it is his 
being itself, his nothing self, which contains the seeds of infinitude, and provides a 
kind of imperfect opposition to the finite.
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In the light of the foregoing analysis, it is impossible to agree with the statements 
of Bellow in interview that there is a blindly afflrmatory quality to the novel. Any 
'humanist' interpretation must be similarly flawed, due not only to the inherently 
ironic portrayal of Augie, which calls into question his suitability for the part, due 
not only to Augie's failure finally to be affected enough by the fate of other human 
beings and his fragile interest in common human needs, but also because, like 
Leventhal, he does not discover anything permanent from his momentary insights 
and flighty understanding. He may be "touched with truth"14, but it is the brushing 
contact of a passing stranger in the street. Augie may be "more larky formerly than 
now"[447] (although right at the close of the novel he says th a t"... I got to grinning 
again. That's the animal ridens in me, the laughing creature forever rising up"[536]), 
but his later statements indicate that his uncertainty of direction is perennial, and 
that his 'fate' constitutes a continuation of his anomalous spinning:-
However, I didn't have the least idea of how to go about it [founding the 
paradisaical foster home]. And of course it was only one of those bubble-headed 
dreams o f people who haven't yet realised what they're like nor what they're intended 
for.[5i5]
Instead I'm in the bondage of strangeness for a time still. It's only temporary. We'll 
get out of it. [523]
The point is that, for Augie at least, escape from "the bondage of strangeness" can 
never be effected, for to do so would be to transport him into the bondage of stasis; 
either as a perpetual prisoner of someone else's design, or in an idealised state of 
sublimity which is contrary to the dynamic of his being. So, in a sense, it is better 
for Augie that he does not learn too well.
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Attempts to prove that, on the other hand, Augie's adventures culminate in a 
despairing retreat into a barricaded gloom are equally ill-founded. For the simple 
fact is that Augie has no formed self in which to seek refuge. The 
conformity/opposition dialectic which actuates Augie, and produces his 'nothing' 
self, means that he straddles the middle-ground between self-fulfilment and fraternal 
absorption. The untenability of a negative conclusion is perhaps highlighted by the 
critical muddle into which it is easy to fall if one chooses to pursue the life-denying 
option. Michael Glenday asserts that Augie "chooses to embrace a stereotypical 
reality and by doing so becomes Bellow's saddest creation"15. Yet before the reader 
has had time to digest this statement, the same author avers that "The Adventures o f  
Augie March is Bellow's capitulation to the forces of unreality"16. Such confusion is 
a direct result of a failure to appreciate fully the dangling formlessness of Augie's 
being - any attempt to pin Augie down initiates these contradictions. In any case, 
for all of Augie's undoubted short-comings, he never loses hope, as is evident in his 
attempts at a reconciliation with Thea:-
Well, now that I knew of this I wanted another chance. I thought I must try to be 
brave again. [403]
Most people are probably in the same condition I'm in. But there must be a way to 
learn to do better [...] How would the hope be there at all otherwise? How would I 
know what to want? [404]
and in his exposition of his philosophy to Tambow:-
Why, it was a crying matter, no fooling, to anyone who might know which side was 
up, that here was I trying to refuse to lead a disappointed life. A hell of a cause of 
sympathetic tears but also, as Clem saw, of haw-haws, as great jokes often are. [432]
It can never be right to offer to die; and if that's what the data of experience tell 
you, then you must get along without them.[436]
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It is, as has been said, an intangible and out-of-reach hope - but its very existence 
shows that Augie, like every other Bellow hero, is not yet ready to throw his hands 
up in the air. Augie's visions of darkness and horror are ultimately as transient as his 
revelatory breakthroughs. And the ending of the novel, typically double-edged, 
juxtaposes the depressing ruins of Dunkirk amidst the cold inhospitable elements 
with the view of Augie, still formless, still dangling, his outlook still containing 
hope in the face of what the reader knows must remain inaccessible desires:-
Look at me, going everywhere! Why, I am a sort of Columbus of those near at 
hand and believe that you can come to them in this immediate terra incognita that 
spreads out in every gaze. I may well be a flop at this line of endeavour. Columbus 
too thought he was a flop, probably when they sent him back in chains. Which 
didn't prove there was no America.[536]
Augie's laugh at the close is at himself - half joyous, half elegaic, expressing the 
essential changeability at the heart of his being. His adventures will continue long 
after the reader has taken his leave of him, with Augie engaging, breaking off, re­
engaging, searching, failing and forever dangling in his attempts to solve life's great 
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Seize the Day - A Destructive Counsel.
"The wretched mouse has by this time accumulated, in addition to the original 
nastiness, so many other nastinesses in the shape of questions and doubts, and so 
many other unresolved problems in addition to the original problem, that it has 
involuntarily collected around itself a fatal morass, a stinking bog, consisting of its 
own doubts and agitation [...]"
Dostoyevsky, Notes from Underground
"The feeling individual appeared weak - he felt nothing but his own weakness. But 
if he accepted his weakness and his separateness and descended into himself 
intensifying his loneliness, he discovered his solidarity with other isolated 
creatures."
Saul Bellow.
"With the publication of Seize the Day," noted Leslie Fiedler, "Saul Bellow has 
become not merely a writer with whom it is possible to come to terms, but one with 
whom it is necessary to come to terms."1 And in the opinion of John J. Clayton, 
"Seize the Day is Bellow's finest novel."2 Indeed, the critical response to Bellow's 
fourth novel has been of near-unanimous approbation. After what some saw as the 
too-sprawling design and "turgid and wooden prose"3 of The Adventures o f Augie 
March, Bellow's return in Seize the Day to a concentration of effect which, if 
anything, is even more compressed and claustrophobic than in both Dangling Man 
and The Victim seems to have been the primary cause of such appreciative 
judgements. The intense and relentlessly focussed portrayal of one day in the 
mismanaged life of the disaster-laden Tommy Wilhelm admits of none of the 
occasional frippery and whimsicality of the previous work. But the sense of 
inexorable fatalism which surrounds and threatens to engulf the blighted hero should 
not obscure the beautifully ambiguous characterisation in Seize the Day. The shuffle 
of the oppressed and browbeaten Wilhelm toward a certain doom, or a glorious 
renaissance, depending on whether an 'anti-humanist' or a 'humanist' position is 
adopted, might, regardless of either position, tend to elicit the reader's sympathetic
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identification with this miserable and crestfallen protagonist. Yet it is impossible to 
agree with the critic who avers that "our sympathy [with Wilhelm] is continual in a 
way that it is not, for instance, with Dostoyevsky's Underground Man."4 In the first 
place, it might fairly be said that our sympathy with the Underground Man is 
continual since, despite the meanness of his character and the wretchedness of his 
existence, he retains an incongruously pitiable feeling for 'all that is best and 
highest'. And although Tommy Wilhelm most definitely possesses such a feeling 
also, the reader does not gain the impression that this sentiment constitutes an 
ineradicable necessity for survival in the way that it does for the Underground Man. 
In the second place, our sympathy with Wilhelm is anything but continual. For 
although we can partly empathise with this woebegone booby, New York's very own 
Holy Fool, Bellow maintains an ironic distance to an extent that it is quite palpable 
how far Wilhelm is responsible for his plight. Moreover, the critical dispute over 
the conclusion of the novel, already perhaps the most controversial in the Bellow 
corpus, is further inflamed by this duality in Wilhelm's nature: part-victim, 
part(self)oppressor. It follows that the untenability of any attempt to systemize and 
resolve Wilhelm's situation by cleaving to a stance of affirmation, or denial, is also 
implicit. Whether the condensed form of Seize the Day is artistically more 
satisfying than the free-flowing and dispersive style of The Adventures o f Augie 
March is a matter for debate. What can be established without any doubt is Tommy 
Wilhelm's close kinship not only to Augie but also to Joseph and Leventhal.
The details of Tommy's life constitute a litany of "so much bad luck, weariness, 
weakness and failure."5 His earliest attempts to break into the acting profession 
have fizzled out - the theatrical agent who meets Tommy having the ironical 
prescience, even at that early stage of Wilhelm's life, to cast the latter as the 'loser' 
type, as the guy who fails the get the girl. For although Tommy in real life does get
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the girl, his marriage ultimately collapses. Now, in middle-age, he is unemployed, 
having resigned from his job with a sales firm dealing in children's toys, after being 
virtually supplanted by a relative o f the boss. And during the course of the day in 
which we encounter him, we see the extent o f his emotional estrangement from his 
ex-wife, the emotional and financial estrangement from his aged father, and the 
wipe-out of his finances as he "haemorrhaged money"[40], swindled by Dr. Tamkin. 
It is certainly true that to some degree Tommy is a punchbag, a sucker, an innocent 
in a world full of predatory and hostile sharks. Yet he, like Leventhal, is by no 
means the simple 'victim' of a malign conspiracy of fate. For Tommy seems to court 
doom and destruction with a perverse relish. It is, after all, he who resigns from his 
job in a fit o f pique. It is he who ditches his wife and children. And it is he who is 
drawn with a baleful fatality to charlatans like the impresario Maurice Venice, who 
turns out to be a pimp, and to Dr. Tamkin, whose doctorate, it seems, has been 
awarded him for services to deceit. In these circumstances, Dr. Adler's weary 
resentment of his son becomes a little more understandable.
The ambiguous nature o f Tommy Wilhelm is hinted at in the very first paragraph 
of the novel:-
When it came to concealing his troubles, Tommy Wilhelm was not less capable 
than the next fellow. So at least he thought, and there was a certain amount of 
evidence to back him up. He had once been an actor - no, not quite an actor, an 
extra - and he knew what acting should be. Also, he was smoking a cigar, and when 
a man is smoking a cigar, wearing a hat, he has an advantage; it is harder to find out 
how he feels. [3]
But Tommy's attempt to hide his real self with a bland mask fails:-
...the cigar was smoked out and the hat did not defend him. He was wrong to 
suppose that he was more capable than the next fellow when it came to concealing 
his troubles. They were clearly written out upon his face. He wasn't even aware of 
it [14]
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The reader, however, is still unsure that this failure to maintain a cover allows better 
access to a glimpse of Tommy's true self. For 'Tommy Wilhelm' is himself a false 
construct - this being the name which Wilhelm 'Wilky' Adler adopted in order to 
boost his prospects as an actor. Wilhelm claims that he can freely admit that his 
changed name was a mistake - but nevertheless bitterly reproaches his father for 
"continually remind[ing] him how he had sinned" [25], And though Tommy believes 
that "Wilky was his inescapable self'[25], it is significant that 'Wilhelm' translates 
into 'Wilky' only in moments of drunken self-torture: "You fool, you clunk, you 
Wilky!"[25], Like Augie, Tommy's self is difficult to pin down - he dangles and 
oscillates between the despised original self o f 'Wilky' and the self of unfulfilled 
potential, 'Wilhelm'.
It may be wondered why Tommy is so anxious to conceal his feelings in the first 
place. It is because he has come to believe that his over-emotional nature is 
responsible for his misfortunes:-
From his mother he had gotten sensitive feelings, a soft heart, a brooding nature, a 
tendency to be confused under pressure. [25]
And as he reflects on his resignation from work:-
Feeling got me in dutch at Rojax. I had the feeling that I belonged to the firm and 
my feelings were hurt when they put Gerber in over me. Dad thinks I'm too 
simple[56].
In the world of Rojaxes, Tamkins and Adlers, Tommy may well be right to say that 
emotions are a liability, although, as we shall presently discover, he remains 
oblivious to the fact that it is only through his emotions that he can actuate the 
transcendent moment and find brief refuge from such an antagonistic reality. But 
the immediate point to be made is that Wilhelm's sensitivities are not always
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extended to those around him. He, this "fair-haired hippopotamus" [6], affronts the 
other guests - particularly his father - with his slobbish and slovenly behaviour at the 
hotel where he lives:-
A faint grime was left by his fingers on the white of the egg after he had picked 
away the shell. Dr. Adler saw it with silent repugnance. What a Wilky he had given 
to the world! Why, he didn't even wash his hands in the morning [...] The doctor 
couldn't bear Wilky's dirty habits. Only once[...] had he visited his room [...] 
Wilhelm lived in worse filth than a savage. [36-37]
And although it is claimed that Wilhelm "was not really so slovenly as his father 
found him to be" [42], his 'finely outlined mouth' and 'gradually incurved nose', which 
apparently bespeak a measure of dignity, go virtually unnoticed amid the welter of 
grossness enveloping Wilhelm. Additionally, Wilhelm seems to rile his father quite 
deliberately on two occasions: once, when he waits until he is seated at the breakfast 
table with his father before taking his 'vitamin pills', in the full knowledge that the 
older man is appalled by this dependency. And again, when even though he 
recognises that "his father, with some justice, wanted to be left in peace"[43], he 
nevertheless collars him to plead for a miraculous paternal solution to his manifold 
problems. And when he is introduced to Mr. Peris, Wilhelm's gut reaction 
highlights the fact that he is not the forlorn angel we might suppose:-
'How d' do,' Wilhelm said. He did not welcome this stranger; he began at once to 
find fault with him [...] 'Who is this damn frazzle-faced herring with his dyed hair 
and his fish teeth and this drippy mustache? [...] How can a human face get into this 
condition. Uch!'[3l]
The equivocal characterisation continues with regard to Tommy's relations with 
money, with the material world of the Adlers and Tamkins. Ostensibly appalled by 
the grubbiness o f this world, Tommy fulminates:-
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Uch! How they love money [...] .They adore money! Holy money! Beautiful 
money! It was getting so that people were feeble-minded about everything except 
money. While if you didn't have it you were a dummy, a dummy! You had to 
excuse yourself from the face of the earth. Chicken! that's what it was. The world's 
business. If only he could find a way out of it. [36]
Yet, far from seeking an exit route from "the world's business", there is a disturbing 
suspicion that Tommy's real desire is to gain entry into it. There is a strong sense 
that Tommy believes that money can solve all his problems. In his febrile longing to 
make a killing on the stock market, Wilhelm wilfully relegates to the background all 
of his crowding doubts about Tamkin's sincerity:-
But oh! If I could only work out a little steady income from this. Not much. I 
don't ask much. But how badly I need -! I'd be so grateful if you'd show me how to 
work it. [10]
Moreover, when, in response to one of his son's frequently supplications about 
money, Dr. Adler tells Wilhelm to "carry nobody on his back", Tommy explodes:-
... you hate me. And if I had money you wouldn't. By God, you have to admit it. 
The money makes the difference. Then we would be a fine father and son [...] Just 
keep your money [...] Keep it and enjoy it yourself. That's the ticket![55]
It may be argued that Tommy is here merely articulating his frustration at the savage 
materialism of those around him. True enough, as Dr. Adler invariably interprets 
his son's cries as being solely of a financial nature. But Tommy should realise, 
better than anyone, that, for all his wealth, Dr. Adler is unable to enjoy his money, 
thanks to his obsessive and neurotic fear of death (and his equally obsessive and 
neurotic fear that someone will relieve him of his funds). The possession of money 
in itself solves nothing - and it certainly would do nothing for Wilhelm. In any case, 
Tommy is not quite so adept at articulating himself when charged by his father that 
his economic bondage to his ex-wife is entirely his own fault: Wilhelm "could not 
speak for a while, dumb and incompetent, he struggled for breath and frowned with
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effort into his father's face" [49], (This scene, incidentally, is paralleled almost 
exactly in Wilhelm's response of stuttering inconsequentiality to the question of why 
he had to leave his wife). And, in a typically playful moment, Bellow shows us that 
Wilhelm's supposed unworldliness does not extend to his nous in dating his cheque 
one day ahead of Tamkin's in their joint funding effort for the stock market 
operation.
There is evidence to suggest that Tommy, like the Underground Man, actually 
thrives on failure and suffering, revels in the awareness of his own humiliation (and, 
in truth, there seems to be little room for debate about where this idea comes from). 
This is not only implied in his actions - he pays his ex-wife amounts of alimony 
which no court would have awarded her, and has a propensity finally to plump for a 
course of action he has rejected innumerable times before, particularly with regard 
to Tamkin, as when, "from the moment [...] he tasted the peculiar flavour of fatality 
in Dr. Tamkin, he could no longer keep back the money" [58], This tendency is also 
explicit in his thought processes:-
From a deeper source, however, came other promptings. If he didn't keep his 
troubles before him he risked losing them altogether, and he knew by experience 
that this was worse. [43]
and>
Once a guy starts to slip, he figures he might as well be a clunk. A real big clunk. 
He even takes pride in it. [47]
Wilhelm is oblivious to the advice of both Adler and Tamkin not to "marry 
suffering" - evidently because he is so suited to the role of the groom. It is difficult 
to maintain a view of Wilhelm as a sympathetically artless dope when he wallows in 
disappointments like this.
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Wilhelm's most damaging deceptions are perpetrated upon himself. Most 
important, and most tragic of all (and it is a feature which, to the best of my 
knowledge, has gone undetected by critics of the novel) is Tommy's failure to realise 
that it is the whole 'seize the day' ethos which is the cause of his trouble. This 
philosophy is articulated by Tamkin:-
The spiritual compensation is what I look for. Bringing people into the here-and- 
now. The real universe. That's the present moment. The past is no good to us. The 
future is full of anxiety. Only the present is real - the here-and-now. Seize the 
Day. [66]
Wilhelm comments that "I like what you say about here-and-now"[66], And Sarah 
Blacher Cohen advises that "The fact remains that Tamkin's advice is essentially 
correct. Wilhelm must seize the day."6 But this is precisely what he should not do - 
For he has suffered from doing so all of his life. From his earliest days Wilhelm 
"had been eager for life to start"[23]. It is this impatience that precipitates his 
headlong rush into failed marriages, pointless careers and stupid schemes. It is this 
philosophy, the philosophy that, as his ex-wife points out to him, "every other day 
you want to make a new start"[l 12], which plunges him into chaos and futility (what 
better example is there than that of Tamkin's here-and-now plan for playing the 
markets - a plan which bleeds Wilhelm dry?). And it is the frenetic madness and 
agitation of the here-and-now view which can only be countered, as was touched 
upon earlier, by transcendence actuated by memory and emotion. The visionary 
breakthroughs which sporadically invade Tommy's consciousness oppose and 
overturn 'seize the day', and act as oases where Tommy finds peace and 
contentment. Wilhelm shows that he is a "visionary sort of animal"[39] on 
numerous occasions - but his visions, as for every other Bellow hero, are fleeting 
and elusive:-
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The spirit, the peculiar burden of his existence lay upon him like an accretion, a 
load, a hump. In any moment of quiet, when sheer fatigue prevented him from 
struggling, he was apt to feel this mysterious weight, this growth or collection of 
nameless things which it was the business of his life to carry about. That must be 
what a man was for [...] Who has to believe that he can know why he exists. 
Though he has never seriously tried to find out why. [38-39]
In his epiphanies, he recalls he tranquillity of his soul at moments during his past 
life:-
When he was with the Rojax corporation Wilhelm had kept a small apartment in 
Roxbury [...] and on mornings of leisure, in late spring weather like this, he used to 
sit expanded in a wicker chair with the sunlight pouring through the weave, and 
sunlight through the slug-eaten holes of the young hollyhocks and as deeply as the 
grass allowed into small flowers. This peace (he forgot that that time had its 
troubles, too), this peace had gone.[42-43]
For several moments of peace he was removed to his small yard at Roxbury.
He breathed in the sugar of the pure morning.
He heard the long phrases of the birds.
No enemy wanted his life. [82]
And is prompted into a powerful but transient love for his ex-wife>
Twenty years ago, in a neat blue wool suit, in a soft hat made of the same cloth - he 
could plainly see her. He stooped his yellow head and looked under the hat at her 
clear, simple face, her living eyes moving, her straight small nose, her jaw 
beautifully, painfully clear in its form. It was a cool day but he smelled the odour of 
pines in the sun, in the granite canyon. Just south of Santa Barbara, this was. [95]
his father:-
'You love your old man?'
Wilhelm grasped at this. 'Of course, of course I love him' [...] As he said this there 
was a great pull at the very center of his soul [...] Wilhelm never identified what 
struck within him. It did not reveal itself. It got away. [92-93]
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and his fellow creatures:-
...all of a sudden, unsought, a general love for all these imperfect and lurid-loking 
people burst out in Wilhelm's breast. He loved them. One and all, he passionately 
loved them [...] On that very same afternoon he didn't hold so high an opinion of this 
on-rush of loving kindness [...] It was only another one of those subway things. 
Like having a hard-on at random. [84-85]
In sum, these visions produce in Wilhelm a feeling of sweet distress:-
The name of a soul, however, must be only that - soul. What did it look like? 
Does my soul look like me? [...] Where does the true soul get its strength? Why 
does it have to love truth? Wilhelm was tormented, but tried to be oblivious to his 
torment. [72]
It is worth quoting these passages at some length in order to emphasise what 
Wilhelm is capable of. Such interludes of refulgent beauty immeasurably enhance 
his status, particularly if one is seeking to place Wilhelm within a humanist 
perspective. But it is Wilhelm's fate that he should be forever turning "from these 
wide considerations to the problems of the moment"[99] - and thus it is that he is 
undone. Even old Mr. Rappaport, who seizes the day every day on the stock market, 
nevertheless clings to the 'wider consideration' of his memories of his encounter 
with Teddy Roosevelt, allowing him to escape the here-and-now. And yet, as 
always in Bellow's fiction, nothing is as cut-and-dried as it may seem. For 
Wilhelm's visions, for all their radiant glory, are a recipe for passivity and 
stagnation, an opting out of reality, and just as restrictive and binding as resignation 
to the turmoil of the here-and-now. The very existence of these sublime moments 
shows that Wilhelm is not utterly resigned to the maelstrom of the present - yet their 
brief nature means that he must involve himself in a turbulent actuality. Tommy, 
like Joseph, Leventhal and Augie, finds himself in the middle - a dangling man.
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Perhaps the most important aspect of Seize the Day, and certainly the one which 
tends to make the the greatest impression on the reader, is, as in The Victim, the lack 
of empathy and communication between people. Contact is perfunctory and 
shallow, intimacy non-existent. Tommy's view is that "I am an idiot. I have no 
reserve [...] I talk. I must ask for it. Everybody wants to have intimate 
conversations, but the smart fellows don't give out, only the fools"[38], In this world 
where everyone attempts to conceal their troubles, there is emotional blockage: a 
wall is erected by Dr. Adler so that "His own son, his one and only son, could not 
speak his mind or ease his heart to him"[io] - Wilhelm's desperate pleas for help fall 
upon deaf ears - and the frosty relations between Wilhelm and his ex-wife simply 
engender more confusion and suffering. Moreover, there is also a blockage on 
simple understanding in the modern-day Babel of New York:-
And was everybody crazy here? What sort of people did you see? Every other man 
spoke a language entirely his own, which he had figured out by private thinking; he 
had his own ideas and peculiar ways [...] You had to translate and translate, explain 
and explain, back and forth, and it was the punishment o f hell itself not to 
understand or be understood, not to know the crazy from the sane, the wise from the 
fools, the young from the old or the sick from the well [...] You had to talk with 
yourself in the daytime and reason with yourself at night. Who else was there to talk 
to in a city like New York?[83-84]
"Communication," Bellow has said, "is what is most notably absent in modem life, 
despite the fact that people are ostensibly informed".7 And this where one of 
Bellow's most glorious creations comes in - the grotesque mountebank, Dr. Tamkin, 
"the confuser of the imagination"[43], If the likes of Adler and Rubin give out too 
little, then Tamkin gives out too much. Yet he is not, in Tommy's terms, an 
emotional fool who cannot stay reticent. Tamkin's torrent of information, 
diagnoses, solutions, advice of every kind is calculated to damage genuine human 
connection and to deceive the gullible. He is the first fully realized characterisation 
of a type that would become familiar in later novels, reaching an apogee in Dewey
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Spangler in The Dean's December. Tamkin, it seems to me, is the hideous 
embodiment of Ortega y Gasset's "mass-man", and there is good evidence for this 
belief. Bellow has written a foreword to Ortega's The Revolt o f  the Masses, and 
comments as follows:-
Ortega when he speaks of the mass man does not refer to the proletariat; he does 
not mean us to think of any social class whatever. To him the mass man is an 
altogether new human type. Lawyers in the courtroom, judges on the bench, 
surgeons bending over anaesthetized patients, international bankers, men of science, 
millionaires in their private jets are, despite their education, their wealth or their 
power, almost invariably mass men, differing in no important aspect from TV repair 
men, clerks in Army-Navy stores, municipal fire-inspectors, or bartenders8
Moreover:-
...the mass man lacks seriousness. With him nothing is for real, all parts are 
interchangeable. For him everything is provisional. He may occasionally play at 
tragedy, but the prevailing mood is one of farce.9
The result:-
The opening up of life and the world for the mediocre man has led him to shut up 
his soul. It is the obliteration of the average soul upon which the rebellion of the 
masses is founded.10
Taking Bellow's comments in conjunction with Ortega's own representations of 
what constitutes the mass man, the conclusion that Tamkin is the result of the fusion 
of certain fundamental ideas with Bellow's imagination becomes irresistible
A characteristic of our times is the predominance, even in those groups who were 
traditionally selective, of mass and popular vulgarity. Even in intellectual life, 
which by its very essence assumes and requires certain qualifications, we see the 




The characteristic note of our time is the dire truth that the mediocre soul, the 
commonplace mind, knowing itself to be mediocre, has the gall to assert its right to 
mediocrity, and goes on to impose itself wherever it can.12
It goes against the grain of this study to delve into the pit of associationism13 (for it 
is a characteristic of the mass man to do so!) but on this occasion the parallels are 
overwhelming. Tamkin, the 'qualified' Doctor, with his vulgarised mish-mash of 
"the rags and tatters of the world's great intellectual and religious heritages,"14 allied 
to the way he bends these to ignoble and farcical applications, and his spouting of 
inane and vacuous gobbledegook which nevertheless possesses the power to half- 
convince - these traits combine to make him the quintessential purveyor of a 
mediocre wisdom and a terrifyingly banal domination. There is even little doubt 
that Tamkin has "shut up his soul", for the deep-hidden unease of this comic- 
pathetic figure occasionally manifests itself to Wilhelm:-
When his hypnotic spell failed, his big underlip made him look weak-minded. Fear 
stared from his eyes, so humble as to make you feel sorry for him. Once or twice 
Wilhelm had seen that look. Like a dog, he thought. [96]
Tamkin himself is awash with paradox. He is both "sane and crazy"[4i], his 
supposed "calm and rational approach" [10] to the money market contrasts sharply 
with his avowed restlessness in the presence of money[9], and his view that money 
constitutes one of the forces inimical to life is juxtaposed with his speculative 
astuteness on the market. His mixture of gimcrack spirituality and inspired 
crassness is apotheosised in his superbly puerile piece of doggerel which utterly 
bewilders Wilhelm. It is only now, almost forty years after the publication of the 
novel, as the language and non-ideas of Tamkin are in reality moulded into a 
homogeneous mass and disseminated through the various media, cultural 
institutions and business - in every walk of life, it seems - and become ever more
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common currency, that we can realise Bellow's prescience when he created this 
figure. Unfortunately for Tommy, he is not quite so observant.
And so to an analysis of the novel's conclusion, a conclusion which, as was 
mentioned earlier, is probably the most controversial ever penned by Bellow. 
Robert Baker had noted that "...the ending of Seize the Day is several cuts above 
those of the other three novels"15 and, if the level of discussion it has generated is 
any guide, then this is surely true. Tommy has mistakenly wandered into a funeral 
parlour, where he is confronted by the corpse of a total stranger. This provokes the 
release of the pent-up emotions which have gathered in him during this day:-
The flowers and lights fused ecstatically in Wilhelm's blind, wet eyes; the heavy 
sea-like music came up to his ears. It poured into him where he had hidden himself 
in the center of a crowd by the great and happy oblivion of tears. He heard it and 
sank deeper than sorrow, through tom sobs and cries to the consummation of his 
heart's ultimate need. [118]
Is this the moment when Wilhelm is able to resolve the contradictions of his 
existence and achieve a lasting, 'humanist' perspective? Eusebio Rodrigues certainly 
thinks so - "Seize the Day ends at the moment when the doors of perception fling 
open, and Wilhelm realises his heart's ultimate need, a feeling of brotherhood and a 
love for all mankind."16 Ralph Freedman concurs, sensing that Wilhelm "rises from 
self-pity to universal mourning and therefore a degree of self-transcendence. 
External and internal perception unite, as Wilhelm both recognises and is recognised 
as a symbolic brother."17 M. Gilbert Porter views the scene as indicative of 
Wilhelm's discovery of his 'real self: "In destroying the pretender soul, Wilhelm 
prepares for the coming of the true soul [...] Where there has been alienation, there 
is now the possibility of communion. Wilhelm's drowning, then, is also a baptism, a 
rebirth."18 John J. Clayton adopts a similar position: "... it is this pretender soul 
which Tommy Wilhelm must destroy in order that he, as representative man, may
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shine forth in glory, power, beauty - and that Bellow may affirm the beauty and 
greatness of man."19
Or is it possible that Tommy weeps out of defeat and resignation, a desire for 
refuge and annihilation? Jonathan Wilson avers that Wilhelm's tears constitute "a 
denial of sheer reality itself."20 Michael Glenday goes to town on Tommy, asserting 
that "Hopelessness is [...] very much Bellow's theme here, a profound hopelessness 
which seems to me deepened by the novel's much discussed final scene"; that "the 
language used by Bellow in the concluding paragraph cannot possibly uphold the 
range of affirmative meanings so often thought to reside there [...] Such meanings 
cannot be discovered elsewhere in the unrelentingly miserable sequence of events 
that make up Tommy's day"; and that "not only the language but also the context of 
this final scene appears to demonstrate [...] his awful isolation within the crowd, his 
emotional release figured as a sinking downwards towards extravagant oblivion."21 
It will be evident that, once again, whether one interprets the final scene as"a 
strongly promising or optimistic one"22 to bolster the humanist case, or the novel as 
one "that ought to have done more to dispel the widely-held view of its author as 
one committed to humanism",23 both perspectives are contingent to a substantial 
degree on the predisposition of the critic. Both views have something to be said for 
them - but both are essentially incorrect. The evidence suggests that Tommy's 
contradictory nature will leave him forever 'dangling'. I think it is significant that 
Bellow writes that Tommy is pointed toward the "consummation of his heart's 
ultimate need" -for he will never truly achieve it. We have no good reason to 
believe that Tommy's final lyric moment will be any less transient than his brief 
visions detailed earlier. Conversely, the very fact that we take our leave of him 
while he experiences another of these visions suggests that 'oblivion' is not on his 
agenda - these are the affirmative meanings to be discovered during Tommy's day.
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Wilhelm complains that "This has been one of those days [...] May I never live to go 
through another like it"[lll]. But if we bear in mind the assertion of Tommy's ex- 
wife quoted earlier - "every other day you want to make a new start" - we gain the 
distinct impression that not only is nothing to be resolved one way or another by the 
events of this day, but also that Tommy may very well live to go through many more 
such days. Days of fleeting transcendence, ephemeral peace, bitter exasperation and 
unruly absurdity. The reader has in some sense witnessed a snapshot, a microcosm 
of the life of Tommy Wilhelm, one day has been seized from his existence for our 
inspection - and if we scrutinise it carefully we discover that he is ultimately no 
different from any other Bellow hero. The most appropriate , and lasting, image we 
have of Tommy is very well crystallised in the film of the novel (the only one of 
Bellow's works to have been filmed). The actor Robin Williams, who plays 
Tommy, seems to convey the impression j&B Tommy is both weeping and laughing 
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Henderson the Rain King - Life of Continual Becoming 
"Conclusion
Without fulfilment. Thence the dream rose upward,
The living dream sprang from the dying vision,
Overarching all. Beneath its branches 
He builds in faith and doubt his shaking house."
Edwin Muir, The Mythical Journey'.
"Books," notes Bellow, "are strongly shaken to see what usable things will fall out 
of them to strengthen a theory or support some system of ideas. The poet becomes a. 
sort of truffle hound who brings marvelous delicacies from the forest. The writer 
himself begins to accept this truffle-hound role, acknowledging the superior value, 
the greater dignity of ideas and explanations over fancy, play, verve - over 
imagination."1 And on another occasion he comments that, "What has been 
substituted for the novel itself is what can be said about the novel by the 
'educated'."2 Bellow's fifth novel, Henderson the Rain King, has been put through 
the mill of Symbolic - or, more properly associative -readings and interpretations 
(although it is to be feared that even now we have seen only the tip of the iceberg in 
this regard).3 Not every critic is guilty of sinning in this respect, of course, but those 
who are make an ever-increasing din. Exactly what purpose is served by an 
associative interpretation is unclear. Assuming that no novelist sits down to write 
with an expres intention of demonstrating, say, the theories of Wilhelm Reich in 
action,4 - for what could be more futile, tedious, derivative and ultimately self- 
defeating? - then the responsibility for the imposition of such a view on the original 
novel lies solely with the critic. The problem with the associative tendency is that it 
can, like statistics, be employed to prove virtually anything - anything, that is, which 
accords with the critic's own notions. This invariably leads to readings which are 
arid and stupefyingly irrelevant. To be fair to critics of such a bent, Bellow hardly 
discouraged their earnest search by creating such a potentially fertile source of 
symbolic readings as Henderson the Rain King (to the extent that he felt compelled
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to issue what amounted to a 'health warning' a week before publication of the 
novel5). For instance, I have no doubt that an ineffably turgid treatise could be 
constructed around the 'deeper meanings' to Henderson's history of dental trouble! 
John J. Clayton, though, is quite right in his speculation that Bellow seems to have 
said to his critical audience, "You want a symbolic novel? I'll give you the most 
symbolic novel you ever wrote a critical article about."6 For the thrust of the novel 
is substantially comic and any symbolic references overtly parodic. And, to state it 
baldly, it is this novel which will be under discussion - not Reich, Freud, Eden or the 
History of Man. The foolery in Henderson itself is enough to be going on with. But 
Bellow has averred that his "fooling [in Henderson] was fairly serious".7 So let us 
also be serious.
Superficially, the character of Henderson himself may seem to be unique among 
Bellow's fictional main players. Only Augie appears to approximate even remotely 
to him. Henderson is an extrovert, rumbustious and bellicose, something of a 
philistine ("...he can sound like Daddy Warbucks trying to explain Spinoza."8), 
"moody, rough, tyrannical and probably mad."9 When we first encounter him, it is 
obvious that not only is he indifferent to the needs and sensibilities of others - like 
Augie, he cannot "be hurt enough by the fate of other people" - but is also himself 
some way down a spiral of self-destruction. Thus it is that he involves himself in 
adulterous behaviour; brawls drunkenly with state troopers; makes a nuisance of 
himself with firearms (including taking a potshot at an abandoned cat in his attic); 
and tortures his wife with a threat to blow his own brains out, in the full knowledge 
that his wife's father had died in just such a fashion. Moreover, he declines to aid 
the poverty-stricken Russian prince from whom he rents a Paris apartment - even 
though he, Henderson, is a millionaire; deliberately riles his army friend Goldstein 
by informing the latter that he wishes to breed pigs after the war; and - worst of all - 
one of his violent paroxysms of rage seems to cause the death of his elderly 
housekeeper. As Keith Opdahl rightly points out, "Henderson suffers from his own
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malice toward others."10 And we may also add that he suffers from his own malice 
toward himselj, riddled with guilt as he is over his failure to match the standards of 
his illustrious lineage, and deeply troubled by the consciousness on his part that 
something in his life is missing, something remains unfulfilled, there is an 
unsatiated desire for something more which needs to be met. It is this consciousness 
which speaks to him in a voice of chaotic, frenzied craving: -
I came, a great weight, a huge shadow on those stairs, with my face full of country 
colour and booze, and yellow pigskin gloves on my hands, and a ceaseless voice in 
my heart that said, I want, I want, oh, I want - yes, go on, I said to myself, Strike, 
strike, strike, strike! [12]
and again:-
Now I have already mentioned that there was a disturbance in my heart, a voice 
that spoke there and said, I want, I want, I want! It happened every afternoon, and 
when I tried to suppress it it got even stronger. It only said one thing, I want, I want! 
And I would ask, "What do you want?"
But this was all it would ever tell me. It never said a thing except I want, I want, I 
want! [24]
It is this unquenchable longing which, in turn, causes Henderson to embark on his 
quest to fabled 'darkest Africa', in a strangely random, vaguely conceived attempt to 
discover meaning to his life and quell the turbulent, importunate voice within. And 
it would be remiss not to mention the fact that Henderson prefaces the descriptions 
of his wild excesses and brutal indifference with the claim, post-quest, that "the 
world which I thought so mighty an oppressor has removed its wrath from me" [3], 
This comment seems to suggest that some sort of transformation has taken place, 
that Henderson is a new man - and that the humanist critics may have found their 
champion at last. But is it so? A perfunctory appraisal of Eugene H. Henderson 
might, as has been said, mark him out as a singular member of the Bellow cast - but 
on a more thorough investigation it becomes abundantly clear that he, too, is a 
dangling tenant of the middle-ground.
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It seems to me that there are three separately identifiable, though closely linked 
facets of Henderson's putative journey of discovery. The first involves the 
relationship between what we usually take to be the distinct and mutually hostile 
forces of Life and Death. In Henderson's mind there is a curious overlapping and 
blurring of the boundaries between the two - and this confusion is often reinforced 
by events in the world which Henderson encounters. "What Henderson is really 
seeking," Bellow has said, "is a remedy to the anxiety over death."11 And it is 
apparent that the striving, frenetic inner voice which actuates Henderson is nothing 
less than a life-impulse, a bulwark of the will against death. The spirit of 'I want' 
cries out in opposition to the void. The life-desire is enhanced in Henderson's 
upbeat conviction that the dominion of death has its limits, evidenced when he tries 
to commune musically with the soul of his dead father:-
I had felt I was pursuing my father's spirit, whispering, "Oh, Father, Pa. Do you 
recognize the sounds? This is me, Gene, on your violin, trying to reach you." For it 
so happens that I have never been able to convince myself the dead are utterly 
dead. [30]
and again, when he is faced with the challenge of disposing of the Wariri corpse:-
I believe in Lazarus. I believe in the awakening of the dead. I am sure that for 
some, at least, there is a resurrection. [ 140]
Yet this same Henderson is obsessed by an equally powerful death-impulse. He 
believes himself to be possessed of a "great death potential" [252], and is made to feel 
"very bitter" when his wife describes him as "unkillable"[6]. Moreover, he is subject 
to horrific visions of the doom which awaits him, in the chillingly portentous form 
of the dead-eyed octopus which he encounters in a French aquarium
It was twilight. I looked in at an octopus, and the creature seemed also to look at 
me and press its soft head to the glass...The eyes spoke to me coldly. But even more 
speaking, even more cold, was the soft head with its speckles, and the Brownian 
motion in those speckles, a cosmic coldness in which I felt I was dying [...] I 
thought, 'This is my last day. Death is giving me notice'. [14]
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And again, the sight of the knick-knackery in his deceased housekeeper's room 
provokes a terrible revelation:-
And I thought, "Oh shame, shame! Oh crying shame! How can we? Why do we 
allow ourselves? What are we doing? The last little room of dirt is waiting. 
Without windows [...] You, too, will die of this pestilence. Death will annihilate 
you and nothing will remain, and there will be nothing left but junk. Because 
nothing will have been and so nothing will be left".[40]
Curiously, Henderson submits that "all the major tasks and the big conquests were 
done before my time. That left the biggest problem of all which was to encounter 
death"[276], Because earlier he had claimed to have become "ultrafamiliar with 
death" and that "Death and I are just about kissing cousins"[174], Similarly, he 
rejects any notion that he "love[s] death" [140], yet he revels in meting it out to the 
frogs blocking the Amewi water supply, and is latterly possessed by a furious urge 
to kill the Wariri tribesman who is the Bunam's assistant. Indeed, the contradictions 
and paradoxes involving Life and Death are heightened during his experiences in 
Africa. When Henderson encounters the Amewi tribe, he is vouchsafed the spirit of 
grun-tu-molani - Man want to live - by the tribal matriarch. But this insight into an 
elemental 'life-force' comes from a people who have so transcended the world that 
they appear passive and vegetated - and virtually dead themselves (indeed, they will 
allow their cattle to die rather than act to save their water supply). When Henderson 
lifts the idol to become rain-king of the Wariri, he feels the spirit's sleep bursting 
again, proclaiming "Life anew! I was still alive and kicking and I had the old grun- 
tu-molani"[l93]. Ironically, however, by this action he mires himself in a web of 
archaic savagery and condemns himself to certain death if he remains among the 
Wariri. Most paradoxical of all is the basis for King Dahfu's attempt to inculcate 
Henderson in the 'spirit of the lion'. Henderson is supposed to be infused with wild, 
free, natural impulses - an energy of life in itself - derived from the instincts of 
Dahfu's lion Atti. Yet such impulses are to come from an animal which is caged and 
tamed. When the real wild animal is confronted - an unbridled and basic life-force -
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Henderson not only fears that "this was all mankind needed, to be conditioned into 
the image of a ferocious animal like the one below" [307], but also witnesses the 
death-dealing capacity o f the beast, in the brutal killing o f Dahfu. And, in 
consequence of this assertion of primitive 'life-energy', Henderson is propelled into a 
nightmarish, life-threatening situation himself by being forced to assume the title of  
the new king. Finally, even after his adventures, it is clear that Henderson's 
impressions still fluctuate wildly - his life-impulse (as vague and ambiguous as it 
might be) crowds, clashes and interchanges with his terror of death (as animating 
and thrilling though it might be). Henderson, virtually in the same breath, is able to 
meditate on his impending extinction:-
I couldn't get enough of the water, and o f these upside down sierras o f the clouds. 
Like courts o f eternal heaven ( only they aren't eternal, that's the whole thing; they 
are seen once and never seen again, being figures and not abiding realities; Dahfu 
will never be seen again, and presently I will never be seen again ... [333]
and then restate the possibility o f the triumph of life:-
Two smoothly grey eyes moved at me, greatly expanded into the whites - new to 
life ajtogether. They had that new luster. With it they had ancient power, too. You 
could never convince me that this was for the first tim e \339]
Fluid, contradictory, ambiguous, a world of no fixed states or certainties - that is the 
world o f the typically 'dangling' Bellow hero.
The second facet of Henderson's quest, and one which takes place almost by 
accident, involves itself with questions on the nature o f reality. It is, o f course, a 
deliberately comic incongruity on Bellow's part to plunge "this pitiful rude man, this 
poor stumbling bully"[l99] into speculations o f this sort. Nevertheless, as Daniel 
Hughes has pointed out, "...he [Henderson] is searching for a reality, a reality which 
[...] can be shown conclusively to be something other than himself."12 Hughes' 
comment, though, is only half right - for the fact is that Henderson has no clear idea
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of what he is seeking, displays disordered and anomalous attitudes to 'reality', and 
finds that a concrete conception of such is elusive. From such an unreserved and 
experiential character as Henderson, more than a passing acquaintance with 'real 
life' would be expected. And, indeed, Henderson boasts of his knowledge more than 
once. To his wife:-
Lily said, "Oh, Gene, I'm very glad." She gave me a high mark for this and told me, 
"It's good that you are more able to accept reality."
"What?" I said, "I know more about reality than you'll ever know. I am on damned 
good terms with reality, and don't you forget it".[36]
Despite this, however, Henderson refuses to accept the 'reality' of his daughter's love 
(and possible parenthood) of the negro child, preferring that this latter be given into 
care. He then smugly congratulates himself on his ability to accept things the way 
they are:-
I have always argued that Lily neither knows nor likes reality. Me? I love the old 
bitch just the way she is and I like to think that I am always prepared for even the 
very worst she can show me. I am a true adorer of life, and if I can't reach as high as 
the face of it, I plant my kiss somewhere lower down. [150]
This view is somewhat surprising considering that not so long before, Henderson 
had brought down a catastrophic and devastating reality upon the Amewi (by means 
of his bungled attempt to clear their water supply), and had himself crept away in 
shame and disgrace. Seemingly unabashed, he later informs Dahfu as to what 
constitutes the real love of his life:-
When you come right down to it, there aren't many guys who have stuck with real 
life through thick and thin, like me. It's my most basic loyalty [...] I love the stuff. 
Grun-tu-molani\[232]
Again, this assertion is more than a touch debatable. Prior to making this claim, 
Henderson had made a desperately absurd plea for deliverance from the 'ultimate 
reality' of the rain-king's initiation ceremony - ultimate in the sense that Henderson
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had earlier equated truth with blows[23], many of which he receives during the 
performance of this ritual:-
And with all my heart I yelled, "Mercy, have mercy!" And after that I yelled, "No, 
justice!" And after that I changed my mind and cried, "No, no, truth, truth!" And 
then, "Thy will be done! Not my will, but Thy will!"[199]
It would seem that not only is reality unbearable in this instance, but truth is to be 
sought elsewhere than in blows. Moreover, Henderson's bragging about his love of 
'reality' is put to flight in the face of the terrible reality of the lion that will slay 
Dahfu: -
But oh, unreality! Unreality, unreality! That has been my scheme for a troubled 
but eternal life. But now I was blasted away from this practice by the throat of the 
lion. [307]
Yet even this statement requires qualification. Henderson is a war veteran, 
informing us that "the war meant much to me" [22], He himself has stepped on a 
land mine, and must have faced death on several.occasions amidst the cruelties and 
atrocities of war. Can we believe that his life up to the confrontation with the lion 
was - unreality? Henderson had, in any case, referred, in another vague orison, to 
the leonine proclivities of the Wariri as 'unreality':-
'Oh, you [...] Something,' I said, 'you Something because of whom there is not 
Nothing. Help me to do thy will [...] Heavenly Father, open up my dumb heart and 
for Christ's sake preserve me from unreal things. Oh, Thou who tookest me from 
pigs, let me not be killed over lions.[253]
It is hardly a surprise that when such a confused and confusing picture emerges 
from Henderson's experiences with 'reality', his meditations on the subject are in 
equal disarray. When he opines that "...reality may be terrible [...] [but] it's better 
than what I've got"[l05], his later imprecation "Reality! Oh reality! Damn you 
anyhow, reality! "[291] seems entirely in keeping with the flux of his nature. As does 
his view that "it's love that makes reality reality" [286] ( a signpost at which the
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humanist critic can heave a sigh of relief) - a view which seems to take no account 
of his assertion, enunciated only just before, that "that word [love] is full of 
bluff'[284], And when Henderson arrives at the 'profound' revelation that reality 
consists of an individual's own creations:-
What we call reality is nothing but pedantry[...] I need not have had that quarrel 
with Lily [...] I proclaimed I was on better terms with the real than she [...] The 
world of facts is real, all right, and not to be altered [...] But then there is the 
noumenal department, and there we create and create and create. As we tread our 
overanxious ways, we think we know what is real. And I was telling the truth to 
Lily after a fashion. I knew it better, all right, but I knew it because it was mine - 
filled, flowing and floating with my own resemblances; as hers was with her 
resemblances. Oh, what a revelation! Truth spoke to me. To me, Henderson! [167]
the reader expects to encounter a blatant contradiction of this insight - and 
Henderson does not disappoint:-
Well, maybe every guy has his own Africa. Or if he goes to sea, his own ocean. 
By which I meant that as I was a turbulent individual, I was having a turbulent 
Africa. This is not to say, however, that I think the world exists for my sake. No, I 
really believe in reality. That's a known fact. [276]
Small wonder, then, that it is Henderson's groggy, plangent cry that "everything 
depends on the values - the values. And where's reality? I ask you, where is it?"[87] 
which we place most store by. In this sense, Henderson demonstrates the inaccuracy 
of Jonathan Wilson's insistence that "If the Bellow hero is to continue 'dangling', his 
options must always gradually close down."13 For Henderson's options remain open, 
exceptionally variegated, his farrago of shifting perspectives ensuring that he is 
placed in a nebulous, indeterminate region - the ultimate 'dangler' in a world 
constantly in a state of change. And yet Henderson, like the other Bellow heroes, is 
offered an imaginative and spiritual escape route from the turmoil and uproar of his 
life - and if ever there was a case of the authentic voice of Bellow intruding upon his 
fiction, then it is surely heard in the following conjecture articulated by the 
supposedly philistine Henderson:-
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What? Well, for instance, that chaos doesn't run the whole show. That this is not a 
sick and hasty ride, helpless, through a dream into oblivion. No, sir! It can be 
arrested by a thing or two. By art, for instance. [175-76]
Leaving aside the incongruity of this declaration coming from Eugene H. 
Henderson, it is nevertheless true that it is in the 'unreality' o f aesthetic visions and 
memories where Henderson achieves a kind of contentment - short-lived and subject 
to dissolution though these are. Dahfu, just as Tamkin had done with Tommy in 
Seize the Day, instructed Henderson to allow the king's lion Atti to "force the 
present moment upon [him]"[260]. Yet Dahfu's advice, if  not as wilfully malicious 
as that o f Tamkin, is still just as wrong - only in the past, and in the brief periods of 
artistic, if  not religious, transcendence does Henderson approach an awareness of 
the reason for, and the meaning of, his existence. It is surely significant that 
Henderson not only relates his African experiences in retrospect, but also states that 
"something of the highest importance has been presented to me [...] as in a 
dream"[22], for at least some o f the aspects o f his odyssey have ben sublimated into 
visionary and ethereal states, the remembrance of which outweighs in importance 
even their actuality. Thus Henderson's 'pink light' epiphany, "the fringe of 
Nirvana" [102]; Mtalba's dance o f seduction which causes him to ache with 
beauty[98]; the faint indications o f a benign deity already cited; and the blissful 
recollections which he owns "have made a sizeable difference to me"[336] -these are 
the intangibles which transport Henderson to a realm of imaginative tranquility. But 
again, for the Bellow hero these visions are of their very nature transient - as 
Henderson puts it, "I grow confused, my breast melts, and then bang, the thing is 
gone. Once more I'm on the wrong side of it" [98], And it must not be forgotten that 
Henderson's capacity for enlightenment can also make him "crazy with misery"[29], 
also allowing, as it does, o f stark and frightening intimations o f death which, as we 
have already noted, continue to surface even after his return from Africa. His 
consciousness admits of both extremes without being annexed by either. 'Truth' is 
never fully equated with either reality or with the vigour of an inspired 'unreality'.
72
Keith Opdahl's declaration that "By the end o f his African journey, Henderson can 
face both the internal and external reality"14 is o f dubious validity - simply because, 
as Henderson spins in the complex, multiform, ever-changing world o f the 'dangler', 
he has no certain idea of either internal or external reality. We have seen how 
external reality escapes classification by Henderson - and how his fluctuating 
consciousness compounds this feature. And tied in with this idea o f an 'internal' 
reality is the third facet of Henderson's expedition.
It is difficult, just as it is with the other central characters in Bellow's fiction, to 
assign to Henderson a fixed and constituted 'self. Henderson himself realises this, 
as he explains to Dahfu:-
If I had the mental constitution to live inside the nutshell and think myself the king 
of infinite space, that would be just fine. But that's not how I am. King, I am a 
Becomer. Now you see your situation is different. You are a Be-er. I've just got to 
stop Becoming. Jesus Christ, when am I going to Be?[l9l]
Clearly, Henderson's inner voice crying 'I want', and his lamentations over "... the 
condition! Oh, my condition! First and last that condition!"[65] are tied in with this 
desire to escape the formlessness o f his present state and graduate to an idyllic rank 
of stabilised Be-ing. But this longing on Henderson's part is woefully misplaced. 
For if he did attain to an essence of Be-ing, his striving, querulous, unruly nature - 
his real grun-tu-molani, his genuine vivifying force - would be neutralised, leaving 
him etiolated and burnt-out, rather like Allbee at the conclusion of The Victim. And 
would not Henderson find himself imprisoned in the state of Be-ing, just like those 
whom he perceives already manifest it? Willatale, the 'woman of bittahness', may 
have the grun-tu-molani but she is enslaved by impotence, passivity and 
helplessness. And Dahfu is in a no-win situation in this regard. His premature death 
is already assured by dint of the tribal custom that when the king can no longer meet 
the needs o f his legion of wives, he must perish. But as he tells Henderson, "I too 
must complete Becoming" [210], Of course, in his attempt to stop Becoming and
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start Be-ing - by capturing the lion Gmilo - he dies. A few points about Dahfu: like 
Tamkin in Seize the Day he is a composite - in this case part noble savage, part 
civilised clown, part genius, part dilettante, a brilliant man whose brilliance "rested 
on doubtful underpinnings" [269], Elements of his philosophy are thoroughly absurd 
and contradictory. His belief that "good exchanged for evil truly is the answer" and 
that "the noble will have its turn in the world" [214-15] seems hopelessly out of place 
amidst the savage indifference of the Wariri - and even more so when juxtaposed 
with Dahfu's mild acceptance o f his role as leader o f this people. Dahfu also extols 
the cathartic changing powers o f the imagination:-
Imagination, imagination, imagination! It converts to actual. It sustains, it alters, it 
redeems! "You see," he said, "I sit here in Africa and devote myself to this in 
personal fashion, to my best ability, I am convinced. What homo sapiens imagines, 
he may slowly convert himself to". [271]
Yet not only do the transfiguring capacities of the imagination appear severely 
limited by a combination of the cruel atavism of the Wariri and the deterministic 
force o f their ancient rituals, but Dahfu can also tell Henderson "to move from the 
states that I myself make into the states which are o f themselves" [284] - but if 
Henderson were to do this he would enter into a state o f Be-ing - fixed, 
transcendent, passive and dangerously quiescent, a state which is the antithesis of 
the essence o f the Bellow hero. Dahfu's error is to believe that there is a closure to 
the powers of conversion - they must continually regenerate themselves, or end in 
stagnation or death. And Dahfu can also speculate with Henderson:-
Well Henderson, what are the generations for, please explain to me? Only to 
repeat fear and desire without a change? This cannot be what the thing is for, over 
and over and over. Any good man will try to break the cycle. There is no issue 
from that cycle for a man who do not take things into his own hands. [297]
Yet Dahfu is the last one to take things into his own hands, dying as he does in 
performance of the cyclic ritual with Gmilo. The reader is left to wonder whether in 
fact it is Henderson who has broken the cycle, at least with regard to the Wariri, by
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stealing away the lion cub which is supposed to house the spirit o f Dahfu, and thus 
vitiating the integrity o f any future performances of the tribe's ceremony. Dahfu is 
astute enough, though, to recognise that Henderson defies all prescriptions and 
categories - that he will never be a Be-er>
You are a compound. Maybe a large amount o f agony. Maybe a small touch o f the 
Lazarus. But I cannot fully subsume you. No rubric will fully hold you. Maybe 
because we are friends [...] Rubrics will not do with friends.[300]
What Henderson has amply demonstrated is that his is a life o f continual Becoming, 
his self elusive and protean. During his adventures, he finds that he cannot embrace 
the community of the Wariri as to do so would threaten his life. Neither can he 
embrace the Amewi, as he threatens the community. But he cannot settle either on 
a self o f amor fati or on a self of natural will. The "old self' which he refers to [275] 
will not be transmuted into a new one. For this is his permanent self - the 'dangling' 
self. It is clear that Henderson's articulation o f this state is his most honest insight:-
This again smote me straight on the spirit, and I had all the old difficulty, thinking 
of my condition. A crowd of facts came upon me with accompanying pressure on 
the chest. Who - who was I? A millionaire wanderer and wayfarer. A brutal and 
violent man driven into the world. A man who fled his own country, settled by his 
forefathers. A fellow whose heart said I want, I want. Who played the violin in 
despair, seeking the voice of angels. Who had to burst the spirit's sleep, or else [...] 
And the process started over again. Once more it was, Who are you? And I must 
confess that I didn't know where to begin. [76-77]
Robert Boyers avers that he knows of no "serious commentator who has found 
[the] novel's conclusion satisfactory".15 Without wishing to cast aspersions on the 
seriousness of some critics myself, it must be said that many symbol-seekers have 
found the conclusion to be extremely rewarding. A wealth of figurative readings 
can be elicited from the final scenes. We have, for instance, the seeming enactment 
of the "three metamorphoses" from Thus Spake Zarathustra. We have Henderson 
landing in Newfoundland (say it slowly!), which ocasions Eusebio Rodrigues' 
bizarre, orgiastic declaration that "the unquenchable and radiant power o f the human
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spirit is now incarnate in Henderson and will lead both him and America to true 
glory."16 We are even treated to the sight of Henderson returning on a Sunday, "just 
before Thanksgiving week", which one study is kind enough to inform us is a "week 
in November when Americans express their gratitude for their existence."17 But the 
appearance of the child, in particular, in the closing chapter is so gratuitous that it is 
impossible to believe that Bellow intended anything other than to mock the critical 
associative tendency. John J.Clayton, who believes this, also realises that humanist 
interpretations o f the kind given by M. Gilbert Porter - "This is the fully regenerate 
Henderson joyously celebrating the new life that he has discovered"18 - will not 
wash because "we cannot believe that he [Henderson] is fundamentally different 
from what he was."19 True, in a flood o f over-confidence, Henderson outlines his 
desire to enrol at medical school under the name of Leo E. Henderson (for obvious 
reasons) - but later modifies his ambition with the statement that "I would never 
make a lion. I knew that; but I might pick up a small gain here and there in the 
attempt" [298]. Michael Glenday is quite right to have doubts about "the nature of 
Henderson's euphoria, about its origin and durability." But he errs when he claims 
that "At the end of the novel [...] we are faced with [this kind of] equivocatory prose 
at a point where we had every right to expect a clarifying perspective"20 - for what 
gives us this right? All the evidence up to now gives the impression that Henderson 
will be in a state of permanent 'dangling' - and the final chapter does nothing to 
dispel this view, with its deeply ambiguous tone, its climate o f uncertainty, vague 
hope and uneasy fear. Earlier Henderson had said that all that was left to him was 
"kindness and love"[3i6]. Yet he is unsure if his wife loves him, deciding that even 
if  she only seemed to, that "was better than nothing" [329]. In similar fashion, he says 
of his children that "I love them very much-1 think [...] We'll have to see" [33 5]. And 
whether this love can be translated into something lasting is thrown further into 
doubt by the evidence, in the form of his harangue o f the consular officials, that his 
short-tempered peevishness is still very much with him[33l], Henderson's seemingly 
transformational proclamation - "I had a voice that said I want! I want! 11 It should
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have told me she wants, he wants, they want" [286] - can be seen in this uneasy and 
ambiguous light. There are quasi-religious overtones, almost as if Henderson is 
fervently awaiting the Second Coming, in his avowal of a belief in justice, the 
reason, and his further recitation of the passage from Handel [328,334], But these 
indications of spiritual promise are conditional, as they jockey for position with a 
languorous fear of death. Moreover, Henderson's importation of the young lion cub 
wherein rests the soul of Dahfu (allegedly), can easily be seen as either a strong 
pointer of optimism or as a rather sad and desperate gesture. Similarly, it is difficult 
to say whether Henderson is now privy to a conception of the nobility of the human 
struggle, or whether he simply believes that he is not as badly off as he thought. I 
think, in both cases, there is an intermingling of both extremes. And there is even a 
hint, in an enigmatic passage, that Henderson has learned to reconcile himself better 
to the 'dangling' essence, not of his be-ing but of his becoming:-
'Oh you can't get away from rhythm, Romilayu,' I recall saying many times to him. 
'You just can't get away from it. The left hand shakes with the right hand, the inhale 
follows the exhale, the systole talks back to the diastole, the hands play patty-cake, 
and the feet dance with each other. And the seasons. And the stars and all of that. 
And the tides and all that junk. You've got to live at peace with it because if it's 
going to worry you, you'll lose'.[329]
Henderson seems to be groping toward a realisation of eternal rhythm, of opposites 
crowding and clashing, of the central paradox that it is his changeable, formless 
'dangling' nature which remains - unchanged. Fittingly, in the aethestic final scene, 
Henderson is in motion, fluid, mutable, dancing around the aeroplane, forever 
becoming, never being. And let us give in to a mischievous temptation, for it is 
irresistible. If it is impossible to see Henderson as a member of a new nobility, then 
he is at least a conditional and absurd Higher Man:-
Lift up your hearts, my brothers, high, higher! And do not forget your legs! Lift up 
your legs too, you fine dancers: and better still, stand on your heads21
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Chapter Six
Herzog - A descent into the maelstrom
"Woe to the thinker who is not the gardener 
but only the soil of the plants that grow in him!"
Nietzsche, Daybreak.
"And if the unexplained life is not worth living, 
the explained life is unbearable too."
Saul Bellow, Herzog.
In beginning this chapter I shall take the unusual step of agreeing with Michael 
Glenday's view that Herzog marks a perceptible shift in the focus of Bellow's art. 
Many critics felt there to be a radical departure from the norm in what seemed to be 
the overt pessimism and misanthropic conservatism of Mr. Sammler's Planet. I shall 
argue in the relevant chapter that this is not the case, that Artur Sammler is little 
different from his predecessors. What is certainly true is that Sammler evinces traits 
directly inherited from his immediate fictional forebear. Without altering the essential 
'dangling' nature of the hero, what Bellow has done is twofold. First, he has 
heightened the consciousness and awareness of his central character to a dreadfully 
intense level, such that he, and every subsequent hero, become "prisoner[s] of 
perception [...] compulsory witness[es]"[72]. And second, without compromising the 
depth of characterisation (except perhaps in the cases of Albert Corde and Kenneth 
Trachtenberg), Bellow has shown the extrinsic world of 'reality' to be ever more 
chaotic and bizarre, this turbulence itself being heightened through the raised 
receptivity of the consciousness of the hero. In such a way, it is not Mr. Sammler's 
Planet but Herzog which is the first novel characterised by these modifications - 
though, as I say, the middle ground remains the eternal haunt of the central figures 
themselves.
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Tony Tanner believes that "Bellow excels himself in this book by presenting not 
only the importance, but also the curse and the comedy of intense consciousness."1 
Herzog is, after all, the man with "the immense (the appalling!) collection of facts in 
his [...] head"[224], Bellow himself has placed more emphasis on the comic aspects of 
the novel
There are times when I enjoy making fun of the educated American. Herzog, for 
instance, was meant to be a comic novel.2
and, on another occasion:-
My readers were oppressed by the thinking-cap and blind to the whirlwind comedy. 
Too bad. I am largely to blame for that3
Ignoring the comedy of the novel (or relegating an awareness of such too far into the 
background) can certainly produce critical responses which are piercingly shrill, and 
often wildly inaccurate. One critic castigates Bellow for giving us "the most flattering 
image of the intellectual to be found in modem literature", noting, without a trace of 
resentment, that the novel "has brought much good cheer and glad tidings to the 
intellectual community, and as is so often the case, such service has not gone 
unrewarded."4 Another laments "Bellow's failure to acknowledge the comic 
preposterousness of the kind of mental activity going on [...] a pretension that might 
itself characterize the hero were he not [...] indistinguishable from the author", and 
directs us to see Bellow's inability to appreciate "the essential irrelevance, the essential 
pretension and shabbiness of the self-aggrandizing mind at work in, and for, the 
hero."5 Such comments, clearly, are deeply misplaced, for, even though Bellow may 
have been "making fun of [his] own type", the author attempted to "disinfect [Herzog] 
of all Bellow influences."6 A reading of the novel will reveal that Moses E. Herzog 
enjoys the same relationship with his creator as do the other main figures in Bellow's
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fiction - the 'ironic endorsement' which results in the 'dangling' state. This relationship 
is in this case refined to such an extent that it produces undoubtedly the most complex, 
the most contradictory, the most ambiguous character in the Bellow corpus. Herzog is 
a man at once lovable and hateful, incisive and fatuous, sophisticated and puerile, an 
idiotic genius and a dazzling buffoon. Yet herein lies the problem with the novel - the 
paradoxical portrayal is not so much laboured (as is the irony in certain parts of The 
Adventures o f Augie March) but unfocused. Irving Howe makes what I think to be a 
valid point in this respect, declaring that "there are occasions when the uses of 
ambiguity can themselves be ambiguous, shading off into confusion or evasiveness."7 
Whether Bellow has slightly lost control of his narrative technique or whether the 
chaos of Herzog's consciousness is deliberately designed to elevate him to a 'hyper- 
dangling' state, the results are, either way, not wholly satisfactory. The view of Herzog 
is altogether too muzzy and blurred, for when the reader comes (as he must) to address 
the underlying seriousness of the novel, his concentration and patience are often 
dissipated in a maelstrom of anarchy. In brief, there is an ambiguity which satisfies 
and an ambiguity which frustrates - and Herzog has a tendency to lapse into the latter. 
It is difficult to account for this phenomenon, especially as it does not seem to be 
repeated to anything like the same degree in subsequent novels. Perhaps it was simply 
an inevitable corollary of delving into the frenzied turmoil of the mind of a Moses 
Herzog.
"Considering his entire life, he realized that he had mismanaged everything - 
everything. His life was, as the phrase goes, ruined. But since it hadn't been much to 
begin with, there was not much to grieve about" [3]. So reflects Herzog, recumbent 
amidst the ruins and decay of his dilapidated country house. A man whose character 
was "narcissistic [...] masochistic [...] anachronistic"[4], whose gifts have rotted away 
in the dissolution of uncompleted projects, failed careers and turbulent relationships,
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and whose profligacy with his inheritance has left him with the wretched 'white 
elephant' of this ramshackle estate in the middle of nowhere, Herzog gives us a potted 
history of himselfi-
Resuming his self-examination, he admitted that he had been a bad husband - twice. 
Daisy, his first wife, he had treated miserably. Madelaine, his second, had tried to do 
him in. To his son and daughter he was a loving but bad father. To his own parents he 
had been an ungrateful child. To his country, an indifferent citizen. To his brothers 
and sisters, affectionate but remote. With his friends, an egotist. With love, lazy. 
With brightness, dull. With power, passive. With his own soul, evasive [...] But how 
charming we remain, notwithstanding. [4-5]
Since all of these events and traits are indubitably true, the reader is liable to be 
impressed by the candour and rigour of Herzog's musings. But the characteristically 
self-satisfied conclusion to these musings highlights the fact that Herzog is not quite so 
honest with himself as he might believe. For instance, Herzog has been made a 
cuckold by Madelaine - but he fails to confront the implicit logic of his affair with his 
Polish mistress Wanda, in that he would have become a cuckolder had she not refused 
to break her marriage. And it takes Herzog's Aunt Zelda to point out something which 
Herzog had conveniently suppressed in his mind:-
"You've been reckless about women."
"Since Madelaine threw me out, maybe. Trying to get back my self-respect."
"No, while you were still married." Zelda's mouth tightened.
Herzog felt himself redden. A thick, hot pressure filled his chest. His heart felt ill and 
his forehead instantly wet. He muttered, "She made it tough for me too. Sexually". [38-
39]
Herzog's earlier admission that he had been a bad husband clearly has more to do with 
a sense of wounded self-pity than with a confession of adultery. Indeed, the number 
and frequency of Herzog's dalliances with the opposite sex makes his indignation at 
being left "wearing the horns" by Madelaine and Gersbach a trifle ludicrous. And if 
Gersbach shows scant regard for Herzog in stealing the latter's wife, then Herzog has
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little more time for the emotional wreck Hoberly, the spumed lover of Herzog’s latest 
mistress Ramona, viewing him as a case study to be assigned to a theoretical 
compartment: "It's possible that a man like Hoberly by falling apart intends to bear 
witness to the failure of individual existence. He proves it can't work" [208]. In short, 
the attraction o f this feeling intellectual to "dirty ways" and "lewd knowledge" [247] is a 
bit too all-consuming for comfort:- "He might look down his conscious nose at sensual 
delight, but [...] No amount of sublimation could replace that erotic happiness, that 
knowledge"[185-186], And what o f Madelaine, that grotesque, neurotic, hysterically 
distracted creature - at least as she is described by Herzog? Is it perhaps significant 
that only Herzog's mistresses agree with his view of her as a bitch from hell - they 
would, wouldn't they? - and is Herzog engaged in some sickly form of self- 
justification?
Viewed by other people, Herzog is a foolish Innocent, a babe in the ways o f the 
world, a hopelessly incongruous twentieth-century Man of Feeling'. Moses is a 
"stumbling, ingenuous burlap [...] a heart without guile, in need of protection"[307], 
"infected by the Old World with feelings like Love - Filial Emotion. Old stuporous 
dreams"[281], who takes refuge in "childish jingles and Mother Goose"[77], And this is 
undoubtedly true to some extent, and is shown in action on several occasions 
(particularly in the hilarious exchange between Herzog and the deformed and brutal 
lawyer, Himmelstein). Indeed, Herzog becomes a comic figure because o f his naivety. 
Again, however, this artlessness is not all that it seems. There is a suspicion that 
Herzog actively promotes this view of himself, in order to differentiate himself from 
the "Reality Instructors. [Those who] want to teach you - to punish you - with the 
lessons of the real"[l25]. By doing so, Herzog can appear foolish - but superior, 
ingenuous - but true. In a curious and self-supporting way his guilelessness becomes a 
badge o f honour for him. And it can easily deflect attention (not least his own) from
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foibles which suggest that he is not quite so pure and unadorned. For, like Joseph, he 
is given to bouts of spleen and bitchiness, as in this attack on an old schoolfellow:-
I knew him at school, we played ping-pong at the Reynolds Club. He had a white 
buttocky face with a few moles, and fat, curling thumbs that put a cheating spin on the 
ball [...] I don't believe his I.Q. was so terribly high .... [51]
The resentment of the marginalised intellectual is also evident in this assault upon a 
man who now wields great 'public' influence. Like Leventhal, he is often paranoid, as 
evidenced in his suspicions about the motives of Himmelstein's spouse when she and 
Herzog are discussing Madelaine[82], or in his morbid fear of being trapped into 
marriage by Ramona (Herzog could conceivably fit into most - though not all - o f the 
categories that go to make up the 'paranoid personality'[77]). Like Henderson, he is 
prone to violent fantasies, speculating as to how Madelaine would react "if he had 
knocked her down, clutched her hair, dragged her screaming and fighting round the 
room, flogged her until her buttocks bled" [ 10]. And like Wilhelm, Herzog is 
fatalistically drawn to potential dangers: there is a "flavour of subjugation" in his love 
for Madelaine[8]; he is "flattered" by the affections of a man with underworld 
connections[35]; and he sums up this propensity in his own Shelleyesque reflection:-
I fall upon the thorns of life, I bleed. And then? I fall upon the thorns of life, I bleed. 
And what next? I get laid, I take a short holiday, but very soon after I fall upon those 
same thorns with gratification in pain, or suffering in joy - who knows what the 
mixture is! [206-207]
The foregoing characteristics establish the basic duality of Herzog's actions. But since 
Herzog's life is overwhelmingly mental, it is in this realm that we encounter the truest 
picture of Herzog - the bizarre and disordered inferno of his thoughts.
What accounts for this chaos is the crushing weight of Herzog's "need to explain, to 
have it out, to justify, to put in perspective, to clarify, to make amends"[2]. This need
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is like a virus, infecting every part of Herzog's consciousness. Yet the problem is that 
although this compulsion to clarity is intended to act as a purgative, a path through 
confusion to some sort of harmony, in practice it merely defines the disarray. Herzog 
is unable to resolve the problems which beset his vulnerable perception, because 
although he "practiced the art of circling among random facts to swoop down on 
essentials [...] nothing of the sort happened"[10]. Bellow has commented that Herzog 
"needs to dismiss a great mass of irrelevancy and nonsense in order to survive."8 
Perhaps he does - but he is also the purveyor of a great deal of irrelevancy and 
nonsense, his mind a farrago of inchoate and peripheral 'concerns'. Without any 
shadow of doubt Bellow intended that Herzog be this way. But the problem lies in the 
notion of 'dismissal'. A superficial reading of the novel's conclusion might support the 
view that Herzog has rid himself of the intolerable burden of hyper-consciousness. 
But the author himself admits that this is not the case:-
... he's [Herzog] come to a point of rest, which is saying a lot for anybody these days 
[...but...] he's going to have to assume roles again, and deal with people again. He's 
just come to a well-earned interregnum. Don't grudge poor Moses that9
In fairness, the reader is only too delighted that Moses has come to a rest. But if we 
are to assume that Herzog's mass of tangential absurdities are to return, and that he 
will continue to dangle in this mental imbroglio, then not only are the 'humanist' and 
'anti-humanist' positions undermined (dependent as they are on lasting progress or 
terminal decline), but the survival of Herzog's sanity is also in jeopardy. And although 
he claims that, "if I am out of my mind, it's all right with me"[l], [315], this claim is 
made during his temporary period of rest - when he is inevitably plunged back into the 
maelstrom, the experience might prove too much for him (although, as always with the 
Bellow hero, suffering is alternated with vitality in the dangling area). But it must be 
owned that the contradictions of the Herzog view can quickly become overpowering.
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Just as did Henderson in Henderson the Rain King, so Herzog seems to have a 
problem defining exactly what constitutes 'reality'. Surrounded as he is by the 
corrupting influence of 'Reality Instructors', Herzog nevertheless maintains a deep- 
seated hope that what he sees as the innate dignity of Man can find expression in the 
modem world. In this most unaccommodating and brutal of centuries, and up against 
a formidable recent history of intellectual and technological opposition to his wish, 
Herzog's faith can appear to be mere wilful overcompensation for the prevailing view 
of those who, like Himmelstein, claim "facts are nasty" [86] and that the creed of the 
contemporary age, in a distortion of Nietzsche's dictum, must be "Death is God"[290], 
Whether Moses' view is indeed an incongruous bequest gleaned from his studies of  
Romanticism, he still fights against equating 'realism' with 'cruelty':-
Are all the traditions used up, the beliefs done for, the consciousness of the masses 
not yet ready for the next development? Is this the full crisis of dissolution? Has the 
filthy moment come when moral feeling dies, conscience disintegrates, and respect for 
liberty, law, public decency, all the rest, collapses in cowardice, decadence, blood? 
[...] The canned sauerkraut of Spengler's "Prussian Socialism", the commonplaces of 
the Wasteland outlook, the cheap mental stimulants of Alienation, the cant and rant of 
pipsqueaks about Inauthenticity and Forlomess. I can't accept this foolish dreariness. 
We are talking about the whole life of Mankind. The subject is too great, too deep for 
such weakness, cowardice ... [74-75]
And, in another of his 'mental letters', he lambasts the apocalyptic view of those who 
wallow in trendy despair:-
We must get it out of our heads that this is a doomed time, that we are waiting for the 
end, and the rest of it, mere junk from fashionable magazines [...] the advocacy and 
praise of suffering take us in the wrong direction and those of us who remain loyal to 
civilisation must not go for it [...] More commonly suffering breaks people, crushes 
them, and is simply unilluminating. You see how gruesomely human beings are 
destroyed by pain, when they have the added torment of losing their humanity first, so 
that their death is a total defeat. ... [316-317]
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There is no reason to doubt the basic sincerity of Herzog's view. However, the 
circumstances of his immediate 'reality' tend to qualify this belief, since more often 
than not they prove to be uncomfortable and even hostile. His failed first marriage, his 
second which ends in divorce and betrayal, his estrangement from his children, the 
duplicity of his best 'friend' Gersbach (indeed, throughout the novel Herzog never 
seems to be really intimate with anyone, not even his brother Will, or the eccentric 
scientist Asphalter), his failed career - these events combine to turn Moses into the 
suffering clown that he is. Moreover, Herzog reveals in a nightmarish memory that he 
has been molested and sexually abused as a child - would this experience not have 
coloured his view of 'reality'? This is especially relevant when we witness his 
reactions when reality again proves bestial, in the case of the child murder, the details 
of which Herzog overhears in a courtroom. Herzog is "wrung, and wrung again, and 
wrung again, again" [240] at the supposed realisation that this brutal strain of reality 
exists - yet he surely could not have blinded himself to it in the light of his childhood 
horror. Additionally, Herzog is sometimes guilty of the same intellectual tendencies as 
the Spenglers of history, assigning complex individuals to compartments, turning them 
into mere representatives of the direction of historical and cultural forces. There is no 
better example of this tendency than Herzog's view of Gersbach, whom he pictures as 
a protean 'mass-man', a ludicrous artist-politician, a "poet in mass 
communications"[215]. As Herzog discovers when he sees Gersbach tenderly bathing 
the former's daughter, such generalisations lead directly to inhuman actions. Herzog's 
ambivalence is crystallised when he upbraids a 'friend' for constructing "a merely 
aesthetic critique of modem history! After the wars and mass killings! "[75] - yet later 
chides himself for failing fully to comprehend such slaughter:-
You fooll Look at these millions of dead. Can you pity them, feel for them? You can 
nothing! There were too many. We burned them to ashes, we buried them with 
bulldozers. History is the history of cruelty, not love, as soft men think. [290]
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With some irony, Herzog realises that he, too, is a Reality Instructor, "a very special 
sort of lunatic [who] expects to inculcate his principles" [125] - but it seems that neither 
he nor we are ever sure just what his reality is.
The suspicion that Herzog is rather proud of his 'Holy Fool' status has already been 
noted. Implicit in the distinction between Moses and those Reality Instructors who are 
sure of their principles is the emotional belief of the former and the cold, often savage 
logic of the latter. But again, Herzog seems to occupy the no-man's land between the 
two poles of Faith and Reason rather than being an unalloyed representative of one or 
the other. For Herzog does have confidence in the power of rationality - "Reason 
exists! Reason ..."[165] -is well aware of the strides forward that man has made through 
this faculty, and indeed manifests the potentially transformational qualities of the mind 
in many of his discourses ('potentially', since none of his mental letters are ever 
mailed). Yet the modem desire to understand and explain absolutely everything in 
terms of pristine and objective reason leaves Herzog with a bad case of 'rationality 
fatigue'. His bouts of hyper-reasoning, the crazy excess of information in his ever- 
burgeoning consciousness - these lead to utter chaos, a chaos which can only be 
relieved by mental breakdown or a flight into the emotions, away from "the unbearable 
intensity of these ideas" [290], In the affective domain, memory and faith come 
together with emotion and we see the soul (that Bellovian word), the distilled essence 
of Moses E. Herzog. Much as it is for the other Bellow heroes, Herzog's view is that 
life is "unexpected intrusions of beauty" [218], In this case, it is the uniquely personal 
memories of Herzog which define his existence, for although these are occasionally 
unpleasant (the death of his mother or the sexual attack upon him), they possess a 
languid sweetness which means infinitely more to Moses than the incessant babble 
which assaults his conscious mind. Additionally, during such beautiful intervals,
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Herzog often experiences overt and explicit visions of God, far more open than any of 
his fictional predecessors
In the mild afternoon, later, at the waterside in Woods Hole, waiting for the ferry, he 
looked through the green darkness at the net of bright reflections on the bottom. He 
loved to think about the power of the sun, about light, about the ocean. The purity of 
the air moved him. There was no stain in the water, where schools of minnows swam. 
Herzog sighed and said to himself, 'Praise God - praise God'. [91]
Commenting on Herzog, Bellow describes what takes place during these transient 
periods of peace:-
In the greatest confusion there is still an open channel to the soul. It may be difficult 
to find because by midlife it is overgrown, and some of the wildest thickets that 
surround it grow out of what we describe as our education. But the channel is always 
there, and it is our business to keep it open, to have access to the deepest part of 
ourselves [...] The soul has to find and hold its ground against hostile forces, 
sometimes embodied in ideas which frequently deny its very existence, and which 
indeed often seem to be trying to annul it altogether.10
The problem for Herzog is that not only is this channel blocked for most of the time, 
but it is the very contradictions in his emotional realm which cause the obstruction. 
We already know that Herzog's emotional 'reality', in the shape of Madelaine, 
Gersbach etc, is a wreckage. On top of this, Moses often sneers at his emotions when 
they take the form of what he contemptuously refers to as 'potato love' - "Amorphous, 
swelling, hungry, indiscriminate, cowardly potato love"[9l] - as they all too regularly 
do. He himself is not altogether free from a scorn for the supposed 'weakness' of 
feeling. Most pertinently, when confronted by the appalling reality of the child 
murder, Herzog finds that his emotional reactions render him utterly impotent:-
He pressed himself with intensity, but 'all his might' could get nothing for the buried 
boy. Having experienced nothing but his own human feelings, in which he found 
nothing of use. What if he felt moved to cry? Or pray? He pressed hand to hand. 
And what did he feel? Why he felt himself - his own trembling hands, and eyes that 
stung. And what was there in modem post, ... post-Christian America to pray for?
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Justice - justice and mercy? And pray away the monstrousness of life, the wicked 
dream it was? [240]
And what of Herzog's faith, in the face of such shocking brutality? Bellow, in 
examining the central character in a review of another novel, explains why he finds the 
book disappointing:-
A man might well be meek in his own interests, but furious at such abuses of the soul 
and eager to show what is positive and powerful in his faith. The lack of such power 
makes faith itself shadowy, more like obscure tenacity than spiritual conviction.11
In the light of an often hostile reality, and a vacillating and anomalous nature, it does 
not take a great leap of imagination to envisage that the foregoing passage might have 
been written about Moses E. Herzog. Is he not guilty of - "obscure tenacity"? Perhaps 
- but he should not be blamed too greatly for that, for such obscure tenacity is Herzog's 
most valuable commodity. What is certain is that Herzog's ideal of living in the 
"inspired condition, to know truth, to be free, to love another, to consummate 
existence," to achieve a synthesis of "belief based on reason"[165] remains an obscure 
and distant one. "What this country needs," jokes Herzog, "is a good five cent 
synthesis" [207], He could certainly do with one himself.
Perhaps the most ambiguous feature of the novel is the relationship between 
Herzog's views of'self and 'brotherhood'. This is a particularly difficult relationship to 
establish, since not only do these two notions tend intrinsically to vie with one another, 
but Herzog's ideas of both are exceptionally confused and confusing. The first 
problem lies in trying to decipher what Herzog's self actually is. R.R.Dutton points out 
that "his [Herzog's] trouble lies in a lack of self-definition."12 True enough - for 
Herzog frequently appears to be composed of other selves, "people in public life [...] 
friends [...] relatives [...] the dead [...] his own obscure dead, and finally the famous
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dead"[l], Herzog's fear that "the private sphere" is being invaded[l63], and his boast 
that "a man like me has shown the arbitrary withdrawal of proud subjectivity from the 
collective and historical progress of mankind" [307], seem bizarre statements to make 
when one considers that, in the first place, his consciousness is one o f the most 
'invaded' there is, and, in the second place, his mind seems to be the playground for the 
theories and speculations of philosophers, historians and politicians. That self, Moses 
E.Herzog, becomes embroiled in the turmoil of discourse, as our hero mixes an 
anachronistic Romanticised over-valuation o f the individual with the universal 
concepts (science, technology, economics, history of mankind, grand-scale 
philosophy) which, in however debased or ill-apprehended a form, have shaped human 
life in the mass. The second difficulty lies in pinpointing just what is Moses' attitude 
to the self. Herzog's most significant history, as we have seen, is his personal one, and 
he appears to be a staunch defender of the value of the self, insisting that "the strength 
of a man's virtue or spiritual capacity [be] measured by his ordinary life" [106]; that, 
with Emerson, "the private life of one man shall be a more illustrious monarchy [...] 
than any kingdom in history"[l60]; and indeed that "the revolutions o f the twentieth 
century, the liberation of the masses by production, created private life but gave 
nothing to fill it with. This was where he came in. The progress of civilisation - 
indeed, the survival of civilisation - depended on the success of Moses E.Herzog"[125], 
In short, Herzog claims to have his finger in the dyke as the waters o f self-obliteration 
threaten to burst out:-
This little demon was impregnated with modem ideas, and one in particular excited 
his terrible little heart: you must sacrifice your poor, squawking, niggardly 
individuality - which may be nothing anyway (from an analytic viewpoint) but a 
persistent infantile megalomania, or (from a Marxian point of view) a stinking little 
bourgeois property - to historical necessity [...] But of course he, Herzog, predictably 
bucking such trends, had characteristically [...] tried to be a marvelous Herzog.[93]
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Though this last sentence is not without irony, it seems there can be no gainsaying 
Herzog's intentions. Or can there? Bellow, again commenting on Herzog, says:-
Many people feel a 'private life' to be an affliction. In some sense it is a genuine 
affliction; it cuts one off from a common life. To me, a significant theme of Herzog is 
the imprisonment of the individual in a shameful and impotent privacy. He feels 
humiliated by it; he struggles comically with it; and he comes to realise at last that 
what he considered his intellectual 'privilege' has proved to be another form of 
bondage.13
Herzog becomes that most curious of creatures, the self-despising egotist. For he is 
just as much disposed to attack the self as to defend it. Herzog is the man who "did 
not care for his own personality" [12] (despite wallowing in a memory o f sexual self- 
satisfaction only moments later[i3]); who fears that "self-development" and "self- 
realization" are "titles under which [...] lunacies occurred"[66]; who suspects that death 
is to be preferred to"the torment and boredom of an incorrigible character"[182]; and 
who concludes, not without some measure of regret, that "Oneself is simply 
grotesque" [219] and that "personal life is a humiliation and to be an individual 
contemptible" [264]. Not only, then, are Moses' attitudes to the self contradictory, but if  
this, second, deprecatory, attitude toward the uniqueness of the individual is, as 
Bellow seems to imply, to be translated into a desire for community, a deliverance 
from the bondage of private life into a sense o f brotherhood, then such a passage, 
already fraught with anomalies, becomes even more difficult, thanks to Herzog's 
intrinsically ambivalent responses to fraternity. True, his longing for a place in a 
human fellowship is explicitly stated on several occasions. "Fighting his sadness over 
this solitary life" [24], Herzog is aware o f "the loathsomeness o f a particular existence" 
and that "the whole was required to redeem every separate spirit" [156], And Herzog 
invites his 'faith' to assist in the expression of this longing:-
I really believe that brotherhood is what makes a man human. If I owe God a human 
life, this is where I fall down. Man liveth not by self alone but in his brother's face
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[...] Each shall behold the Eternal Father and love and joy abound.' When the 
preachers of dread tell you that others only distract you from metaphysical freedom 
then you must turn away from them. The real and essential question is one of our 
employment by other human beings and their employment by us. [272]
Yet Herzog is uncomfortably conscious of the down side of the equation:-
Innumerable millions of passengers had polished the wood of the turnstile with their 
hips. From this arose a feeling of communion - brotherhood in one of its cheapest 
forms [...] The more individuals are destroyed (by processes such as I know) the 
worse their yearning for collectivity. Worse, because they return to the mass agitated, 
made fervent by their failure. Not as brethren but as degenerates. [176]
There is a lingering suspicion that if Herzog rejects existentialist prescriptions about 
'other people', then what he seeks is not true community, but the anonymity of 
submergence in the crazy crowd - that he desires not linkage of selves, but burial of his 
own troubled self. Moreover, his fitful 'intellectual' prejudice against the 'mass man' 
embodied by Valentine Gersbach - which gives rise to horrendous visions of "mobs 
breaking into the palaces and churches and sacking Versailles, wallowing in cream 
desserts, or pouring wine over their dicks and dressing in purple velvet, snatching 
crowns and miters and crosses ..."[215] - is always lurking dangerously in the 
background. And it is perhaps significant that Herzog's magnum opus, which would 
show "how life could be lived by renewing universal connections; overturning the last 
of the Romantic errors about the uniqueness of the self'[39], has been aborted. In any 
case, his ability to 'commune' with his fellow creatures must be in grave doubt, since 
relations are inevitably botched on the material plane, and none of his mental letters 
are ever sent. Herzog's most vibrant and at the same time threatening community of 
souls - is in his head.
The conclusion of the novel settles none of the discord in either Herzog's or the 
reader's mind. Since the events of the book are conducted through the medium of 
Moses' memory, the earliest and finishing sections overlap, allowing Herzog to steal a
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march on the reader by declaring that he now feels, 'confident, cheerful, clairvoyant 
and strong"[l]. Yet Bellow has already mentioned that any peaceful 'state of grace' 
which Herzog might obtain is merely an interregnum, a hiatus. Herzog himself knows 
this to be the case:-
The bitter cup would come round again, by and by. This rest and well-being were 
only a momentary difference in the strange lining or variable silk between life and the 
void. [326]
Moreover, all o f the inconsistencies which Herzog's mind has thrown up are still 
present. Herzog re-affirms his intention "to share with other human beings as far as 
possible"[322], rejecting his one-time "plan for solitary self-sufficiency"[310-311] - yet 
does this while sitting alone in the wreckage of his country house. Amidst the 
apparent tranquility and radiance o f his posture, Herzog can still find reason for a 
splenetic outburst against a Navy psychiatrist who once examined him[324]. He tells 
his brother Will that he does not "contemplate putting myself in the hands of Ramona 
or any woman, at this time"[336] - before inviting Ramona to dinner, then lazily 
meditating while the cleaning woman clears up his mess. Herzog in fact seems to end 
up in an anomalous state of solitary dependency, shuttling between self-absorption 
(such as that can be!) and a reliance on, not a concord with others (Will, Ramona etc.). 
Michael Glenday believes that Herzog achieves "self-knowledge" in a withdrawal from 
an "implacable and hostile reality"14 (and thus Moses becomes the first real hero of the 
anti-humanist critics). But it is difficult to define accurately the self-knowledge of a 
man whose conception of self is in basic and thoroughgoing confusion, whose 
withdrawal is but temporary, and who is so susceptible to influences (be they physical- 
emotional, philosophical or historical) that he is open to the suspicion that when he is 
even briefly bereft o f these influences - "At this time he had no messages for anyone. 
Nothing. Not a single word" [341] - the essential amorphous nothingness o f his 'self 
will be amplified. Such problems, allied to the cyclic nature of Herzog's relations with
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'reality', also cast doubt upon the opposing interpretation, in which Herzog "has 
arrived, stripped of illusion, free and self-aware",15 brought "by Grace [...] into a new 
domain of the spirit, where it is good to be",16 into "a celebration of the human species 
and the transcendent self'.17 Clayton, again the best of the ’humanist' critics, says of 
the conclusion that "Herzog is a man communing with God and nature, not with men 
[...] essentially he is still alone"; realizes that Moses' 'transformation' "seems likely to 
be temporary and restricted to Herzog while he is alone"; but ends by declaring that he 
sees herein "a new kind of intellectuality, a new kind of humanist philosophy [...] a 
rich and profound statement of man's significance."18 I cannot agree that Herzog, 
spinning alone in his essentially unchanged consciousness, should be made standard- 
bearer for a "new kind of humanism". However, when Clayton points to Herzog's 
"communing with God", he identifies the feature which will make it more and more 
difficult to style Bellow's central figures as 'humanists'. For even if Moses' spiritual 
insight is transitory (as it is) or the product of a desperate longing (as it may well be), 
the fact remains that the hero is driven to seek a mystical apprehension as a release- 
valve, an outlet to evade the problems and turmoil of - the human. The religious 
overtones of the closing scenes make Herzog reminiscent in many ways of Schlossberg 
in The Victim, Moses desiring a "mild or moderate truthfulness" [316], and his transient 
joy in a deistic amor fati being, if anything, a devout hyper-extension of the philosophy 
of Asa's acquaintance :-
This strange organisation, I know it will die. And inside - something, something, 
happiness [...] 'Thou movest me.' That leaves no choice. Something produces 
intensity, a holy feeling as oranges produce orange, as grass green, as birds heat [...] 
But I have no arguments to make about it. 'Thou movest me.' "But what do you want, 
Herzog?' But that's just it - not a solitary thing. I am pretty well satisfied to be, to be 
just as it is willed, and for as long as I may remain in occupancy. [340]
Herzog's amor fati is as disingenuous as that of Augie, however, since not only is it 
destined to be short-lived, but it can easily degenerate into the passive acceptance, the
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'leave me in peace' type of attitude manifested by his brother Will. But if Herzog 
occupies a static and inert area at the moment, he must presently return to the vibrancy 
and tempestuousness of the 'dangling' state - a fact which he seems to recognize - 
"Myself is thus and so, and will continue thus and so. And why fight it? My balance 
comes from instability. Not organisation ..."[330]. Typically, though, Herzog 
undermines any reconciliation with himself by the demonstrably false declaration that 
he is "much better now at ambiguities"[304], The end fits the man. As Dostoyevsky 
said of his Underground hero: "He could not help going on. But to us too it seems that 
this will be a good place to stop..."19
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Chapter Seven
Mr.Sammler's Planet - Old World, New World. No World
"Pity the planet, all joy gone 
from this sweet volcanic cone;
...until the end of time 
...a ghost
orbiting forever lost
in our monotonous sublime."
Robert Lowell, 'Waking Early Sunday Morning'.
"Madness is something rare in individuals - but in 
groups, parties, peoples, ages it is the rule."
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil.
An alienated, cantankerous and desiccated old man bringing down choleric and 
resentful imprecations upon the (literally!) unwashed multitudes. So flowed the 
general tide of criticism against Mr. Artur Sammler, holocaust survivor and erstwhile 
accolyte of H.G.Wells, as at home amidst what he perceives to be the nightmarish 
and insistent chaos of modern-day Manhattan as an Eloi invited to a Morlocks' 
dinner party. Yet such criticism was easily transposed onto Bellow himself, for 
whom the old Polish Jew seemed an authentic spokesman. With the benefit of 
hindsight, it is easy to laugh at John Clayton's previously cited1 likening of the 
author to Messrs Agnew and Wallace, two figures whose influence as forces of 
putative reaction has proved to have been vastly overestimated. But at the time of 
publication of this, Bellow's seventh novel (1970), such a response was perhaps 
understandable - for Mr.Sammler's Planet dealt a severe blow to Bellow's humanist 
critics. True, these critics ought to have seen the seeds of their despair in Herzog (as 
was mentioned in the foregoing chapter) - perhaps the diffusive and unfocused 
rendering of Moses allowed the suppression of such a recognition.2 But the more 
tightly structured world of Mr. Sammler seemed to leave little room for doubt in 
their minds that the author was guilty of a terrible act of apostasy, losing his nerve
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and selling his literary soul to the powers of an obdurate and cynically reactionary 
conservativism. Of course, the premise for such a sell-out - namely that Bellow had 
been an unalloyed spokesman for the inevitability of a 'humanistic' breakthrough - 
was entirely lacking in the first place. Nevertheless, Benjamin De Mott, speculating 
that Bellow "may have been pushed into intolerance by the cliche-mongering 
protestors rumoured to have told him at a White House party that 'having made you, 
we can break you'", goes on to accuse the author of an "over-rigid, over-familiar 
'decline of culture' set of mind" and complains that "the root of the book's trouble, 
both as argument and as art, is a defect of sympathy".3 David Galloway claims that 
the novel "ultimately shows the bankruptcy of Bellow's novelistic imagination", and 
senses "something Sammleresque" in the author - "a contentment with the ways of 
the past, a dis-ease with the present, an avuncular superiority over unwashed 
radicalism".4 Similarly, M.Gilbert Porter, lamenting the 'essayistic' form of the 
book, informs us that "one's intellectual faculties and critical sensibilities find 
themselves responding more to an essay than to a novel, more to actual objectives 
than to virtual objects", concluding that because "it is a novel by Saul Bellow that 
occasions such responses [it] is a matter of not a little disappointment".5 Eusebio 
Rodrigues desperately tries to salvage something from the humanistic wreckage by 
developing a sudden and profound awareness of the use of irony in Bellow's work, 
cautioning us that Sammler is "not a mere mouthpiece [...] for Bellow's attitudes and 
opinions", and that the reader has to be "alert at all times to the ironic and non- 
Sammlerian points of view"6 - statements which are true enough in themselves, but 
which one suspects have only gained full credence in the mind of this critic because 
to deny them in the context of this novel would make a nonsense of his humanistic 
interpretations of Bellow's work.
1 0 0
But really, all this critical consternation is unnecessary, for Rodrigues is 
essentially correct in this instance - Sammler, like all the other Bellow heroes, is no 
parrot for the circumscribed Bellovian view. The outside world, and the hero's 
reactions to it, may have soured (although one thinks of some of the fearful 
responses to external chaos of Joseph, Leventhal, Tommy, and particularly Herzog) 
but the subtlety of Bellow's art remains, ensuring that Sammler takes his place 
among the perpetually dangling. Alfred Kazin makes the error of conflating author 
and character, accusing Bellow/Sammler of setting an agenda of "punitive moral 
outrage", and claiming that "the unsatisfactory thing about Mr.Sammler is that he is 
always right while most other people are usually wrong - sinfully so. Artur Sammler 
is right and has to be right all the time."7 And, since it suits their purposes, critics 
who oppose the humanist point of view per se, like Michael Glenday, see little room 
for irony in Sammler's construction.8 Yet not only can these views be shown to be 
misguided, it further seems to me that Sammler's language manifests not "rage and 
intolerance"9 (surely it is the likes of the simian student who berates Sammler during 
a lecture who evince such traits) but rather a profound and heartfelt sadness, a 
desperate sympathy - "Mr. Sammler, sorry for all and sore at heart"10 - and indeed, a 
pitiful awareness of the mad comedy of the distortions of the soul, vexed and 
harassed by the aching pressures of modem urban life. The one-eyed Mr. Sammler 
is by no means a Wellsian king in the country of the blind - but he is not the 
Puritanical zealot many critics believe him to be. As for Bellow himself, in answer 
to a question about the novel which he seems astonished should have been asked at 
all, he comments wearily, resignedly: "Of course it was misread..."11
Artur Sammler is a man back from the dead. Buried under a pile of bodies, 
including that of his wife, which have been pitched into a mass grave during the 
horrors of World War Two, and blinded in one eye by the butt of a Nazi rifle,
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Sammler crawls from his hideous charnel prison to eke out a survival as a partisan, 
virtually a scavenging animal, in the Zamosht forest in Poland. Rescued from an 
internment camp by his nephew, Elya Gruner, Sammler has maintained a materially 
comfortable existence in the intervening twenty five years between the war's end 
and the period in which the novel is set, thanks to the largesse of his relative. But 
now, in New York at the start of the Seventies, Sammler is anything but spiritually 
comfortable amidst the overwhelming restlessness and gruesome stimulation of a 
world seemingly out of control. Not so much a Lazarus as a Nosferatu - one of the 
undead - Sammler is riven between a terrible anxiety over the direction of the Life 
of Man, and his own personal horror of the death he once fortuitously evaded. A 
man displaced, out of his time not only in his feeling that he should not, by all 
rights, even be there, but also in his conviction that he represents altogether another 
age, another standard, conveyed after his comical encounter with the imbecilic 
'radicalism' of the scatalogical student:-
He was not sorry to have met the facts, however saddening, regrettable the facts. 
But the effect was that Mr. Sammler did feel somewhat separated from the rest of his 
species, if not in some fashion severed - severed not so much by age as by 
preoccupations too different and remote, disproportionate on the side of the 
spiritual, Platonic, Augustinian, thirteenth-century. [43]
Sammler reads "the wrong books, the wrong papers"[3], particularly those of the 
German religious mystic Meister Eckhart, feels that the "place of honor" [73] was 
outside this time, and, in making a vain appeal to the assembled crowd to break up 
the struggle between Feffer and the black pickpocket, Sammler experiences a 
dreadful epiphany of isolation:-
'Some of you,' Sammler ordered. 'Here! Help him. Break this up.' But of course 
'some of you' did not exist. No one would do anything, and suddenly Sammler felt 
extremely foreign - voice, accent, syntax, manner, face, mind, everything, 
foreign. [287]
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The chaos of the modem world threatens to engulf him - in its character randomly 
violent, grubbily materialistic, risibly exotic and saturated with a lascivious and 
menacing bestiality - at least as Sammler often sees it. This disorder is represented 
in microcosm in Sammler's immediate group o f relatives and acquaintances. There 
is some justification in Porter's criticism that "with the exception of Mr.Sammler, 
the characters seem merely walk-on functionaries, as though they are bearing signs 
declaring their thematic significance"12 - but since their comic purpose is never in 
doubt, this is not a serious flaw (and in any case there is a substantial degree of 
pathos underlying the comedy). So it is that we encounter the turbulent intellectual 
entrepreneur, Feffer, who buzzes with a feeling of information glamour; the "high 
IQ moron" Wallace[i77], whose grotesque desire to do everything, to experience 
everything, makes him the prime exemplar of the modem spirit overcharged with 
unrest, where supposed vitality masks a hideous nihilism; Sammler's own daughter, 
Shula/Slawa, cruelly fixated on her father's long-abandoned memoir o f H.G.Wells; 
the theory junkie, Margotte, who bores Sammler with her interminable 
'explanations'; the "smiling gloomy maniac" Eisen[i55], purveyor of a psychotic and 
deadly 'artistic creativity'; and Bmch and Angela, whose immersion in the "sexual 
madness" which was "overwhelming the Western World" [66] is given comic focus in 
the former's compulsion to masturbate at the sight o f hairy female arms in the 
subway, and in the latter's propensity to administer fellatio to holiday acquaintances. 
Bearing in mind that the Raskolnikovian pickpocket also exposes himself to 
Sammler as a sign of his power, vitality - and relevance - Sammler seems hopelessly 
enmeshed in licentious anarchy, seeing that:-
...the privileges of aristocracy (without any duties) [were] spread wide, especially 
the libidinous privileges, the right to be uninhibited, spontaneous, urinating, 
defacating, belching, coupling in all positions, tripling, quadrupling, polymorphous, 
noble in being natural, primitive, combining the leisure and luxurious inventiveness 
of Versailles with the hibiscus-covered erotic ease of Samoa. [33]
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Surrounded by those who are "communicating chaos" [67], be that chaos physical or 
intellectual, political or personal, Sammler's "earth-departure objectivity"[134] cries 
out for an exit from this intolerable pressure. Thus it appears that he is ready to 
embrace the speculative proposal o f Dr.Lal that the Moon be colonised by Man, that 
it is time "to blow this great white, blue, green planet or to be blown from it"[5l]. 
Fearing that "this earth was a grave"[l82], Sammler senses in the purely biological 
and materially driven argument of Lai the possibility o f spiritual replenishment, a 
new beginning for the human race in a potentially higher 'transcendent' state. 
Sammler is not so much concerned with the actual physical transfer o f Mankind to 
the Moon, but rather with the untouched and unmarred satellite (unspoiled at least 
by humankind) as a symbol for breaking the barriers oj the pressurising physical.
Yet such a longing is set against the fact that Sammler seems as much a part of 
this crazy earth as any o f the mad characters he encounters - and he shares many o f  
their foibles. For instance, though Sammler was "alert to the peril and disgrace of 
explanations, he was himself no mean explainer" [19] - as he proves on numerous 
occasions, particularly in response to Margotte and Lai, and even, at one comical 
juncture, when Angela, racked with anxiety over the impending death of her father, 
fears that Sammler "was trying to turn the subject in a theoretical direction"[ 154], 
Moreover, the world around him may seem bestial, full o f "confused sex-excrement 
militancy, explosiveness, abusiveness, tooth-showing, Barbary Ape howling"[43] - 
but Sammler's own reactions are curiously animalistic. Sammler may claim to 
partake in "aesthetic consumption o f the environment"[44], but it his sense o f smell 
which appears to determine many o f his judgments. This olfactory sensitivity is 
often extremely disturbing - he smells Angela's "sensual womanhood"[30], notes 
with distaste that the dirty female students who had "resolved to stink together in 
defiance of a corrupt tradition" were "naturally more prone to grossness, had more
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smells, needed more washing, clipping, binding, pruning, grooming, perfuming and 
training" [36], senses the "usual smell of long-seated bottoms, of sour shoes, of 
tobacco muck, of stogies, cologne, face powder" on public transport[44], and is 
aware of "a slightly unclean odour from the rear. The merest hint o f fecal 
carelessness" emanating from Wallace" [87]. Detecting spoors everywhere, 
Sammler's nose is "a peculiarly delicate recording system" [87-88] - yes indeed! 
Additionally, in the opinion of the apish student heckler, Sammler is all washed up 
because his sexual potency is a thing of the past. But this view could not be more 
wrong. Sammler may be appalled at the prevailing "sexual madness" - but he, too, 
cannot escape its powerful grip. In a nicely understated sentence, we are informed 
that "Sammler's own sex impulses" were "perhaps even now not altogether 
gone"[l6l]. The old man demonstrates that they are far  from gone - when Sammler 
thinks back to his pre-war existence, he is unable, and unwilling, to block the 
thought of the area (delicacy forbids) "between the legs" o f his long dead wife[28]; 
when his own daughter emerges from bathing, Sammler is aware that he "still 
received primordial messages", noting that "beneath the waist [there was] a thing 
[...] to make a lover gasp"[197]; and on every meeting with Angela, "Mr.Minutely- 
observant Artur Sammler" [12] makes full use o f this faculty in appraising the sexual 
potential of his niece. Indeed, he seems to derive a vicarious thrill from being 
Angela's confidant, listening to her mad sexual adventures - at the very least he does 
not exactly discourage her compulsive relation of them. And there is little doubt that 
Sammler is perversely attracted to the "barbarous-majestical manner" [294], the 
naked nobility of the black pickpocket. So much so that the thiefs exhibitionism 
occasions in Sammler's mind the reflection that, "in this same biological respect he 
was comely enough, in his own Jewish way" [66]. He is even incautious enough to 
hope that Elya had had love affairs, due to the latter's inability to find satisfaction in 
his sexually cold wife[276].
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Furthermore, Sammler has much more in common with the psycopathic lunatic 
Eisen than might at first appear to be the case. Both have come through horrendous 
wartime experiences, Sammler in Poland, Eisen at Stalingrad. Like his son-in-law, 
Sammler is prone to shattering fits o f rage which lay him up for a week with 
"intense migraines"[27]. And when Eisen is savagely bludgeoning the black 
pickpocket (with his ’artistic' creations) he pauses to confront Sammler with the 
brutal reasoning which lies behind his blood-lust:-
Eisen [...] seemed amused at Sammler's ludicrous inconsistency. He said, 'You 
can't hit a man like this just once. When you hit him you must really hit him. 
Otherwise he'll kill you. You know. We both fought in the war. You were a 
partisan. You had a gun. So don't you know?'[29l]
The fact is that Sammler does know, for he himself had pitilessly murdered an 
unarmed German soldier in the Zamosht Forest all those years ago - and had 
experienced a thrilling joy in so doing:-
Mr. Sammler himself was able to add, to the basic wisdom, that to kill the man he 
had ambushed in the snow had given him pleasure. Was it only pleasure? It was 
more. It was joy [...] When he fired his gun, Sammler, himself nearly a corpse, 
burst into life. Freezing in Zamosht Forest, he had often dreamed of being near a 
fire. Well, this was more sumptuous than fire. His heart felt lined with brilliant, 
rapturous satin. To kill the man and to kill him without pity, for he was dispensed 
from pity. There was a flash, a blot of fiery white. When he fired again it was less 
to make sure of the man than to try again for that bliss. To drink more flames. [140- 
141]
And, as a final point, is Sammler's devotion to the works o f Meister Eckhart not all 
too similar to his daughter's "horrible-comical obsession" [51] with Wells? In short, 
Sammler is not the censorious moral pillar many critics believe him to be - he is in 
fact drawn to and attracted by the absurd excitement generated by the crazy crowd 
(he repeats, time and again, his journeys on the bus which is the 'territory' o f the
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black pickpocket - "he craved a repetition"[n].) So deep is this attraction that 
Sammler can be seen as being rather akin to Poe's Man of the Crowd - the man who 
seeks in the multitudes a remedy to his terrible sense of isolation. Sammler is very 
much a part of his time, of these conditions, a fact which he (if not too many critics) 
seems to sense - "My dear girl, in spite of my years, I am a man of the modem 
age" [30], He may try to convince himself that "the place of honour" was outside this 
time, but is blocked by the realisation that "what was achieved by remoteness, by 
being simply a vestige, a visiting consciousness which happened to reside in a West 
Side bedroom, did not entitle one to the outside honours" [73], Despite everything, 
this is Mr.Sammler's planet.
Just like the other Bellow heroes, Sammler is tom between notions of the value of 
the self, and the importance of human brotherhood - and just like the other heroes, 
he is unable to resolve this paradox. Sammler sees the chaos of those around him 
resulting from the fact that, in his view, the "liberation into individuality has not 
been a great success" [228], This emancipation has become so grotesquely 
elaborated that what Sammler witnesses around him, not with rancour but with 
regret, is the failure of the self. One of Bellow's most acute diagnoses of the modem 
condition, which he has frequently mentioned in interview, is the observation that "a 
degenerate negative romanticism is at the core of modem mass culture [...] popular 
nihilism"13 - that the twentieth century has "inverted Romanticism by substituting 
hate for love and nihilism for self-realisation."14 This view is most certainly shared 
by Sammler who sees that a "Dark Romanticism now took hold" [33]:-
He saw the increasing triumph of Enlightenment - Liberty, Fraternity, Equality, 
Adultery! Enlightenment, universal education, universal suffrage, the rights of the 
majority recognised by all governments, the rights of women, the rights of children, 
the rights of criminals, the unity of different races affirmed, social security, public 
health, the dignity of the person, the right to justice [...] but liberal beliefs did not 
seem capable of self-defense, and you could smell decay. You could see the
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suicidal impulses of civilization pushing strongly. You wondered whether this 
Western culture could survive universal dissemination [...] whether the worst 
enemies of civilization might not prove to be its petted intellectuals who attacked it 
at its weakest moments -attacked it in the name of proletarian revolution, in the 
name of reason and in the name of irrationality, in the name of visceral depth, in the 
name of sex, in the name of perfect instantaneous freedom. For what it amounted to 
was limitless demand - insatiability, refusal of the doomed creature (death being 
sure and final) to go away from this earth unsatisfied. A full bill of demand and 
complaint was therefore presented by each individual. Nonnegotiable. Recognising 
no scarcity of supply in any human department. Enlightenment? Marvelous! But 
out of hand, wasn't it?[32-34]
It is this terribly extended demand for the freedom to undergo all forms of  
experience - to be everything and everyone - to cram as much as possible into a 
horribly brief existence, which leads to the pitiful spectacle o f debased, gimcrack 
and, importantly from Sammler's point o f view, helplessly public and amoral 
individuality. The true self is submerged beneath "the whole experience of mankind 
[...] covering each separate life its flood"[26]>
Art increased, and a sort of chaos. More possibility, more actors, apes, copy-cats, 
more invention, more fiction, illusion, more fantasy, more despair [...] Just look 
(Sammler looked) at this imitative anarchy of the streets - these Chinese 
revolutionary tunics, these babes in unisex toyland, these surrealist warchiefs, 
Western stagecoach drivers - Ph.Ds in philosophy, some of them [...] They sought 
originality. They were obviously derivative [...] of Hollywood extras. Acting 
mythic. Casting themselves into chaos, hoping to adhere to higher consciousness, to 
be washed up on the shores of truth. Better, thought Sammler, to accept the 
inevitability of imitation and then to imitate good things [...] But choose higher 
representations. Otherwise the individual must be the failure he now sees and 
knows himself to be. [148-49]
Sammler, "aware of the suffering" [229] underlying this dreadful comedy, reinforces 
the point in his talk with Dr Lal:-
Hearts that get no real wage, souls that find no nourishment. Falsehoods, 
unlimited. Desire, unlimited. Possibility, unlimited. Impossible demands upon 
complex realities, unlimited [...] But one notices most a peculiar play-acting, an 
elaborate and sometimes quite artistic manner of presenting oneself as an individual 
and a strange desire for originality, distinction, interest - yes, interest [...] modem
108
man [...] has a fever of originality. The idea of the uniqueness of the soul. An 
excellent idea. A true idea. But in these forms? In these poor forms? Dear God! 
With hair, with clothes, with drugs and cosmetics, with genitalia, with round trips 
through evil, monstrosity, and orgy, with even God approached through obscenities? 
How terrified the soul must be in this vehemence, how little that is really dear to it it 
can see in these Sadie exercises. [229]
The amoral aspect of the false self is given shocking clarity in Sammler's obsessive 
remembrances about the hideous burlesque o f Chaim Rumkowski, the Nazi- 
installed mock ruler o f the Jews of Lodz, the "King of rags and shit" [232]. 
Rumkowski, with his "antics o f failed individuality, the grand seigneur or dictatorial 
absurdities" [231] presided over the death o f half a million people - what self- 
mutilation was necessary to play this role one can only guess. At any rate, since 
Rumkowski eventually stepped voluntarily into the train bound for Auschwitz, the 
degree o f self-hatred on his part must have become intolerable. The relevance of 
this morbid circus to Sammler is correctly identified by Judie Newman:- "The rise of 
the atomistic individual has created, in Sammler's opinion, a world populated with 
Rumkowskis, each a king in a circumscribed sphere only by dint o f ignoring the 
existence o f a wider universe in which their actions occur."15 But Sammler is not 
overcome by the urge to rage or condemn - rather, the sight o f the meretricious, 
interchangeable and foundationless self induces in him only sympathy and sadness. 
He understands the agonised craving for recognition which underlies Bruch's sexual 
compulsion[62]; he senses "the undertones appealing really for help" beneath Feffer's 
chaos[llo]; recognises that Margotte "was a good soul"[i32]; feels pity when 
Wallace laments that "I never had any dignity to start with"[24i]; and, despite the 
trouble she causes him, and the lunatic deformations of her personality, tells Shula 
that "you're a good daughter, the best o f any. No better daughter" [311]. What 
Sammler seeks to encourage is the development of an ethical, inner self - his aim is 
"to bring out the weakness o f the outer forms which are at present available for our 
humanity, and the pitiable lack of confidence in them [...] as long as there is no
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ethical life and everything is poured so barbarously and recklessly into personal 
gesture this [misery] must be endured" [233,235]. Positing the concept of a genius for 
the "common life"[l47], o f discharging one's actions in accordance with everyday 
duty, Sammler articulates his fervent hope that there is an "implicit morality in the 
will to live" [220]:-
When you know what pain is, you agree that not to have been bom is better. But 
being bom one respects the powers of creation, one obeys the will o f God - with 
whatever inner reservations truth imposes [...] The pain of duty makes the creature 
upright, and this uprightness is no negligible thing.[220]
Thus it is how Sammler believes the formation of the 'true self will come about. 
But, as Lai points out, one's duties can easily become intolerable - "...duty is pain. 
Duty is hateful-misery, oppressive" [220] - and so not only morality in the will-to-live 
but the will-to-live itself is threatened with extinction. And in Sammler's 
conviction that "a few may comprehend that it is the strength to do one's duty daily 
and promptly that makes saints and heroes"[93], there is also the inherent possibility 
that such a philosophy will produce madmen and irrelevant martyrs, becoming part 
of that remoteness which Sammler had earlier rejected. The dangers o f a passive 
stoicism have already been seen all too clearly in the figures o f Schlossberg and 
Herzog.
But if  Sammler is dismayed by the signs that the self is crumbling, his hope of 
solace in the ultimate unity of his species is tenuous. Pre-war, Sammler had been 
involved in Olaf Stapledon's and Gerald Heard's 'Cosmopolis' project for the creation 
of a World State, "a service society based on a rational scientific attitude toward 
life"[41]. Though he still looks back on it half-fondly, as a "kind-hearted ingenuous, 
stupid scheme"[4l], the war, with all o f its scientific barbarism and irrationality, had 
inevitably vitiated this ideal. Nevertheless, Sammler's slender feelings of 
brotherhood, of belonging, remain - but mostly on a level which seems divorced
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from the human, in the rarified atmosphere of a desperate spirituality. True, the 
intimations of a commonality firmly grounded in the human are there - "All about 
was a softness of perhaps dissolved soot, or of air passed through many breasts, or 
metabolized in multitudinous brains, or released from as many intestines, and it got 
to one - oh, deeply, too! "[117] - but such outlines of the "whole" on a material plane 
can just as easily be dismissed by Sammler as "childish notion[s]" which led to "all 
this madness, mad religions, LSD, suicide, to crime"[ l81]. More frequent are the 
passages which indicate a desire to commune, rather than an actual belief in the 
certainty of experiencing such community:-
No, his personal idea was of the human being conditioned by other human beings, 
and knowing that present arrangements were not, sub specie aeternitatis, the truth, 
but that one should be satisfied with such truth as one could get by approximation. 
Trying to live with a civil heart. With disinterested charity. With a sense of the 
mystic potency of humankind. With an inclination to believe in archetypes of 
goodness. A desire for virtue was no accident. [136]
Sammler often thinks about the "psychic unity" o f Man[l89], citing the example 
from War and Peace where Pierre Bezukhov exchanges a 'human look' with the 
cruel French general about to order his execution, and, as a result of such contact, 
Pierre is spared. Though sympathizing "with such a desire for such a belief' 
however[i89], Sammler sadly concludes:-
'I myself never knew it to work. No, I never saw it happen. It is a thing worth 
praying for. And it is based on something. It's not an arbitrary idea. It's based on 
the belief that there is the same truth in the heart of every human being, or a splash 
of God's own spirit, and that this is the richest thing we share in common. And up to 
a point I would agree. But though it's not an arbitrary idea, I wouldn't count on 
it.'[189]
The reason, of course, why Sammler is unable fully to accept this idea is that such a 
look from the unarmed German soldier who died at Sammler's hands made no 
impression on the latter - there was no bond, however slight, between the two. Thus
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it is that Sammler's hopes have a vague and forlorn air about them, and why he can 
often lapse into terror of his species, as he does whenever he passes along 
Broadway:-
By a convergence of all minds and all movements the conviction transmitted by 
this crowd seemed to be that reality was a terrible thing, and that the final truth 
about Mankind was overwhelming and crushing. This vulgar, cowardly conclusion, 
rejected by Sammler with all his heart, was the implicit local orthodoxy...[280]
In attempting to straddle the gap between the false self and some form of other­
worldly unity, Sammler holds up the example of Elya Gruner as combining elements 
of true individuality with brotherly concern. Elya, with his "Old World family 
feelings"[n], had "a passion for kinships"[82], and was "a dependable man - a man 
who took thought for others"[85], And though Sammler seems to be under no 
illusions about Elya - "he's touchy, boastful, he repeats himself. He's vain, grouchy, 
proud. But he's done well, and I admire him"[303] - the latter appears to embody the 
ethical personalism combined with familial devotion to duty to which Sammler 
aspires. And to a certain extent this is true, since Gruner has been gracious enough 
to support both Sammler and Shula, and repeatedly expresses his anxiety over his 
own wayward children's future after his impending death. But Elya's "old 
system"[302] does not seem to make an imprint on anyone but Sammler. Angela 
grudgingly accedes to Sammler's characterisation of Elya - "So he's human. All 
right, he's human"[303] - but neither she nor Wallace can come to any kind of moral 
rapprochement with their dying father. Moreover, Sammler discovers during the 
course of the novel that Elya had performed illegal abortions at the behest of the 
Mafia, the proceeds of which he has carefully hidden from his admittedly avaricious 
offspring. So, in reaffirming his kinship with Elya, Sammler again seems to place 
the relationship out of this world:-
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About essentials, almost nothing could be said. Still, signs could be made, should 
be made, must be made. One should declare something like this: However actual I 
may seem to you and you to me, we are not as actual as all that. We will die. 
Nevertheless there is a bond. There is a bond.'[26l]
In essence, Sammler dangles between a surrender to the onrush o f the false 
construct o f individuality and empathy with the underlying, stifled humanity; and 
between a revulsion for the mad crowd and an unpromising transcendental unity. It 
is an unenviable position in which to be - his compassion is evident, but so is his 
powerlessness.
Touching on Sammler's transcendent longings brings us to a further area in which 
he dangles - between the human and beyond the human, between creatureliness and 
spirituality, between the finite and the infinite. In seeking a way out o f "spatial- 
temporal prison"[53], Sammler's interest in Lai's aiming at the moon extends, as was 
said, only so far as the endeavour is "advantageous for us metaphysically" [237]. The 
moon, though distant, is still finite - "Finite is still feeling through the veil, 
examining the naked inner reality with a gloved hand"[53], Sammler's desire to 
transcend the finite comes in large measure from his terror o f a final, absolute 
creaturely death. He had "once been on far more easy terms with death" - his 
existence had, after all, been a sort of Life in Death - but now, with the advancing 
years, he "had lost ground, regressed"[105]. Battered by images which signal the end 
- Elya in his hospital bed, the metaphorical death of humanity he sees in the New  
York streets, even his visit to the subway recalling his incarceration in the funeral 
vault where he hid from the Nazis during the war - Sammler's ache for the infinite 
appears to have reached such a pitch that he is almost convinced of its veracity:-
Blessed are the poor in spirit. Poor is he who has nothing. He who is poor in spirit 
is receptive of all spirit. Now God is the spirit o f spirits. The fruit o f the spirit is 
love, joy, and peace. See to it that you are stripped o f all creatures, o f all 
consolation from creatures. For certainly as long as creatures comfort and are able 
to comfort you, you will never find true comfort. But if  nothing can comfort you 
save God, truly God will console you. [253]
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Although Sammler "could not say that he literally believed what he was reading (a 
passage from Meister Eckhart) [...] he cared to read nothing but this"[253-54], 
Moreover, he claims that "...almost daily I have strong impressions o f eternity" 
which take the form of "God adumbrations" [237] and a place where "all is not flatly 
knowable" and "one's ape restiveness would stop"[236,237], But we have already 
seen how much at home Sammler is in the creaturely, physical world. And, in spite 
o f the fact that "he wanted, with God, to be free from the bondage o f the ordinary 
and the finite. A soul released from Nature, from impressions, and from everyday 
life"[ll7], Sammler is aware that "in the human setting, along with everyone else, 
among particulars o f ordinary life he was human", is open to the "low tricks" and 
"doggish hind-sniffing charm" of creatureliness[ll7], and is "so powerfully, so 
persuasively, drawn back to human conditions", to "a return match with the 
persistent creature"[l 18], It is also worth mentioning in passing how much of 
Sammler's philosophy of the ethical self is bound up with "the bondage of the 
ordinary and finite". In any case, Sammler is also uncomfortable with notions of the 
infinite. He does "not personally care for the illimitable" [183], and declares that "I 
like ceilings, and the high better than the low" [184] (immediately contradicting his 
assertion that "I seem to be a depth man rather than a height man"[i83]). Sammler's 
apprehension over the limitless is due to the realisation on his part that it is an 
infinite desire which engenders the nihilism which he divines to be rife among the 
masses - but this desire is mostly on a material level. It does seem, however, that 
Sammler is alive to the danger that a passion for the spiritual infinite could be just 
as mad, cranky, and horribly detrimental to the person as a passion for the 
experiential infinite. He rejects Kierkegaard's idea o f the Knight o f Faith', the "real 
prodigy" who, "having set its relations with the infinite, was entirely at home in the 
finite" [62], In the twentieth century, as Sammler has discovered to his cost, such a 
figure would become, and did become, lawless, unaccountable, voraciously
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smashing old-fashioned "humanly appointed laws in obedience to God" [63], In sum, 
Sammler is "the human being at the point where he attempted to obtain his release 
from being human" [251] - but armed with an awareness that transcendence is "also 
getting rid of the human being" [235], Sammler dangles in a nebulous area "willing 
as God wills"[236], a foot in either camp of animalistic experience and transcendent 
eternity, maintaining the paradoxical state of unstable equilibrium.
This last statement sums up Artur Sammler to such a degree that it is difficult to 
appreciate the jaundiced condemnation of many critics. In a passage that could have 
been written for any one of Bellow's gallery of heroes, Sammler reflects that "Once 
take a stand, once draw a base line, and contraries will assail you. Declare for 
normalcy and you will be stormed by aberrancies. All postures are mocked by their 
opposites"[118], So it is that Sammler is "someone between the human and not- 
human states, between content and emptiness, between full and void, meaning and 
not-meaning, between this world and no world"[290], who exemplifies "this vivid 
shuffle with its pangs of higher intuition from the one side and the continual muddy 
suck of the grave underfoot" [260-61], It logically follows that if the view of the 
novel as bitter and defeatist is incorrect in the light of Sammler's dangling, then it is 
equally impossible to concur with the view of a minority of critics who cast 
Sammler as "an exponent of old-style humanism"16 or see the novel as "a beautiful 
defense of our common humanity"17 - it should be clear that Sammler is too 
contradictory, his sense of brotherhood too tentative and religious, his experiences 
too scarring for such a conclusion to be justified. His final words over Elya's body 
are more of a sad prayer and a final, plaintive articulation of his philosophy of Duty 
than a definitive affirmation of a humanist ideal :-
'Remember, God, the soul of Elya Gruner, who, as willingly as possible and as well 
as he was able, and even to an intolerable point, and even in suffocation and even as 
death was coming was eager, even childishly perhaps (may I be forgiven for this), 
even with a certain servility, to do what was required of him. At his best this man 
was much kinder than at my very best I have ever been or could ever be. He was
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aware that he must meet, and he did meet - through all the confusion and degraded 
clowning of this life through which we are speeding - he did meet the terms of his 
contract. The terms which, in his inmost heart, each man knows. As I know mine. 
As all know. For that is the truth of it - that we all know, God, that we know, that 
we know, we know, we know'. [313]
There are the threads of a shared experience and knowledge explicit in Sammler's 
orison, but the truth of it is that Sammler is by no means certain that "we all know" - 
for he has seen little to confirm this view. More properly, his benediction reflects 
the hope that, obscured beneath the junk of false consciousness, beneath the 
spurious trappings of modem living, there lies something unchanging, vital and 
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Chapter Eight
Humboldt's Gift - Systems of Transcendence.
"We have described truly enough the soul as we at present see it. But we see it in a 
state like that of Glaucus the sea-god, and its original nature is as difficult to see as 
his was after long immersion had broken and worn away and deformed his limbs, 
and covered him with shells and seaweed and rock, till he looked more like a 
monster than what he really was. That is the sort of state we see the soul reduced to 
by countless evils."
Plato, The Republic.
"Flaubert complained that the exterior world was 'disgusting, enervating, corruptive 
and brutalising [...] I am turning towards a kind of aesthetic mysticism', he wrote."
Saul Bellow.
In what one suspects was a spirit of profound relief after the perceived nightmares 
of Mr.Sammler’s Planet, Malcolm Bradbury greeted the publication of Humboldt's 
Gift with the joyous declaration that "Bellow has bounced back, back to the 
panoramic, picaresque, ebullient vein of some of his earlier novels."1 To a certain 
extent this is indeed the case. Not only is there a perceptible attenuation in the 
claustrophobic tensions of Artur Sammler's world, but Humboldt's Gift, suffused as 
it is with a varied array of often outlandish characters, seems most closely to recall 
the 'adventures' of a certain Mr.March. Moreover, the air of plaintive comedy which 
has its roots in that novel published over twenty years previously is given perhaps its 
most full bodied realisation in the calamitous enterprises of Charlie Citrine. 
However, the depth and scope of Humboldt's Gift was seen to so far outweigh that of 
The Adventures o f Augie March that Eusebio Rodrigues, in a delirium of sudorific 
exultation, bursts forth with the splendid news that in "attempting a Mahabharata- 
like novel, Bellow had to direct all the creative energies he now possessed and use 
all the fictional strategies he commanded to demonstrate and dramatize such a 
cyclocosmic vision".2 Recovering from these tidings, though, and attempting to 
penetrate beneath the legend, we find that Charlie is not simply an ageing Augie -
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but he does share, and indeed takes to an extreme, the central characteristic of the 
younger hero.
It was noted earlier that there is something deeply elusive about Augie - his 
'nothing self - and Charlie reflects this slipperiness of being almost to the point of 
invisibility. So difficult is it to pin Charlie down that there are several differing 
interpretations of his status. Jonathan Wilson sees Citrine as an "avatar of his 
creator", noting that, "in Humboldt's Gift Bellow seems finally to have consumed 
himself'.3 Roger Shattuck divines that "the more closely Bellow projects himself 
into Citrine, the more mocking his voice seems to become", and concludes that "in 
Humboldt's Gift, Bellow gets in his own way"4 Whilst Charles Newman declares 
that "Citrine is a character apart from Bellow's other narrators", averring that 
"Herzog would find Citrine on many occasions cliched, pretentious, a facsimile of 
the very intellect he claims to despise most, the professor manque [...and...] 
Sammler would find him morally passive and intellectually sloppy".5 Shattuck 
seems closest to an appreciation of the ironic endorsement in a Bellow narrative, 
that near concurrence of authorial encouragement and distance which occasions the 
hero's 'dangling'. But since this is a characteristic common to all Bellow's main 
protagonists, it does not in itself explain the particular vagueness surrounding 
Citrine. I think such vagueness can be accounted for in two ways. First, the strength 
of the portrayal of many of the other characters in the novel, especially Humboldt 
and Cantabile. Charlie (like Augie), can often be overshadowed by the sheer force 
of these frantic personalities; indeed, he confesses at one point to being "the 
expressive delegate of other people".6 Second, and most pertinent in this case, is 
Citrine's recurring disposition to "switch out"[83] of his environment and attempt to 
enter a mystical realm of transcendent beauty, an area which seems to be fashioned 
from a reading of Plato, Blake, Emerson and, in particular, of Rudolf Steiner:
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"when", laments Charlie in an echo of Steiner's most famous work, "would I rise at 
last above all this stuff, the accidental, the merely phenomenal, the wastefully and 
randomly human, and be fit to enter higher worlds?"[29l].7 This seems a point 
almost too obvious to mention; but it should be emphasised not only because Citrine 
is without doubt the most overtly esoteric of Bellow's creations (to such a degree 
that John J.Clayton cautioned Bellow against a fiction "which cuts itself off from 
life"8), but because it is Charlie's dualistic relationship to his mystical experiences 
around which the inability to fully define him coalesces. Thus Newman is not 
entirely wrong when he sees Citrine as "a character apart". To be sure, Charlie is a 
dangling man - but the difference lies in the impression that he has, at least to some 
degree, accepted and come to terms with much of the appalling chaos and feverish 
dissolution of the modem world, that he is a man with a sense of wry 
rapprochement. Therefore it is his urge to opt out, to move on, which receives our 
attention, rather than the diagnoses of contemporary maladies (which, it should be 
noted, are by no means reduced in their force of portrayal). Thus it is that Charlie 
seems to evade concrete definition, and why his narrative speculations can often 
appear utterly divorced from 'real-life' situations and contexts. Yet for all that, 
Charlie's immersion in harum-scarum Chicago, in what he styles the "moronic 
inferno"[35], is just as potent as his spiritual craving (and certainly more 
entertaining). Charlie is just as likely to be forced to inhale the fragrance of the 
erstwhile contents of Cantabile's bowels as he is to undergo a coruscating visionary 
experience! As these two areas of the crassly material and the gloriously 
transcendent vie with each other, Citrine's shimmering presence in the middle 
provides further evidence of the unaltered state of the Bellow hero.
When we first encounter Charlie Citrine, successful author (biographer of 
Woodrow Wilson and Harry Hopkins), celebrity and public 'personality', he is
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engaged in one of his numerous remembrances of his one-time friend and mentor, 
the poet Von Humboldt Fleisher. On the surface, the fates of the two men could not 
be more different. Whilst Charlie fraternises with politicians, pens Broadway hits, 
delights in the company of sensuous and sophisticated women, and, in short, has a 
"proven ability to earn big sums" [230], Humboldt faithfully enacts the classic role of 
the artist in the United States, by becoming a self-destructive "farcical martyr"[345] 
who reaches Potter's Field via Bellevue:-
For after all Humboldt did what poets in crass America are supposed to do. He 
chased ruin and death even harder than he chased women. He blew his talent and 
his wealth and reached home, the grave, in a dusty slide. He plowed himself under 
[...] For some reason this awfulness is peculiarly appreciated by business and 
technological America. The country is proud o f its dead poets. It takes terrific 
satisfaction in the poets' testimony that America is too tough, too big, too much, too 
rugged, that American reality is overpowering. And to be a poet is a school thing, a 
skirt thing, a church thing. The weakness of the spiritual powers is proved in the 
childishness, madness, drunkenness, and despair o f these martyrs.[ll7-H8]
And the theatricality of Humboldt's mission (his only published collection of poetry 
is entitled Harlequin Ballads') is encapsulated in this prescription:-
But no, instead of being a poet he was merely the figure of a poet. He was enacting 
"The Agony of the American Artist." And it was not Humboldt, it was the USA that 
was making its point: Fellow Americans, listen. If you abandon materialism and the 
normal pursuits of life you wind up at Bellevue like this poor kook". [156]
Humboldt, "passionately liv[ing] out the theme of Success [...] died a failure"[6], 
For to be a Success in art in the USA is to be a failure. A memorable amalgam of 
Poe, John Berryman and Delmore Schwartz (and indeed, in his brilliant gibberish, of 
Dr.Tamkin from Seize the Day), Humboldt's artistic purity is the mortal enemy of 
ubiquitous and turbulent reality, of the 'Great Noise', "the noise of technology, the 
noise of money or advertising and promotion, the noise of the media, the noise of 
miseducation [...] the terrible excitement and distraction generated by the crises of
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modem life"9 Citrine, on the other hand, is racked with regret over the impurity of 
his works and his status, "filled [...] with guilt and shame"[51] because his debased 
and commercial 'Art' merely adds to the prevailing turmoil and agitation. As he 
explains to his old sweetheart:-
... society claims more and more and more of your inner self and infects you with 
its restlessness. It trains you in distraction, colonizes consciousness as fast as 
consciousness advances. The true poise, that of contemplation or imagination, sits 
right on the border of sleep and dreaming. Now, Naomi, as I was lying stretched out 
in America, determined to resist its material interests and hoping for redemption by 
art, I fell into a deep snooze that lasted for years and decades. Evidently I didn't 
have what it took. What it took was more strength, more courage, more stature. [306]
Maybe so, but such thoughts are more than a little self-indulgent on Citrine's part, as 
he is fully aware that the possession of such courage might lead to ridicule, 
ruination, and death in the doss-house. After all, subsequent to informing us that he 
had "always loved" Humboldt[2], he avoids the chance of reconciliation with his 
estranged former teacher, then in a state of terminal material and spiritual penury, 
going so far as to hide behind a parked car so that Humboldt who "had death all over 
him" [7] cannot see him. Charlie is intensely troubled by this recollection, not only 
because of his moral cowardice, but also because of the message it transmits to him 
about the value of his life's endeavour. Must the bona fide artist in America be a 
wretched, shambolic and doomed figure?
Yet all is not as straightforward as it may seem - for although their paths seem to 
have taken diametrically opposed routes, the truth is that Humboldt and Charlie 
have more in common than perhaps even they suspect. Both are, to a significant 
degree, actors. We have already noted the indicators of a performance in 
Humboldt's life and work as he demonstrates the failure of the spiritual. Charlie, 
too, has assumed the trappings of a showman, not only in his celebrity status
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(Charlie is in fact famous not for his work, but is simply famous for being famous - 
he is a 'somebody' because he is in 'Who's Who'), but also by adopting the 
disinterested manners of the 'world-historical individual', aloof from the concerns of 
petty humanity.10 And although Charlie is not guilty of taking this intuition to 
Raskolnikovian lengths, he is nevertheless culpable in respect of acting as if he bore 
a unique imprint which, when released, would transform the race. It is with some 
justification, we feel, that Cantabile accuses Citrine of despising the "people of the 
world"[96], that ex-wife Denise upbraids him for having "delusions about being a 
marvelous noble person"[43-44], and that mistress Renata describes as "boring" 
Citrine's efforts to "dope [his] way out of the human condition" [430]. Belatedly, 
Charlie seems to cut through all of this pompous tomfoolery, realising that what he 
had created was merely "a superior emptiness"[323] - although in his later 
Steineresque meditations there is a strong sense that Charlie sees himself as a 
special conduit for new and essential information. In fairness to Charlie, there are 
no prizes for guessing whose 'artistic' influence sent him in this direction! Indeed, 
there is a deep ambiguity about Humboldt's 'art' itself. The Harlequin Ballads' are 
produced during a contented period of Humboldt's life. When he degenerates into 
wife-beater, drunk, pill popper and madman (and thus becomes possessed of the true 
credentials of the 'American Artist'), he is creatively barren - further enforcing the 
notion that he is merely a performing clown. This is not to doubt the fact that true 
art can be produced by those who are not alcoholic lunatics, but rather to question 
why Humboldt fell into this role: did he feel-compelled to? Moreover, since his first 
flush of fame as a poet, Humboldt seems to have devoted his attention to two things. 
First, there are his comic attempts to land sinecures at major universities (at one 
stage, and in the knowledge that Humboldt had secured at least four of these, Citrine 
half wistfully, half acidly comments that "He (Humboldt) was at the height of his
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reputation though not of his powers"[17]), and second, there is his headlong pursuit 
of riches, crystallised in an amusing exchange with Charlie:-
Humboldt had the conviction that there was wealth in the world - not his - to which 
he had a sovereign claim and that he was bound to get it. He had told me once that 
he was fated to win a big lawsuit, a million-dollar suit. 'With a million bucks,' he 
said, 'I'll be free to think of nothing but poetry.'
'How will this happen?'
'Somebody will wrong me.'
'Wrong you a million dollars worth?'
'If I'm obsessed, as a poet shouldn't be, there's a reason for it,' [...] 'The reason is 
that we're Americans after all [...] Walpole said it was natural for free men to think 
about money. Why? Because money is freedom, that's why'. [159]
If what emerges is not exactly a sense o f intrinsic falseness about Humboldt's art, 
then at the very least there is something degraded - and degrading - about it. 
Humboldt turns himself from an artist into something of a cultural functionary. It is 
doubly ironic, then, that in the film treatment Humboldt bequeaths to Charlie, the 
protagonist's experiences not only mirror the vitiated and soiled nature o f Citrine's 
'art', but also lament Humboldt's own lost ideal. Yet if Humboldt becomes 
something of a Machiavelli, then Charlie has been one all along! And only Charlie 
seems to have suppressed this knowledge. For not only was Humboldt wary of the 
intense ambition of this disingenuous Rube, but Charlie's oldest friend George 
points out to him that "When you were younger you were on the make. You may 
not realize it but you were damn clever and canny about your career" [314]. And 
because of the nature of Citrine's biographies, old acquaintance Huggins accuses 
him of being an apologist for the American system of government, "a front man and 
stooge, practically an Andrei Vishinsky"[32i], Charlie's success is a testament to the 
fact that these charges might not be without foundation. And yet even here there is 
a bond with Humboldt. For if  Humboldt's metier had led him to poverty, madness 
and destitution, then Charlie's accomplishments have only led him to be a target for 
freaks, lunatics, gold-digging bimbos and grasping lawyers. Charlie is bombarded
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with demands from this menagerie to the extent that, like Tommy in Seize the Day, 
he "haemorrhages money". Now, though, tired with the blandishments o f the world 
(or perhaps more accurately the pressures they induce), Charlie seems to desire 
nothing more than a way out o f such 'success'. One thing in his favour is that no-one 
disagrees that Charlie has "a real soul"[307]. Encouraged by Humboldt's parting shot 
in his will - "we are not natural beings but supernatural beings" [347] - Citrine 
determines, much as did Henderson (although Charlie has more knowledge of 
Shelley's poetry than does Eugene), to "burst the spirit's sleep", to search behind the 
Mayan 'veil' for eternity, rejecting "the plastered idols of the Appearances"[16]. It is 
characteristic of the Bellow hero, however, that the more he tries to cultivate the 
powers o f the soul, the more he is immersed in the chaos of the fallen world: in 
Charlie's case in the crackpot schemes o f Cantabile and Thaxter, and in the webs 
and strategies o f hoodlum lawyers and Clausewitzian females. Indeed, it is equally 
characteristic that the hero is attracted to this world.
"Absorbed in determining what a human being is"[89], Charlie's growing 
conviction that he is more than the sum of his fleshly parts is given recurrent focus, 
his mystical intimations encroaching more and more into his daily life. He puts his 
nascent ability to peer behind the appearances of reality down to a recovery of 
something long-forgotten, innocent and unselfconscious:-
And last spring, almost an elderly fellow now, I found that I had left the sidewalk 
and that I was following the curb and looking. For what? What was I doing? 
Suppose I had found a dime? Suppose I found a fifty-cent piece? What then? I 
don't know how the child's soul had gotten back, but it was back. Everything was 
melting. Ice, discretion, maturity. What would Humboldt have said to this? [3]
Humboldt would no doubt have approved, as Charlie takes up one of his former 
mentor's ideas, that of the 'child-soul' belonging to some sort of Platonic home- 
world:-
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One of Humboldt's themes was the perennial human feeling that there was an 
original world, a home-world, which was lost. Sometimes he spoke of poetry as the 
merciful Ellis Island where a host of aliens began their naturalization and of this 
planet as a thrilling but insufficiently humanised imitation of that home-world. He 
spoke of our species as castaways. [24]
The connection of poets and artists (and even those as dodgy as Humboldt and 
Charlie) with aliens and children in Business and Scientific America is clearly no 
coincidence. But, essentially, what the existence of a home-world would mean to 
Charlie is that he could confront his overbearing terror of Death with the knowledge 
that the soul is immortal. For Citrine is no less susceptible than any of the other 
central characters (one thinks particularly of Henderson and Sammler) to an ever- 
increasing consciousness that the grave might just prove to be the ultimate victor. 
His fear of the end is obvious, as when he agonises over the fates of Demmie and 
Humboldt, his beloved dead:-
You could simply assume that they had been forever wiped out, as you too would 
one day be. So if the daily papers told of murders committed in the streets before 
crowds of neutral witnesses, there was nothing illogical about such neutrality. On 
the metaphysical assumptions about death everyone in the world had apparently 
reached, everyone would be snatched, ravished by death, throttled, smothered. This 
terror and this murdering were the most natural things in the world. And the same 
conclusions were incorporated into the life of society and present in all its 
institutions, in politics, education, banking, justice. [263-264]
"Either I conceded the finality of death and refused to have any further 
intimations, condemned my childish sentimentality and hankering," says Charlie, "or 
I conducted a full and proper investigation"[263]. So it is that Citrine cleaves to the 
feeling that the imperishable soul returns after death to the home-world, from where 
it makes joyous and varied forays of cyclic permanence back into this world:-
At this moment I must say, almost in the form of a deposition, without argument, 
that I do not believe my birth began my first existence. Nor Humboldt's. Nor
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anyone's. On esthetic grounds, if on no others, I cannot accept the view of death 
taken by most of us, and taken by me during most of my life - on esthetic grounds 
therefore I am obliged to deny that so extraordinary a thing as a human soul can be 
wiped out forever. [141]
and:-
The whole thing is disintegrating and reintegrating all the time, and you have to 
guess whether it's always the same cast of characters or a lot of different 
characters. [301]
And he invokes Plato to ratify "my sense that this was not my first time around. We 
had all been here before and would presently be here again. There was another 
place" [89], Armed with such Zarathustrian confidence in 'eternal recurrence', 
Charlie experiences "a kind of light-in-the-being", an inner radiance which was "like 
the breath of life itself'[177]. And, as always with the Bellow hero, the key to 
tapping in to this outgrowth of the rich spiritual kingdom beyond lies in the 
activation of memories occasioned by love. In Charlie's case these are abundant and 
diverse, involving recollections of his parents, his childhood sweetheart Naomi, his 
old lodger Menasha, his time with Demmie Vonghel, his salad days with Humboldt, 
and even a minutely detailed remembrance of the previous day spent with Renata. 
As he explains to brother Ulick after one particular reminiscence:-
T)o you remember all that? Well, I'll tell you why I bring it up - there are good 
esthetic reasons why this should not be wiped from the record eternally. No one 
would put so much heart into things doomed to be forgotten and wasted. Or so 
much love. Love is gratitude for being. This love would be hate, Ulick, if the whole 
thing was nothing but a gyp'. [392]
Ulick's indifferent response to this speech, however, shows the difficulty of 
communicating such sentiments. It is a nice touch, incidentally, that Charlie should 
describe both his intimations of immortality, and his memories, as "esthetic", 
bearing in mind the role that "Art" plays in the novel. Such preoccupations, it
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seems, represent the true domain of the artist, and the area where potential 
transcendence is to be sought. But although Charlie desires to dwell with 
archangels, he cannot escape the limits o f the physical, fallen world. And indeed, 
although he complains about death being incorporated into every facet o f life, he 
can nevertheless find much compensation in the realm of the corporeal. Humboldt 
had once chided Citrine for being "one of those Axel types that only cares about 
inner inspiration, no connection with the actual world [...] The actual world can 
kiss your ass" [122]. He could not have been more wrong. Charlie himself is not 
quite as candid as he might be>
In my case (which I suspect is not so rare as all that) there may have been an 
incomplete forgetting o f the pure soul-life, so that the mineral condition of re- 
embodiment seemed abnormal, so that from an early age I was taken aback to see 
eyes move in faces, noses breathe, skins sweat, hairs grow, and the like, finding it 
comical. [90]
But Charlie's "critical mass of indifference" [3 5] not only fails to encompass his 
political hob-nobbing, his susceptibility to all sorts o f tawdry awards (the Zig-Zag 
Book Club), and his exploitation of his celebrity status (to gain advances on 
unplanned or unpublishable works), but it is also posted missing when it comes to 
his string of lovers. Not caring, in this instance, to look too far behind "the plastered 
idols of the appearances", his involvement with the likes of Naomi, Demmie, 
Denise, Renata and Doris testifies to an unquenchable licentiousness. Age has 
certainly not withered Charlie. By his own admission he is "a nymph-troubled 
man" [190], but it is the sort o f trouble he welcomes, in order to feed both his vanity 
and his "sensation-loving soul"[l02], Charlie makes an unconvincing attempt to 
excuse his increasingly ridiculous adventures o f the flesh, but finally capitulates 
(gladly) to the prevailing sexual madness, asking "what was I to do singlehanded 
about a force that had seized the whole world?" [206]. It takes Cantabile, in 
inimitable fashion, to sum Charlie up>
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You want me to believe you have nothing in your thoughts except angels on 
ladders and immortal spirits but I can see from the way you live that it can't be true. 
First of all you're a dude. I know your tailor. Secondly you're an old sex-pot ...[184]
Perhaps, though, it is this duality that causes Citrine to turn to the abstruse theories 
of Rudolf Steiner - for they seem to offer a way to unify his clashing spiritual and 
physical concerns. It is tempting to view Charlie's involvement with Steiner's 
apparent quackery as part of the comedy of the novel, a device employed by the 
author to show how far Charlie is "out of it". No doubt this is partly true. But in 
interview, Bellow has given backing to the ideas of the Austrian. Evidently with a 
straight face, the author confesses "to being intrigued with Steiner"; that the founder 
of anthroposophy "had a great vision and was a powerful poet as well as philosopher 
and scientist"; and concludes with mock embarrassment that "I hope I will be 
forgiven if I choose not to see this as a sign that I am slipping".11 It is difficult to 
determine the exact amount of mischievousness in these comments (Steiner's 
theories seem to be subjected to the same form of ironic endorsement to which 
Bellow subjects his own characters!), but one suspects that in any case Bellow rather 
enjoys being associated with a supposed mountebank like Steiner, as he has often 
criticised the absolute value of a scientific 'head-culture' which insists on 
interpreting phenomena in exclusively empirical terms:-
'We've ceased to marvel at things we can't explain. We've had introductory courses 
in everything, and therefore we have persuaded ourselves that we can explain 
anything, we don't have to, but if we wanted to, we could. We are in the position of 
savage men who have been educated into believing there are no mysteries.'12
It would be foolish, therefore, to dismiss out of hand Charlie's Steineresque 
meditations, to stigmatize them as the work of a crank. At the same time, though, 
Charlie notes the element of buffoonery in these exercises - "I couldn't make my 
peace with things like the Moon Evolution, the Fire Spirits, the Sons of Life, with 
Atlantis, with the lotus flower organs of spiritual perception or the strange mingling
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of Abraham with Zarathustra, or the coming together of Jesus and the Buddha. It 
was all too much for me”[263] - and enjoys an ambivalent relationship with his 
Steiner tutor, the Tamkin-like (again!) Professor Scheldt (indeed, Charlie cannot 
help recalling Kafka's memoir of the spiritual king Steiner struggling pathetically to 
come to terms with that most mundane of physical preoccupations, a head 
cold[2l8]). The reason for Charlie's attraction to Steiner, though, is clear. One of 
the latter's central ideas is that the internal, spiritual world and the external, physical 
world are indissolubly bound together, and that the intrinsic radiance of this union 
can be apprehended , by means of specific mental exercises, in a transcendent realm 
where the powers of the soul can clear away the erroneous divisions of this 'lower- 
world'. Although Charlie is but "in theosophical kindergarten" [356], he avers that he 
can go some way toward achieving a knowledge of this higher world, a belief which 
he outlines to Scheldt:-
Thinking, the power to think and to know, is a source of freedom. Thinking will 
make it obvious that spirit exists. The physical body is an agent of the spirit and its 
mirror. It is an engine and reflection of the spirit. It is the spirit’s ingenious 
memorandum to itself and the spirit sees itself in my body ...[262]
When Charlie is holed up with Renata in a luxurious suite in New York's Plaza 
Hotel, Steiner's vision seems entirely appropriate:-
I had the strange hunch thatrature itself was not out there, an object world eternally 
separated from subjects, but that everything external corresponded with something 
internal, that the two realms were identical and interchangeable, and that nature was 
my own unconscious being [...] Each thing in nature was an emblem for something 
in my own soul. [356-357]
And, as he absents himself mentally from an escapade involving Ulick's furious 
pursuit of money (and food!), Charlie beautifully defines the anthroposophic goal:-
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Just as soul and spirit left the body in sleep, they could also be drawn from it in full 
consciousness with the purpose of observing the inner life of man. The first result 
of this conscious withdrawal is that everything is reversed. Instead of seeing the 
external world as we normally do with senses and intellect, initiates can see the 
circumscribed self from without [...] The external world we no longer see, for we 
are it. The outer world is now the inner [...] From this new circumference you look 
back to the center, and at the center is your own self. That self, your self is now the 
external world [...] But what an object! Your eyes are now two radiant suns, filled 
with light. Your eyes are identified by this radiance. Your ears are identified by 
sound. From the skin comes a glow. From the human form emanate light, sound, 
and sparkling electrical forces. This is the physical being when the Spirit looks at it 
[...] There is a star world within us that can be seen when the Spirit takes a new 
vantage point outside its body. As for the musculature it is a precipitate of Spirit 
and the signature of the cosmos is in it. In life and death the signature of the cosmos 
is within us. [393-394]
Has Charlie, in a transcendence which is founded firmly in the human, managed to 
resolve the contradictions which have ever assailed the Bellow hero? It seems 
unlikely, since not only do these revelations of ecstatic union belong by definition to 
another, briefly glimpsed world, but they are also, in Charlie's case, prescriptions o f  
desire rather than actual experiences. Even if Charlie had made a Steineresque 
breakthrough, he would still have been unable to communicate this intelligence, 
since perforce those still inhabiting the ’lower world' would find such knowledge 
unintelligible. But there is a frightening corollary to Steiner's vision, which I believe 
has gone unnoticed by critics. Equally firm is my view that Bellow himself was not 
oblivious to this corollary, since it is a theme he developed in his next novel, The 
Dean's December. The fearful irony is that as Charlie moves through the 
unrelenting squalor and decay of urban and post-industrial Chicago, Steiner's radiant 
vision receives a potentially horrific focus, in that outer ruin may very well reflect 
inner ruin. As always in the Bellow world, every force has its equal - and opposite - 
reaction.
As any attempt at transcendence necessarily involves a measure of loss of the self, 
one would expect Citrine to be wearying of the burden of his distinctness. And
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though he is not averse to trading on its value in the world, Charlie most closely 
resembles Herzog when he complains of "the universal tyranny of selfhood" [405], 
Aware of the silly demands of the T, Charlie, in trying to formulate a plan for his 
projected masterpiece on the subject of 'Boredom', pinpoints the root cause of the 
prevalence for such ennui:-
For me the self-conscious ego is the seat of boredom. This increasing, swelling, 
domineering, painful self-consciousness is the only rival of the political and social 
powers that run my life (business, technological-bureaucratic powers, the state). 
You have a great organised movement of life, and you have the single self, 
independently conscious, proud of its detachment and its absolute immunity, its 
stability and its power to remain unaffected by anything whatsoever - by the 
sufferings of others or by society or by politics or external chaos. In a way it doesn't 
give a damn [...] the curse of non-caring lies upon this painfully free consciousness 
[...] For to be fully conscious of oneself as an individual is also to be to be separated 
from all else. [203]
Ironically, Charlie overestimates the sense of separation on his own behalf, since not 
only is he the repository of numerous other selves - writers, philosophers, friends, 
and most particularly his dear departed - but his magnum opus on Boredom also 
demonstrates that society and external chaos do exert a grip on his consciousness. 
His essay seems destined to become a classic example of what Bellow calls "crisis 
chatter", a dramatized and agitated slurry of distorting 'information' about how what 
happens 'out there' affects us, a not so insidious virus of the modem need to be kept 
in a constant state of 'interest'. "The late John Berryman," Bellow has noted, "once 
told me that T.S.Eliot could no longer read the daily paper. 'It was too exciting,' he 
said."13 It is doubly ironic that Charlie's contribution to this state of horrible, empty 
excitement should be on the subject of 'Boredom'. But, since 'it is the business of 
the cultural intelligentsia [...] to produce such chatter",14 perhaps Charlie was only 
doing his job!
Returning to his problems over the value of the self, however, we find that Citrine, 
despite desiring to be relieved of the pressures of such a self, is, like Sammler,
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appalled by the falseness of the modem personality, quoting Schumpeter's view that 
"when people think they are being so subtly inventive or creative [in the domain of 
the self] they merely reflect society's general need for economic growth"[269], 
Charlie again turns to Steiner for help in resolving his dilemma (here is an instance 
where philosophical speculation tends to supplant the action of the novel), being at 
one and the same time tired with selfhood and 'bored' with "the lack of personal 
connection with the external world" [202], Clearly Steiner's programme to unify the 
worlds of internal and external reality might assist in the latter (though one must 
bear in mind the earlier warning about the nature of external reality). Charlie sees a 
way out, though, in the distinction made by Steiner, and modulated by Charlie, 
between the "Consciousness souf'and the "Imaginative soul". The former is the 
false actor of the self, trapped in the fallen state:-
In the arbitrary division between Subject and Object the world has been lost. The 
zero self sought diversion. It became an actor. This was the situation of the 
Consciousness Soul as I interpreted it. [281]
This is the quotidian, everyday self, denied access to higher worlds. It is the state in 
which most people exist. Charlie, however, through Steiner, aspires to the 
"Imaginative Soul", which appears to be a convenient storehouse where Citrine can 
place his disparate concepts of a genuine self unified with nature, and the loss of self 
in a Joseph-like "colony of the spirit", and mould them together by means of the 
redemptive power of the imagination - of Art. Charlie adumbrates this aim after re­
reading one of Humboldt's last poems:-
\
The imagination must not pine away - that was Humboldt's message. It must assert 
again that art manifests the inner powers of nature, [l 12]
and again, during another memory of his deceased teacher: -
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Is it true that as big-time knowledge advances poetry must drop behind, that the 
imaginative mode of thought belongs to the childhood of the race? [...] It's rather 
our minds that have allowed themselves to be convinced that there is no imaginative 
power to connect every individual to the creation independently. [364]
As he gropes toward apprehension of the "Imaginative Soul", he berates Renata with 
his ideas:-
The greatest things, the things most necessary for life, have recoiled and retreated. 
People are actually dying of this, losing all personal life, and the inner well-being of 
millions, many many millions, is missing [...] I admit this private sphere has 
become so repulsive that we are glad to get away from it. But we accept the 
disgrace ascribed to it [...] Mankind must recover its imaginative powers, recover 
living thought and real being, no longer accept these insults to the soul, and do it 
soon. Or else![250]
until he finally settles on his mission:-
The job, once and for all, was to burst from the fatal self-sufficiency of 
consciousness and put my remaining strength over into the Imaginative Soul. As 
Humboldt too should have done. [417]
But as Charlie moves along the path toward putative salvation, two things become 
clear. First, if  Charlie's self can exist only in a higher state (which of necessity can 
be accessible only to initiates of Steiner), then no matter how glorious this state may 
be, he is in danger of cutting off his nose to spite his face, by lapsing into a 
dangerous exclusivity of being. And second, the desire for fraternity which would 
act as a check upon this danger, the need to arouse Mankind from its torpor (Citrine 
at one point describes himself as the herald of the "saviour faculty" 
Imagination[396]) and elevate humanity to the higher plane, is constructed on the 
same basis as was Mr.Sammler's urge for brotherhood. For although Charlie 
believes that "there was a core of the eternal in every human being" [438-439], and 
that "these matters o f spirit are widely and instantly grasped"[91], his connections 
are forged in the knowledge that there is something inexpressible and nebulous
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about them. His desire for unity, like that of his fictional predecessor, is an other­
worldly one, culminating as it does in the vision of a transcendent pool of souls. 
Granted, these souls are supposed to return every so often to this world, but when 
they do the connection seems lost, conditions prove hostile to a maintenance of the 
bond. Charlie, after Baudelaire, is stimulated by the notion that "Real life was a 
relationship between here and there" [460], Perhaps so. But as Charlie spins 
between the two realms of this world and the higher world, it becomes evident that 
his deepest wants cannot be fully realised in either. So Ben Siegel's view, with 
particular regard to this novel, that the author's characters "reassert Bellow's 
unflagging humanism"15 is not quite true, for the requisite ingredients for a humanist 
view belong in this instance outside the realm of the human. Michael Glenday, 
though, is clearly wrong to say that the novel "express[es] Bellow's conviction that 
'real life' can only be sustained by deploying strategies of withdrawal from la vie 
quotidienne" ,16 For Charlie does no such thing. In his conviction that real life was a 
connection between here and there, that "the dead and the living still formed one 
community"[405], Charlie is shrewd enough to know that "this planet was still the 
base of operations"[405], And even though we leave Charlie after he has been jilted 
by Renata, there is nothing to suggest that he will not continue in his insatiable lust, 
nor indeed in his involvement with the "moronic inferno", in the machinations of 
such as Cantabile. For despite everything, Charlie's immersion in the fallen world is 
quite an enjoyable experience for him, and if his Steineresque visions prove to be 
groundless, then he is certainly not going to turn monastic in this world! Charlie is 
right in one sense - the sense that he cannot slough off the burden of selfhood in this 
world - and that same sense will ensure that withdrawal from the world is not an 
option.
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The ending is typically ambiguous and uneasy. From the money accrued from the 
selling of the old screenplay co-authored by Charlie and Humboldt, Charlie 
determines to give Humboldt a decent reburial. In an ironic echo of this film 
treatment, Charlie's is an act of atonement similar to that of the film's main 
character, who makes public repentance of his earlier misdeeds (the similarity does 
not end there - the film's main character became a cannibal, whilst Charlie had 
metaphorically cannibalised Humboldt's character to use as material for his 
Broadway hit). The poignancy of this final scene is undermined by a threatening 
combination of the presence of bulldozers employed to fashion Humboldt's new 
resting-place (in many ways reminiscent of the yellow dinosaur steamshovels, 
vanguards of a deathly technology, of Lowell's 'For the Union Dead') and Charlie's 
horrific vision as he sees a concrete block being lowered over Humboldt's coffin:-
So the coffin was enclosed and the soil did not come directly upon it. But then, 
how did one get out? One didn't, didn't, didn't! You stayed, you stayed! [...] Thus 
the condensation of collective intelligences and combined ingenuities [...] dealt with 
the individual poet. [487]
Yet the horror of this is mitigated by the appearance of the crocus at the burial- 
ground, a small spark of hope and transcendence, a counter-point to the overtones of 
terrible finality. Is it Humboldt's "Imaginative Soul" triumphantly resurfacing? As 
Bellow himself had pointed out earlier, we should not perhaps scoff at things we 
cannot explain. Charlie leaves us with just such a sense of mystery:-
The fact is, I suspect, that we occupy a point within a great hierarchy that goes far 
beyond ourselves. The ruling premises deny this. We feel suffocated and don't 
know why. The existence of a soul is beyond proof under the ruling premises, but 
people go on behaving as though they had souls, nevertheless. They behave as if 
they came from another place, another life, and they have impulses and desires that 
nothing in this world, none of our present premises , can account for. [479]
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Charlie, like the rest of us, must wait for the intervention of the ultimate arbiter to 
determine the validity of his vision.
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Chapter Nine
The Dean’s December - O ut Out and Awav.
_ "From their side, looking at us in the West, they must be struck by our innocence, our 
apparent ignorance of the main facts, our self-indulgent playing about with ideological 
toys, our reckless rocking of the boat. They must also wonder as well about the dull 
refractory minds, the sleepiness of many of us. For one part of mankind is in prison 
[...] and those of us who are free and fed are not awake. What will it take to rouse us?"
Saul Bellow.
"It is only from within that the outer world itself can be studied. We ourselves, 
individually, are the only Knowers of its qualities - Qualities which, as matters stand, 
we are not nowadays educated to grasp [...] That world is one described by a most 
intelligent friend of mine as a world of outsides without insides."
Saul Bellow
Bellow was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1976, a year after the 
publication of Humboldt's Gift. Since that novel has been characterised by one critic 
as the author's "Mount Everest",1 the award might have seemed to constitute 'official' 
recognition that Bellow had, to use the unavoidable pun, reached the peak of his 
fictional powers. However, to use an even more unavoidable pun, the author was 
piqued by suggestions that the only way for him to go now was down. No one was 
more alive to the inherent perils of his newly-won status than Bellow himself:-
As a Nobel Prize winner one could become, if one is not careful, a cultural 
functionary, to be trundled out in honorific robes whenever the occasion requires.2
- a fate somewhat reminiscent of that of Charlie in Humboldt's Gift\ To his eternal 
credit, however, Bellow refused to be pensioned off and become a dreadful media 
'personality'. Instead, he produced possibly the most provocative and contentious 
novel of his career. As he explained in discussing his new work:-
I felt that it would be wrong of me simply to wrap myself up in my honours and lie
down quietly. I couldn't bear the thought of that. The cliche about anyone who has 
won the Nobel Prize is that he has shot his bolt, he's finished, he's ready to bite the 
dust, nothing more will come from his pen or his typewriter. I defied that particular
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prejudice. I didn't defy it defiantly, I defied it quietly, because I thought it was 
nonsensical. But there are a great many people who had their pieces already prepared: 
bye bye Bellow. I didn't oblige them by biting the dust - at least I don't think I did. I'm 
going to be under fire until I am a reverend senior, if I live long enough to join the 
Robert Frost category.3
and>
My intention in this book was to be hard, to abandon rhetorical flourishes and keep 
myself to direct statement. I don't think I've ever written a book with so many simple 
declarative sentences. The idea was to hit and to hit hard, to make sure that every 
stroke of the hammer would tell.4
The result was The Dean's December, a book which "they're not going to be able to 
shrug [...] off, though there are some very powerful shruggers around."5 For it is 
indeed a hard-hitting novel. In its twin settings of Chicago and Bucharest, Bellow has 
provided some of the most vivid, grim and often brutal description of his artistic life. 
The crumbling slums and appalling deprivation of certain parts of his native city 
contrast with the deadening and grotesque uniformity of Ceaucescu's Rumania. And in 
the spindly, reserved figure of Albert Corde, variously described as a "hungry 
observer",6 "temperamentally an image man"[22] and "objectivity (no, impartiality) 
intoxicated"[l63], we are provided with the typical Bellovian means not only for the 
recording of such information, but also for the adumbration of its implications. Corde 
is at once a paradoxical figure in that he is one of the mildest and most inoffensive of 
Bellow's central characters, who nevertheless is surrounded by much horror and chaos 
(and indeed he seems to provoke some of the chaos thanks to the excoriating articles 
he has just penned on Chicago's decay). Moreover, many critics have not been at all 
enamoured of Corde, due to the impression that he is, like Citrine, a rather tentative 
presence around which to base events. There is a certain amount of justice in Jonathan 
Wilson's complaint that Corde is "something of a cipher".7 Dean Flower, though, goes 
too far when he claims that "Corde embarrassed by his writing (but not really)
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becomes Bellow apologising (but not really) for his 'high-mindedness', admitting that 
his novel is weighed down with 'philosophising' when it should have given 'straight 
narrative'". Flower further contends that this is part of a devious authorial strategy 
"designed to make the reader see the virtue in tedious Tiigh-mindedness' and to forget 
that crude desire for plot".8 What is undeniable is that The Dean's December 
continues and advances the post-Herzog trend in Bellow's novels of the gradual 
polarisation of ideas and action. The declarative sentences the author mentioned 
earlier can often appear as if in reliej from the main pattern of events. But it would be 
unfair to view Corde as merely an adjunct to ideas, or as an unsuccessful sop to the 
form of the novel. For although the force of the declarative narrative exerts a major 
influence on our reactions to the book, Corde's interjections of rhetorical flourish and 
argumentation serve to underline that the novel is not all philosophical polemic. 
Though the finer points of characterisation can be muffled on occasion, the fictional 
'dangling' man at the centre of things is essential to Bellow's art.
I would advance two more reasons for Corde's quality of 'not-thereness'. First, 
Bellow seems to have borrowed a fair amount from his own personality and
experiences to animate Corde.9 This is not to say that Corde does not suffer from 
ironic treatment at the hands of his creator, for he most certainly does. But what it 
does mean is that many critics consequently felt that they were being subjected to a 
sociological lecture given not by Corde, but by Bellow. Accordingly, much of the 
reaction to the novel centres on the differing perceptions of whether it is an 
imaginative exercise or a straightforward authorial essay. So while Salman Rushdie 
lauds the book as "astoundingly well-written" and "thrillingly ambitious",10 Jonathan 
Wilson sees it as the "least successful" and "surely the bleakest novel in the canon".11 
And, unable to see beyond the purely 'political' ramifications, Diane Johnson castigates 
Bellow for giving us "a lie at the heart of the book [...] in assuming or pretending that
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there would be a great public reaction to objective descriptions of American social 
conditions".12 Such a blase attitude as this last could only come from the 
professionally smart and cynical. And in any case, it misses the point entirely. For 
although the images of chaos engendered by an obscene and lurid poverty are 
memorably ghastly (indeed, only the insistently worldly could fail to be shocked by the 
implications of such as the Spofford Mitchell case), the real thrust of the novel, and 
certainly of Corde's attention, is directed to addressing the spiritual indigence of the 
city's inhabitants, towards confronting "the slum of innermost being, of which the 
inner city was perhaps a material representation" [199], This is, after all, the second of 
those reasons which account for the tenuous nature of the character of Corde. For he, 
like every Bellow hero from Herzog onwards, is more and more drawn away from the 
corporeal, away from a bludgeoning reality and towards the spiritual - and thus the 
solidity of his representation is weakened. As was noticed with Moses, Sammler and 
Charlie, this desire will remain unfulfillable - just as it will in this case. But it is little 
surprise that, faced with the drabness and inertia of Communist Bucharest on the one 
side, and the demoniac and whirling fury of Chicago on the other, Corde's instinct is to 
gravitate toward the object of his astronomer wife's studies - to move out, out and 
away.
Corde, like others in the Bellow canon, has a remarkable propensity to find himself 
mired in dangerous situations. Described as "an executive" - "wasn't a college dean a 
kind of executive?" [7] - he is embroiled in a battle with radical students (who receive a 
hideously familiar embodiment in the form of Corde's nephew, the pasty and distracted 
Mason, the white man who feels that he alone among white men can relate to the 
problems of Chicago's 'superfluous' black population) over the alleged murder of a 
white student by a black pimp and his whore. By posting a reward for information 
leading to the arrest of the suspects, Corde has made himself the target for all kinds of
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opprobrium from 'progressive' elements. As if that were not enough, he is the subject 
of much vituperation and scorn over the articles he has published, zealously attacking 
the state of his native city - the slums, the squalid and haphazard violence, the 
nightmarish turmoil of the prisons, the corruption of the local government 'machine', 
and the corruption of language and information by the media. Not really a proper 
dean nor a proper journalist, Corde is now in the Rumanian capital to attend to his 
dying mother-in-law. Away from the place where "it was open season on Corde" [63], 
he is given the opportunity to try to make some sense of his views, both of himself and 
of the direction of human affairs. In this enterprise, Bellow shows the dangling man at 
his most naked and exposed.
On the most fundamental level, the differences between Chicago and Bucharest are 
evident to Corde, as to everyone. These are the basic differences between a 
totalitarian and a democratic system of government. The dreary oppressiveness of 
tyranny takes on a dark and threatening character, as an almost animalistic force of 
extinction:-
Here, as everywhere in Bucharest, the light was inadequate. They were short on 
energy in Rumania - something about subnormal rainfall and low water in all the 
dams. That's right, blame nature. December brown set in about three in the afternoon. 
By four it had climbed down the stucco of old walls, the gray of Communist 
residential blocks: brown darkness took over the pavements, and then came back again 
from the pavements more thickly and isolated the street lamps. These were feebly 
yellow in the impure melancholy winter effluence. Air sadness, Corde called this. In 
the final stage of dusk, a brown sediment seemed to encircle the lamps. Then there 
was a livid death movement. Night was very different here, thought Albert Corde. [9]
The scarcity of material goods and even basic foodstuffs in the East contrasts sharply 
with the plenitude of availability (in theory, at least) in the Capitalist West. Moreover, 
there is a shortage of mental stimuli behind the iron curtain, in opposition to the 
terrible proliferation of information outlets in the United States:-
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Corde said, 'At the Intercontinental I saw nothing but Pravda and Tribuna Ludu. They 
don't seem to carry the Herald Tribune.' But he was really in two minds about the 
news. At home he read too many papers. He was better off without his daily dose of 
world botheration, sham happenings, without newspaper phrases. Nothing true - really 
true - could be said in the papers. In the dining room there was a huge short-wave 
radio which looked as if it could reach Java but gave only jamming squeals. The big 
TV with its wooden cowl was equally useless. On it you saw nobody but the dictator. 
He inspected, reviewed, greeted, presided; and there were fanfares, flowers and 
limousines. People were shown applauding. But if emigration were permitted, the 
country would be empty in less than a month.
It is doubly ironic that to be the possessor of 'information' is of vital importance in a 
despotic world of suspicion and spying networks. But perhaps more disturbing than 
the overt differences which Corde finds between the societies are the underlying 
similarities. For beneath the surface he senses a sinister and cynical mutuality:-
Where the Communists saw class war, civil war, pictures of catastrophe, we saw only 
temporary aberrations. Capitalistic democracies could never be at home with the 
catastrophe outlook. We are used to peace and plenty, we are for everything nice and 
against cruelty, wickedness, craftiness, monstrousness. Worshippers of progress, its 
dependents, we are unwilling to reckon with villainy and misanthropy, we reject the 
horrible [...] Our outlook requires the assumption that each of us is at heart 
trustworthy, each of us is naturally decent and wills the good [...] Modem 
businessmen and politicians, if they are going to give billions in credit to the other 
side, don't want to think of an epoch of wars and revolutions. They need to think 
about contractual stability, and therefore assume the basic seriousness of the 
authorities in Communist countries - their counterparts, officials, practical people like 
themselves, but with different titles. [197-198]
The two systems (or rather, those at the head of the two systems) ultimately rely on the 
stability of the other for their economic benefit. The horrifying corollary of this, of 
which Corde is only too well aware, is that large sections of humanity are viewed as 
economically expendable. The only difference is that while one side incorporates this 
view into its philosophy of government, the other, as Corde says, rejects the horrible - 
or more accurately, ignores it:-
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Well, they set the pain level for you over here. The government has the power to set 
it. Everybody has to understand this monopoly and be prepared to accept it. At home, 
in the West, it's different. America is never going to take an open position on the pain 
level, because it's a pleasure society, a pleasure society that likes to think of itself as a 
tenderness society. A tender liberal society has to find soft ways to institutionalize 
harshness and smooth it over compatibly with progress, buoyancy. So that with us 
when people are merciless, when they kill, we explain that it's because they're 
disadvantaged, or have lead poisoning, or come from a backward section of the 
country, or need psychological treatment. Over here the position was scarcely 
concealed that such and such numbers were going to be expended. In Russia, for the 
building of socialism, that policy was set by Lenin from the first. He would have 
allowed millions to die in the early famines. More would have died in the early years 
if the kindly Red Cross and Herbert Hoover hadn't distributed food. Even with us, 
conservative capitalism has to temper or conceal its position that classic conditions of 
competition will bring suffering and death. [271-72]
In Rumania the individual is sacrificed on the altar of Marxist 'progress', the human 
being lacks absolute value. In America the wretched are assigned to a ruined category 
and glossed over. The victims in Chicago are the black 'underclass', a problem which, 
as Bellow has articulated, is only too real:-
You can't live in Chicago without being sharply aware of the presence of this 
underclass. It is a source of disorder in the city. The crime rate is very high. The 
streets are not only unsafe but have acquired a barbarous character [...] what has 
happened, in effect, is that you have a mass of people in America's cities who have 
become, for technological reasons, superfluous. Nobody knows what to do with them. 
They don't know what to with and about themselves [...] What we are looking at is a 
doomed population, one which has no visible prospects of survival. Billions of dollars 
have been spent mostly on bureaucracies appointed to deal with these problems, and 
they have utterly failed to do so. They have simply failed. Matters grow worse, not 
better.13
Corde himself is horrified when Mason confronts him with the brutal logic of the 
powers that be>
The blacks on food stamps, they're the underclass - that's what your sociologists 
around here call them. They're hoping that drugs and killings and prison will eliminate 
the lousy trouble-making underclass. [39]
And is similarly affected when reformed drug-addict Winthrop avers:-
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'I'm telling you, Professor, that the few who find us and many hundred of thousand 
more who never do and never will - they're marked out to be destroyed. Those are the 
people next to die, Sir. That's what we're looking at.'[i9i]
The significance of these ideas both for Corde, and for this present study, lie in the 
implications they possess for a humanistic interpretation of the world. Corde can no 
more alleviate the plight of his fellow creatures than fly in the air. What he can do, is 
to do what Bellow suggests he does:-
That is to say, if you call yourself a 'humanist', you cannot permit yourself to do this 
without a real review of the facts of life. You are obliged to see them at their worst. 
You cannot afford to mitigate them.14
Does this entail a 'humanism' which acknowledges that some people are incapable of 
enlightenment? Corde certainly does not shrink from a confrontation with, and a 
painfully detailed description of, the 'facts o f life' as he sees them. But in his eagerness 
to alert people to such things, he not only adopts such a fervent, indignant and preachy 
stance as to repel his readers (he "sounded like the Reverend Jones of 
Jonestown"[243]), merely adding to the swirl of apocalypses in which the general 
public was "marinated"[141], but he also proves to be ill-equipped as a public 
'communicator', recording his reactions to the horrors he sees in terms of the 
"soul","imagination" and "the slums we carry around inside us. Every man's inner 
inner city"[205]. For a public steeped in politics and current-event fatigue, guided by 
the euphemistic gravy o f the prose of such as Spangler over the depredations of 
spiritual life, such intensely personal terms are strictly off-limits. Thus the furore 
surrounding his articles. Corde's intention is certainly noble:-
He [Corde] thinks that human beings don't grasp what is not forcefully expressed: that 
is to say, that we have found a language or languages to mask these things (the worst 
facts of life) from us because it is our desire to conceal them [...] The need for clearly 
stated truth is like the need for bread to eat or water to drink [...] People who have
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truly grown up reading the great books of the tradition feel how necessary it is that 
someone should write now as to furnish [...] the edible bread and the drinkable water. 
That is why Corde is in such a ferment, almost in a frenzy. It has struck him that there 
is no way to transmit these things any more, that the world is beyond shock...15
but his readers are not prepared for the shock of his 'literary' style. And this is where 
Corde falls down as a humanist. Quite apart from the fact that his inclination is 
towards the intangibles of the spirit, he specifically rejects the idea of being cast as a 
"humanist intellectual", comparing the latter to "the Ruling Reptiles of the 
Mesozoic"[i37], It is Spangler who, for all his confusion, correctly identifies that 
Corde is not programmatic but deeply personal in his convictions: "...the Dean has no 
bent for such enterprises. He is not a man for models, he is a sensitive and emotional 
private observer" [295], So sensitive, in fact, that he can recognise an element of 
distasteful truth about himself as he listens to Mason's diatribe:-
The Dean understood only too well what the kid was transmitting when he said, 
"Appalled'? 'All shook up"?' He was saying, Let's not fuck around with these high 
sentiments and humane teachings and pieties and poetry, and the rest of that jazz. You 
keep going back to the knife and the gag and the blood and the corpse and the 
prostrated wife [the details of the murder of the white student]. And you do it to stir 
yourself with horror. Stones advertising how 'human' they are.
The truth of this, even if it was not more than a particle, was a poisonous particle. [46]
Though such self-deprecation is more than a little harsh, Corde can recognise the 
grain of truth in this judgment because he is not a 'humanist' in any rational, systematic 
or prescriptive sense. Rather he is a man who most effectively functions when dealing 
with the spiritual qualities , as he sees them, of specific individuals - what he calls the 
"depth-level" of a person [93] - an underlying reality wherein emotional bonds are the 
potentially unifying force. The depth-level remains latent because it is, as its name 
suggests, obscured beneath many layers of spurious mental consciousness. And 
because Corde, in his articles, must at least to some extent deal in public currency (the 
problems of society), when he speaks in terms of the spirit it strikes a discordant note,
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and invites only ridicule and suggestions o f crankiness - simply because the matters of 
the spirit themselves lie at the depth-level, and can only be approached through private 
cultivation and not through public forum. Importantly, though, what is most 
pertinently revealed to Corde during his stay in Bucharest is that the 'depth-level' there 
seems to be much more apparent than in the United States. He finds that there exists a 
dignity and genuineness o f feeling for each other in the East, a feeling which is 
unspoken but nevertheless powerfully acknowledged by all. This is particularly 
evident to Corde in the form of "the woman connection" [131], a matriarchy which 
consists o f his wife's relations, who operate on "the old discipline"[l3l], ensuring the 
maintenance of the deepest emotional kinships in the face of a regime which attempts 
to extinguish them. These bonds seem genuine because they must needs be kept 
private. Corde does not kid himself over the reasons for this purity o f feeling: "On the 
other side, it's the archaic standard, Oriental and despotic, affliction accepted as the 
ground of existence, its real basis" [272]. The existence o f suffering and hardship 
actually engenders this purity, as a sort o f spiritual antidote to material rigours. And 
though he bears the proviso of State repression in mind, Corde cannot help but 
compare what he sees in Rumania with the false consciousness o f the West:-
In America the emotions were different somehow, perhaps thinner. Here you led a 
crypto-emotional life in the shadow of the Party and the State. You had no personal 
rights, but on the other hand, the claims of feeling were more fully acknowledged. [76- 
77]
The rights of feeling in the East are contrasted with the West, where any number of 
material rights are possessed, but there exists a hideous politicized consciousness 
where the private human being ought to be. And this is a consciousness which is far 
from suppressed, being rather a whirling madness given free play to a crazy, 
uncontrollable extent, so that, whilst some are better able to resist infection by this 
"information sickness"16 than others, no one can really escape. So even Corde, who
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can identify the symptoms, is nevertheless prone to them, in that "he read too many 
articles and books"[26] and "gathered too many associations" [98], The essential 
contrast is between the flimsy and irrelevant nature of this public information and the 
real knowledge needed to develop the individual spirit. The grotesque embodiment of 
modem public consciousness is of course Dewey Spangler, the culmination of those 
eccentric and overloaded figures which began with Tamkin in Seize the Day. "In the 
privileged democracies," comments Bellow, "we find people who force politics on 
themselves."17 Spangler, the syndicated journalist whose idol is Walter Lippmann, is 
the great satisfier of the demand "to know what's happening to ws".18 Bellow has 
described his type in interview:-
They're extremely influential people and they are opinion-makers and even 
celebrities, and at the same time frivolous, irresponsible and silly, many of them. They 
are sources of information for the modem world [...] They are really the creators of 
public excitement and distraction. They are the people who make all nations feel they 
are in the act - while what there really is is a chaotic mess of distractions which makes 
information impossible. It's all too silly [...] It doesn't tell you anything that you need 
to know. It keeps up a sort of daily fever. It's show business.19
And Corde sees Spangler as the deceiver, the debaser of private experience:-
Spangler, the world-communicator, was a maker of discourse (increasing the debris 
of false description). Twice weekly, readers all over the U.S. picked up their fresh 
thick newspapers and turned to Spangler's column to tune up their thinking on world 
affairs, to correct their pitch. [241]
Moreover:-
The great public, the consumer of his views, didn't require him to take any ground. He 
needed only to keep talking. He lived (although Corde doubted that such tension 
should be called living) in a kind of event-glamour, among the deepest developments 
of the times, communicating what most concerned serious and responsible opinion. 
To Corde there was something bogus and grotesque about this. It was only 'modem 
public consciousness.' There was no real experience in it, none whatsoever. The 
forms that made true experience were corrupted. [123]
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And in a passage which demonstrates why Corde failed to make any headway with his 
articles:-
In touch with the Sadats and the Kissingers, the Brezhnevs and the Nixons, 
interpreting them to the world, Dewey was a master of the public forms of discourse. 
If you were going to be a communicator, you had to know the passwords, the code 
words, you had to signify your acceptance of the prevailing standards. You could say 
nothing publicly, not if you expected to be taken seriously, without the right 
clearance. [296]
This flurry of neurotic and ultimately fatuous 'information' produces a sense of 
disordered excitement in an audience, each and everyone of whom feel the necessity 
of having an opinion on matters of public 'concem':-
It isn't true that people are unsophisticated in the United States: they are barbarously 
sophisticated. I think that would be a much more correct way to put it. They know all 
kinds of things they have learned from press and TV, from watching panel discussions. 
They've picked up psychological, anthropological, sociological, political jargon. They 
are simply abuzz with ideas or the simulacra of ideas, so that if you try to assume that 
you are dealing with a lay public which has no ideas, I think you're quite mistaken.20
The sumptuous gabble of Spangler's article in which he apparently betrays his old 
friend Corde out of "gaieii de coeur"21 shows how the public can be affected in the 
foregoing way - and why their exposure to the mass communications technique of the 
likes of Spangler renders them insensible to the personalised appeals of Corde. 
Spangler, as Jonathan Wilson rightly points out, "is the true instance of the Decline of 
the West"22 - not so much an artist-politician as a political philophaster. And yet, for 
all that, Spangler's summation of Corde's position is very accurate and concise:-
'Professor Corde,' Dewey went on, 'is very hard on journalism, on the mass media. 
His charge is that they fail to deal with the moral, emotional imaginative life, in short, 
the true life of human beings, and that their great power prevents people from having 
access to this true life. What we call "information" he would classify as delusion.'[296]
151
Whatever else he is, Spangler is no fool. Perhaps it is Corde who is foolishly naive, in 
his attempts to set himself up as "the moralist o f seeing"[i25]. In any case, there is a 
certain amount o f pathos in the figure of Spangler, fumbling miserably with his 
colostomy bag. Corde also recalls "the original skinny, frantic, striving screeching 
Dewey" he had liked so much[H5]. Spangler is certainly a much more sympathetic 
figure than Corde's lawyer cousin, Max Detillion, a latter-day Selah Tarrant whose lust 
for publicity - "a moronic genius for getting attention" [64] - is actuated by the belief 
that as long as he remains in the public eye, his erotic life can be extended 
(Mysteriously, there are unsubstantiated hints about Corde's own sexual madness - 
"erotic instability"[l5], and "sexual offences"[i33], mean that he was "supposed to have 
been a wild ladies' man"[83], Since there is nothing to substantiate these charges, 
further weight is lent to the suspicion of a degree o f autobiography). What the 
examples of Spangler and Detillion essentially reveal, however, is that in the 
ostensible land of the free, the wwfree, politicized consciousness holds greater and 
greater sway. Whilst in the ostensibly politicized East, it is the qualities o f personal 
concern which struggle to the surface. Corde, though, is ultimately unable to choose 
between what either society manifests:-
When we've worn ourselves out with our soft nihilism, the Russians would like to 
arrive with their hard nihilism. They feel humanly superior. [...] They say, "We 
haven't got justice or personal freedom but we do have warmth, humanity, 
brotherhood, and our afflictions have given us some character. All you can offer us is 
supermarkets." Whereas the best defence that liberal democracy can make goes like 
this: "True, we're short on charisma and fraternal love, although you have it in debased 
forms, don't kid yourself about that. What we do have in the West is a kind of rational 
citizens' courage which you don't understand in the least. At our best we can be 
patient, we keep our heads in crisis, we can be decent in a cold steady way. Don't 
underestimate us. "[273]
Corde rejects both the suffering that is conditional in the former, and the spiritual 
emptiness conditional in the latter, based as it is on a shameless desire to perpetuate 
capitalism for its own sake. Thus it is that Corde turns away from public reality on
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both sides of the Atlantic, and attempts to clarify his perspectives on the inner life, on 
the underlying reality of the soul.
Corde's attacks on 'real' reality certainly reflect to some degree Mason's charge that 
Corde excites himself with horror, for he has focused on the most appalling examples 
of this reality in order to hammer home his point regarding the spiritual paucity of the 
modem condition. In administering his "own Rorschach test to the U.S."[186], Corde 
had hoped to shatter the torpor of its citizens, to penetrate the general befuddlement 
with something more deep and lasting. He paints a picture o f relentless chaos and 
decay. There is the min of the "stunned city" of Chicago: "many many square miles of 
civil Passchendaele or Somme"[204], There are the twin hells o f the anarchic prisons 
(a judge threatens a mentally retarded defendant with sodomy and torture therein - he 
accepts the brutality as read) and the dialysis unit at the county hospital, where the sick 
stare passively at the TV; and there are the seemingly ubiquitous acts o f robbery, 
vandalism, rape, paederasty and murder. Corde "wrote about whirling souls and 
became a whirling soul himself, lifted up, caught up, spinning, streaming with 
passions, compulsive protests, inspirations" [192]. Small wonder that Corde is 
conscious o f "a certain instability" on his part[l97], and feels "his controls were not in 
dependable working order"[69]. Underlying all this mad agitation, Corde sees a 
paralysing fear, a fear resultant from the incomplete development of the person:-
The advanced modem consciousness was a reduced consciousness inasmuch as it 
contained only the minimum of furniture that civilisation was able to install (practical 
judgements, bare outlines of morality, sketches, cartoons instead of human beings); 
and this consciousness, because its equipment was humanly so meager, so abstract, 
was basically murderous. It was for this reason that murder was easy to 
understand... [192]
In an echo of Charlie Citrine's Steineresque interests, Corde's view is that the "the 
horror is in the literalness [...] The literalness of bodies and their members - outsides
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without insides"[203]. So, when this "earnest, brooding, heart-struck, time-ravaged 
person (or boob), with his moral desires [...] taking up the burden of mankind"[l24] 
confronts this horror, he confronts it with the need, as he sees it, to reconstitute 'reality' 
in accordance with the deepest essentials of the soul - which, just as Spangler had 
outlined, constitute the moral, emotional and imaginative life, the true life of human 
beings:-
In the American moral crisis, the first requirement was to experience what was 
happening and to see what must be seen. The facts were covered from our perception 
[...] The increase of theories and discourse [...] led to horrible distortions of public 
consciousness. Therefore, the first act of morality was to disinter the reality, retrieve 
reality, dig it out from the trash, represent it anew as art would represent it. So when 
Dewey talked about the 'poetry' [of Corde's articles], pouring scorn on it, he was right 
insofar as Corde only made 'poetic' gestures or passes, but not insofar as Corde was 
genuinely inspired. Insofar as he was inspired he had genuine political 
significance. [124-125]
and:-
But perhaps Spangler's main charge against me was that I was guilty of poetry [...] 
He himself was keen on poetry in his youth. He's now a spokesman, though, and poets 
were never really liked in America [...] That's why when we have most need of the 
imagination we have only 'special effects' and histrionics. But for a fellow like me, the 
real temptation of abyssifying is to hope that the approach of the "last days" might be 
liberating, might compel us to reconsider deeply, earnestly. In these last days we have 
a right and even a duty to purge our understanding. In the general weakening of 
authority, the authority of the ruling forms of thought also is reduced, those forms 
which have done much to bring us into despair and into the abyss. [274]
Morality and feeling, for Corde, are implicit in the free play of the imagination, in the 
world that is recovered from beneath "the debris of false description or 
nonexperience"[240], He cites in his articles a (somewhat unconvincing) example of 
how only poetry had the strength "to rival the attractions of narcotics, the magnetism 
of TV, the excitements of sex, or the ecstasies of destruction" [186-87], by noting the 
reaction of black schoolchildren to lines from Macbeth (apparently a 'dangerous' text
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to the 'machine'). Nevertheless, Corde comes increasingly to believe that this inner 
experience is the only worthwhile 'reality':-
This organic, constitutional, sensory oddity, in which Albert Corde's soul had a 
lifelong freehold, must be grasped as knowledge. He wondered what reality was if it 
wasn't this, or what you were 'losing' by death if not this. If it was only the literal 
world that was taken from you the loss was not great. Literal! What you didn't pass 
through your soul didn't even exist, that was what made the literal literal. Thus he had 
taken it upon himself to pass Chicago through his own soul. A mass of data, terrible, 
murderous. It was no easy matter to put such things through. But there was no other 
way for reality to happen. Reality didn't exist 'out there'. It began to be real only when 
the soul found its underlying truth. [262]
The drive into the self seems to have led Corde to intimations of other worlds - "If 
there was another world, this was the time for it to show itself. The visible one didn't 
bear looking at"[188] - into a yearning for deliverance, for a state where the soul can 
find the true expression of its vital properties. Corde is surrounded and oppressed 
throughout the novel by pointers of finality, renunciation and death. There are the 
actual deaths of Valeria and Rick Lester to contend with, in conjunction with Corde's 
own tendencies toward self-annihilation: he feels that "you might do worse than return 
to that strict zero-blue and simple ice. In all this Corde felt singularly close to the old 
woman" [108]; and he notes that "you could see it in every face, how the depleted wits 
fought their losing battle with death. Faces told you this. He had learned from his 
own face, and he confirmed the discovery by daily observations" [256]. It is these 
indicators which seem to precipitate his acceptance of the fact that the conditions of 
this world are too hostile to accommodate the rebirth of the soul, and feed the fires of 
his transcendent longings. Indeed, it may be wondered whether Corde is thrown into a 
deep self-hatred, because of the failure and the powerlessness of the qualities which he 
most cherishes - and that consequently he must escape from the limits of this self 
(certainly as Spangler interprets things, Corde's attacks on the falsity of humanistic
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intellectuals encompass the author himself). In any case, Corde's ache for freedom is 
unmistakable
Here in the Midwest there sometimes occurred the blues of Italian landscapes and he 
passed through them, very close to the borders of sense, as if he could do perfectly 
well without the help of his eyes, seeing what you didn't need human organs to see but 
experiencing as freedom and also as joy what the mortal person, seated there in his 
coat and gloves, otherwise recorded as colors, spaces, weights. This was different. It 
was like being poured out to the horizon, like a great expansion. What if death should 
be like this, the soul finding an exit. The porch rail was his figure for the hither side. 
The rest, beyond it, drew you constantly as the completion of your reality. [286]
The familiar problem for the Bellow hero is evident once more. The soul awakening 
can only be achieved by transplanting the spirit to somewhere else, beyond the domain 
of the human. And if Corde were to achieve a mystical satisfaction in the realm of the 
human, it would simply entail a collapse into the self, into an utterly impenetrable 
isolation. In any case, what Corde receives are intimations of spiritual breakthrough, 
never a consummation. So if Corde finds public reality repellent (and there are, after 
all, aspects of this he finds rather enjoyable), he knows that but for transient glimpses, 
the deepest gratification of the soul's existence must be confined to the further side - 
wherever that may be. He remains, and will remain, in a state of constant and troubled 
oscillation.
With the possible exception of Charlie, though, Corde is the only protagonist to be 
offered a substantial way to mitigate his dangling - indeed to end altogether his 
"crawling between heaven and earth"[22l]. This comes in the form of the theory of the 
geophysicist Beech. This latter propounds the notion that the presence of lead in the 
water supply, in the food chain, in society as a whole - as a result of three centuries of 
unchecked industrial growth - is causing mankind to degenerate into "an inferior 
hominid"[l4l]:-
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Chronic lead insult now affects all mankind. Biological dysfunctions, now 
observable in the most advanced populations, must be considered among the causes of 
wars and revolutions. Mental disturbances resulting from lead poison are reflected in 
terrorism, barbarism, crime, cultural degradation. Visible everywhere are the 
irritability, emotional instability, general restlessness, reduced acuity of the reasoning 
powers the difficulty of focusing, et cetera, which the practiced clinician can readily 
identify [...] We couldn't ourselves observe the dulling of consciousness since we were 
all its victims, and we would be dulled down into the abyss unaware that we were 
sinking. [140]
Being one of the few people impressed by the fervour of Corde's Chicago articles, 
Beech now wants the latter to bring the problem of lead insult to the attention of the 
public. Both men have reached similar conclusions about the general chaos, although 
they operate on differing premises. But now, with Beech's 'hard' (and therefore 
respectable) science being backed up by Corde's moral imperatives, there seems a 
chance of effecting Corde's dream of "the reunion of spirit and nature" [124], As Corde 
articulates the proposal: "I must go back to the classroom and learn what it's all about - 
really. When I've understood the beauty and morality contained in the laws of science, 
1 can take part in the decisive struggle - begin to restore the strength of 
Humanism" [225-26], This declaration, though, seems incongruous coming from the 
man who, even though we accept that his attacks were not on Humanism per se, but on 
the falsity of Humanist intellectuals, nevertheless gives every indication of moving not 
in the direction of a cultural humanism, but towards a mystical spiritualism. And 
indeed it is this tendency that seems to overturn the possibility of a reconciliation 
between science and soul. For although we are still unsure, at the close of the novel, 
whether Corde will agree to act as Beech's literary partner, the signs are that he will 
not. For although Corde notes that Beech had become "a burning moral visionary" 
without being aware of it [140], he ultimately cannot accept the material cause for the 
nervous stupefaction as valid, wondering "whether 'lead' is just what Professor Beech 
has fixed upon but stands for something else that we all sense"[222]:-
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Where Beech sees poison lead, I see poison thought or poison theory. The view we 
hold of the material world may put us into a case as heavy as lead, a sarcophagus 
which nobody will even have the art to paint becomingly. The end of philosophy and 
of art will do to 'advanced' thought what flakes of lead paint or leaded exhaust fumes 
do to infants. [225]
Though Corde deals in the constituents of humanist culture, he sees them as catalysts 
to a complete spiritual overhaul - an overhaul which, as was mentioned, appears to be 
only achievable outwith the limits of the human. What Corde has done is to blur the 
boundaries between Humanism and Transcendentalism to such a degree that he is able 
to speak longingly of the "power to cancel everything merely human" [305]. In his 
insistence on seeing contemporary maladies as having a spiritual base, his desires 
continue to gravitate in the one direction - away from the scientific, away from the 
human. Thus his declaration of a new sense of "equilibrium", of "coming into his 
own" [279], and his claim that "his tensions [were] kept in place" [306] seem doubtful 
propositions - simply because his desires will remain unattainable, and be continually 
pressed from behind by unacceptable reality. So Corde is not in equilibrium but in 
flux. Similarly, his talk of an "old self'[279] is just as flawed - and just as flawed as 
that of Joseph in Dangling Man - he is no more content with his earthly station than 
before, just as his moral outlook and devotion to his wife remain unchanged on the 
other side. The fact that Corde remains a dangling man is shown in the final scene of 
the novel. Everything in this scene points to a desire to escape, to transcend, as Corde 
moves up into the roof of the observatory to gaze at the stars: "If this present motion 
were to go on, you would travel straight out. You would go up into the stars" [305-06]. 
And as Corde stands entranced by these stars, he experiences a glorious epiphany:-
Here the living heavens looked as if they would take you in [...] And what he saw 
with his real eyes was not even the real heavens. No, only the white marks, bright 
vibrations, clouds of sky roe, tokens of the real thing, only as much as could be taken 
in through the distortions of the atmosphere. Through these distortions you saw 
objects, forms, partial realities. The rest was to be felt. And it wasn't only that you 
felt, but that you were drawn to feel and to penetrate further, as if  you were being
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informed that what was being spread over you had to do with your existence, down to 
the very blood and the crystal forms inside your bones. Rocks, trees, animals, men and 
women, these also drew you to penetrate further under the distortions (comparable to 
the atmospheric ones, shadows within shadows), to find their real being with your 
own. This was the sense in which you were drawn. [306]
But the vision's glory is matched only by its brevity. Only the balloons Corde had 
earlier released at his sister's party are able to move relentlessly towards the stars. 
Escape for Corde is impossible. He must return to the ground once again. No doubt 
he "mind[s] coming down more" than he minds the cold[307], but it is something he 
must do. "The cosmos", as it always has been, "was beyond him"[l9]. The desire to 
enter it may be stronger, but the results are the same. Corde stays caught between the 
heavens and the earth, obsessed by both, possessed by neither. Michael Glenday's 
view that "to cancel out the human is for Corde, after all he has discovered about its 
purblind nature and its deep seated morbidity of mind, a manumission and 
enlightenment"23 misses the mark. Perhaps it very well might have proved an 
enlightenment - but since the cancellation of the human is an impossible aim, Corde 
continues with, as Gabriel Josipovici neatly puts it, "a foot in the stockyard and an eye 
on the stars".24 But as Corde stands, in equivocal supplication to the stars, the cold 
night air, so pleasing to him, contains dark hints of the coming ice...
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Chapter Ten
More Die o f Heartbreak - The Novava Zemlva of the Soul.
'"But I can tell you, the goods folks still talk about Ethan Brand, in the village 
yonder, and what a strange errand took him away from his lime-kiln. Well, and so 
you have found the Unpardonable Sin?'
'Even so!' said the stranger, calmly.
'If the question is a fair one, proceeded Bartram, 'where might it be?'
Ethan Brand laid his finger on his own heart.
'Here!' replied he."
Hawthorne, Ethan Brand.
"The price you pay for the development of consciousness is the withering of the 
heart."
Saul Bellow.
With More Die o f  Heartbreak, Saul Bellow's novelistic career seems to have 
come to a full stop. Not through scarcity of invention, not even due to the 
advancing years, but rather thanks to what appears to be a profound exhaustion, both 
with the novelistic from itself, and with the world as it is represented in his own 
works. In the case of the former, and since the nineteen eighty seven publication of 
his tenth novel, Bellow has explicitly stated his disinclination to continue in this 
vein:-
Yet we respond with approval when Chekhov tells us, 'Odd, I have now a mania for 
shortness. Whatever I read - my own or other people's works - it all seems to me not 
short enough.' I find myself emphatically agreeing with this [...] The reader will 
open his heart and mind to a writer who has understood this [...] Such a writer will 
trouble no one with his own vanities, will make no unnecessary gestures, indulge 
himself in qo mannerisms, waste no reader's time. He will write as short as he can.1
The precise reasoning behind this change of heart can easily be conjectured by the 
post Herzog Bellow reader, and will be discussed in the final section of this study. 
What is just as significant in the meantime, though, is the author's deepening fatigue 
with regard to the direction and nature of modem society. One critic described 
More Die o f Heartbreak as indicative of a process by which "Saul Bellow's books
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get more and more like seminars in Sodom".2 Without exactly invoking the hand of 
divine retribution, the author has undoubtedly laced the novel with an enervating 
sense o f lassitude, a weariness with the contemporary which has reached saturation 
point, a feeling that things are inevitably destined to fall apart. Most tangible is the 
feeling the reader receives of the sense of utter powerlessness o f the two main 
characters in an environment which is horribly false, corrupt and spiritually 
debilitating.
Moreover, we get the distinct impression that, although the two main characters 
do aspire to a higher ideal, their desires do not altogether move in the direction of 
something higher, something transcendent (as did, for instance, those o f Charlie and 
Corde, to 'higher worlds' and the stars respectively), but rather culminate in a simple 
search for an opt-out clause from the pressures o f modem living - they only want to 
be left alone. Bellow himself, referring to the novel, has described this sense of 
jaded satiety coupled with crippling fear as "a readily observable condition [...] a 
lamentation for all parties".3 More Die o f  Heartbreak is indubitably Bellow's most 
depressing novel. That it is also his funniest, leavened as it is with the kind of 
lacerating and chaotic humour which enlivened Mr. Sammler's Planet, says much 
for the novel and for the author's attitude to the phenomena he describes. For, 
despite all the symptoms of degeneracy he identifies, there is no desire on the 
author's part to subside beneath the onrush of apocalyptic despair, no disposition to 
hurl vengeful thunderbolts at the unheeding mob. It may be true, as Blake noted, 
that "excess of sorrow laughs", but not, I think, in this case. Bellow's eye is too 
trained, and his touch too gentle for such mania. What emerges is rather the same 
sort of plaintive comedy evident in the orbits o f old Artur Sammler, perhaps with an 
ounce or two more o f regret thrown in. As the mentally hyperactive narrator 
Kenneth Trachtenberg puts it, not without a fair degree of self-mockery:-
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If you venture to think in America, you also feel an obligation to provide a 
historical sketch to go with it, to authenticate or legitimize your thoughts. So it's 
one moment o f flashing insight and then a quarter of an hour of pedantry and 
tiresome elaboration - academic gabble. Locke to Freud with stops at local stations 
like Bentham and Kierkegaard. One has to feel sorry for people in such an 
explanatory bind. Or else (a better alternative) one can develop an eye for the 
comical side o f this.4
That both Trachtenberg's, and Bellow's comedy is defined by the low ebb of sadness 
should not obscure the characteristically vivacious and ambiguous artistry of the 
novel. Nor should it lead us to conclude that the author has renounced life, or that 
"there is nothing that can be done except acknowledge the pre-eminence of anti- 
humanistic forces leading to the 'march o f declining humankind'".5 The pernicious 
blandishments o f "horrible islands o f gloom, granite and ice"[i29] are irresistible to 
certain critics. But More Die o f Heartbreak is not a novel which should be 
approached for a gleeful certification o f one's own bleak forebodings. It should 
rather be met with a rueful sense of the ridiculous - because it is this sense that 
ultimately lends a measure of qualified significance to the benighted central 
characters.
What is immediately apparent about the novel is that its events take place in the 
most dream-like, fantastic landscape since Henderson the Rain King. Although the 
setting is discemibly that of a Mid-West Rustbelt town, and the narrative is 
punctuated with factual references, this is not the highly specific realism of, say, The 
Dean's December. Rather, Trachtenberg's environs take on mythic proportions of 
menace, in the form of nightmarish buildings, as everywhere are seen signs o f a 
voracious and self-serving bureaucratic technology which threatens to crush the 
feeble individual. Trachtenberg's sensitive uncle, Benn Crader, is particularly 
vulnerable to the messages o f doom these edifices transmit. As he sits down to 
dinner with his new in-laws, he is oppressed by the predatory presence of the 
Japanese-owned Ecliptic Circle Electronic Tower (a full view of whose hostility he
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is afforded through the luxurious, panoramic windows o f his relatives' apartment), 
part of a 'renewal program' which dominated 'miles o f rubble' and whose giant 
double television masts which "relay programs over the whole region" [126] 
(Trachtenberg "pictured the moribund as prisoners of the TV"[i4i]) act as the 
destructive antennae of an insatiable monster. Then there is the sickly appearance 
of Benn's supposed abode of wedded bliss, the "bourgeois baroque" Roanoke[l48], 
which stands in grotesquely meretricious relief from the surrounding "caved-in 
streets and ruined apartment blocks"[146], Most disturbing o f all is the court 
building where the sexual funfair o f the rape hearing takes place, a structure which 
was designed "in dazzling elliptic curves modeled on the celestial sphere and 
[which] showed what bold fantasy could realize, relying on the skills o f engineers, 
on miraculous technology" [269]. Trachtenberg superbly characterises it as a 
building that "didn't threaten Heaven, like the tower o f Babel, but subsided from the 
heights and melted downwards" [269], The vitality and purity of a natural existence 
is stifled beneath the dead weight of these representations of an ugly and sinister 
mechanisation. Benn's memories of his earlier life on the spot where the Electronic 
Tower now stands, of "mulberry trees" and "grackles"[l46], seem hopelessly 
incongruous. And Trachtenberg, after his cabalistic grandfather, opines that the 
"Tree o f life is buried a thousand feet below the Electronic Tower" [253], the 
building itself being the rotten fruit of the "Tree of Knowledge". Uncongenial as 
these surroundings are for Crader and Trachtenberg, though, they provide the 
wwnatural habitat for the Sammler-Qsque cast o f characters whom the two engage, 
and whose own life-impulses are buried under layers o f falseness.
It is the lot of Benn and Kenneth to be enmeshed in the crazy schemes and scams 
of those whose spiritual deformity and material corruption has reached proportions 
of epic ludicrousness. Judges, City Hall types and political bigshots fall into one of
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two categories: "either they were running for office or were being indicted"[321], 
Benn's uncle Harold Vilitzer - sobriquet of "The Big Heat" - is the classic 
embodiment of a type of brutal politician whose furious energy is expended in 
shuttling between the aforementioned categories right up to his ninth decade. Benn 
himself has been fleeced of thousands of dollars by Vilitzer, in the land deal 
whereby Benn's "garden of love" was supplanted by the appalling Electronic Tower. 
Vilitzer justifies this act by the view that "where money is concerned, the 
operational word is merciless" and that, moreover, "kinship is bullshit" [282], 
Vilitzer's disowned son is Fishl, "an advanced communicator" whose "ideology is 
technique" [175], Putting his 'abilities' into a succession of cranky enterpises doomed 
to failure, Fishl impresses Trachtenberg by his apparent desire to effect a 
reconciliation with his father, in an attempt to end his own chaos. However, Fishl's 
filial devotion turns out to be nothing more than a scheme to ensure he is not 
disinherited - a scheme which uses Benn as a patsy. Not only does the affair end 
badly, but Trachtenberg's feeling that he received "intimations [...] of a second 
Fishl"[l86], a more genuine Fishl, is made to look foolish.
Most dreadful for Benn is the gradual realisation that he has been sucked into 
marriage with Matilda by the combined efforts of his bride and her conniving father, 
Dr.Layamon, in order that they can use him to sue Vilitzer for vast sums as 
recompense for the crooked land deal. Dr.Layamon, "that medical swell and 
hotshot" was "a Charlie Mcarthy, a dummy for subconscious forces. Except when 
he talked about money"[l61], Layamon's lust for money is equalled only by his 
erotic madness, obscenely evidenced when he drags Benn around his ward to show 
the latter the sexual organs of decrepit and indifferent old women. And it is with 
women that Crader and Trachtenberg encounter most distortions and pain. Matilda 
is beautiful, vain, shallow, nervously distracted and street tough, a social climber
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who is the culmination of a type seen earlier in the figures of Madelaine in Herzog 
and Renata in Humboldt's Gift. In contrast to Benn's love of the past, Matilda is 
possessed of what is ominously termed a "progressive orientation" [124], Crader's 
'women trouble' is further glimpsed in the neurotic purveyor of psycho babble, the 
aptly named Caroline Bunge, whose practice it is to fill herself with tissue paper 
hours before sexual intercourse. And it reaches a horribly comic nadir in the cries 
of the spumed Della Bedell, who ends up banging on Benn's door shouting "what am 
I supposed to do with my sexuality? "[86],
Trachtenberg's problems with the female o f the species are no less acute. 
Deserted by his petite lover, who apparently prefers receiving kicks in the shin from 
her slobbish new partner than listening to Kenneth's lectures (perhaps no great 
surprise), Trachtenberg has taken up with Dita Schwartz who, in an effort to get her 
tutor to notice her more, has a quack operation to alleviate her skin condition, with 
diabolical consequences. It is ironic that Dita should fall victim to such excesses of 
the superficial world; she seems possibly the only genuine person among the 
secondary cast, described as having "ten times more heart in her" than anyone 
else[208].
But if the craziness of these people is attested to by Kenneth and Benn, it must not 
be forgotten that they are nearly as mired in madness as any. Referring to 
Trachtenberg's "maddeningly verbose" and "galumphingly portentous" narrative, 
Paul Taylor concludes that "the moronic inferno is now, we gather, beginning to 
swallow up its Dantes".6 And Michael Glenday complains that Kenneth's idiom is 
"ponderous, self-involved, and at times insufferably pompous".7 Well, indeed. But 
Glenday's central thesis is that the Bellow hero must withdraw in the face of the 
hostile, anti-humanistic conditions prevailing in modem society. Kenneth, like
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every other Bellow hero, shows little sign of being able (or oftentimes even willing) 
to disengage from this society. And his narrative style is a direct result o f his 
immersion in one of the forms o f contemporary insanity - the 'Idea - Madness'. 
Trachtenberg frequently likes nothing better than to discourse learnedly, incisively, 
fatuously and irrelevantly all at once, to convert real human experience into the 
false, jargonised mental world of theory. It is part of the comedy that he can 
recognise the spuriousness and futility of this - "The tom-toms beating inside our 
heads, driving us crazy, are the Great Ideas!"[247] - and can classify himself as "a 
genuinely modem individual (can you say worse o f anybody?)" [71], yet is unable to 
resist the temptation to spout forth, often at the most inopportune moments.
It does not do to claim to recognise the inherent comedy o f Trachtenberg's 
manner, and then attack it as a source of weakness, fouling the integrity o f the 
novel's "serious issues".8 For to do so is to misrepresent the author's comic purpose. 
The novel's most "serious issue", that of the search for a pure and uncorrupted love, 
for some form of spiritual succour in a debased and fallen world, is if anything 
enhanced by the buffooneries and failures of both Trachtenberg and Crader. Only 
Trachtenberg, as a 'dangling' man remains imperfect. That the quest for love should 
be placed in the hands of Kenneth and his uncle may appear to render it farcical and 
hopeless - but this is not so. "On the trail o f his soul", Trachtenberg may well be 
something of "a creep",9 but it is the trail itself which lends him dignity. In More 
Die o f  Heartbreak, Bellow's heroes find that the only thing of real value left to them 
is to pursue the search for love, however frustrating or galling that search might be. 
As such it is an aim which does not deserve an easy dismissal.
Only Moses Herzog can approximate to Trachtenberg for sheer chaos in the canon 
of central characters. Kenneth also combines elements of Tamkin, Dahfu and
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Spangler into an intellectual pot-pourri which makes him the definitive purveyor o f  
what Bellow describes as the "cultural macadam":-
Things are continually rushing into their head, whether it's from Toynbee or Plato 
or Immanuel Kant, the Great Books, the news of the day, historic ideas -it's all 
pounded into a sort of uniform stuff with which the mental roads are paved. And 
this is what I mean by the cultural macadam.10
Trachtenberg gives comic articulation to this phenomenon on several occasions. For 
example, when Benn casually mentions Dr.Layamon's "connections", directing 
Kenneth not to sneer at these, the latter opens the flood gates:-
'Who me? I'm not a bit skeptical. I read the papers. I'm probably more with it than 
you are, Uncle. If I didn't follow Wall Street, sports, TV, Washington and the 
political scene right here, I wouldn't be able to understand my own subject.' By this 
I meant the St.Petersburg o f Blok and Bely in 1913 - and their preoccupations: the 
satanic darkness, the abyss o f the Antichrist, the horrible islands of gloom, granite 
and ice, the approaching Terrible Judgement, the crimes o f Immanuel Kant against 
human consciousness, and all the rest of that. I have a big stake in keeping up with 
triumphant America. Doctor's intricate money-and-power didn't surprise me at 
all. [129]
Or indeed, when Trachtenberg's love for Benn is transformed into a series of  
theoretical notions:-
My work was cut out for me: I was to help my dear uncle to defend himself. I 
didn't suppose that the Layamons meant him any great harm; only they weren't likely 
to respect his magics or to have the notion of preserving him for the sake of his gifts. 
There was quite a lot at stake here. I can't continually be spelling it out. As: the 
curse of human impoverishment as revealed to Admiral Byrd in Antarctica; the 
sleep o f love in human beings as referred to by Larkin; the search for sexual 
enchantments as the universal nostrum; the making of one's soul as the only project 
genuinely worth undertaking; and my personal rejection of existentialism, which led 
me to emigrate and which makes me so severe in my analysis of motives. [155]
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Trachtenberg reminds the reader, in style if not in substance, of nothing more than 
the figure of Proust at dinner, as described to Kenneth by an acquaintance who has 
made a study of the Frenchman:-
He told me that Marcel Proust [...] would bend over backwards to answer the 
question of a lady making small talk at dinner. He would reply at length with such 
paralysing completeness when no such answer was required or expected. People 
were flooded with unwanted information by this handsome, wearisome, yogurt­
faced table companion. You could die of it. [52-53]
As a boy, Trachtenberg had sat agog at the feet of Alexandre Kojeve, as the Russian 
philosopher issued a health warning regarding his own practices
He warned me in mind-boggling Russian against the glamour of thought, the 
calculating intellect and its constructions, its fabrications alien to the power of life. 
There were two varieties of truth, one symbolised by the Tree of Knowledge, the 
other by the Tree of Life, one the truth of striving, the other the truth of receptivity. 
Knowledge divorced from life equals sickness. [57]
Trachtenberg suffers from this sickness not so much in that he divorces 
knowledge from life, but in that he converts actual experience in a sloppy, 
indiscriminate and ultimately damaging way into the realm of the general and 
theoretical, a realm where pure life itself finally loses much of its value. This 
tendency is never better, or more obscenely illustrated than when Trachtenberg, 
visiting his mother who works as an aid agent in a famine-ravaged Somalian refugee 
camp, gorges himself on Fauchon charcuterie complemented by a first rate calvados, 
and then begins to prate on about the East having the "ordeal of privation" while the 
West has the "ordeal of desire", about how the sufferings of the soul in super­
abundant America have every right to be compared to the more 'traditional' forms of 
suffering in the East, namely "war, plague, famine and slavery" [ 100]. It may be a 
valid and challenging point in its own right, but in the context of the refugees' agony
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it simply seems grotesque. Kenneth notes, with a tinge of hurt incomprehension, 
that "Mother was scandalized by my theorizing" [101].
In fairness to Kenneth, he realises to a certain extent how stupidly inconsequential 
his theorizing can be: he refers variously to "my great weakness" [52]; to "useful 
elucidation" being "another weakness o f mine" [92]; and as he sits in at the Cusper 
rape hearing he concludes that "this was no time for theory - discussion: one o f my 
deepest weknesses, more harrowing to me than you might think (a haunting, perhaps 
destructive habit)" [278], Yet, astonishingly, he can accuse Benn of being a 
propagator o f "thought-bosh"[l3], and an "excitable bore" given to delivering 
interminable lectures[53]. Moreover, Trachtenberg's arrogation of the spiritual high 
ground which he takes upon himself at the inception of the novel seems distinctly 
silly:-
And please don't get me wrong. I take very little pleasure in theories and I'm not 
going to dump ideas on you. I used to be sold on them, but I discovered that they 
were nothing but trouble if you entertained them indiscriminately. We are looking 
at matters for which theorizing brings no remedy. [19]
In the context of events, the last sentence could act as a maxim for the novel, but 
this does not prevent Kenneth from attempting to apply his own brand o f "thought- 
bosh" as a curative to Benn's woes. For despite his claim that "I trust psychology 
less and less. I see it as one of the lower by-products of the restlessness or 
oscillation of modem consciousness, a terrible agitation which we prize as 
'insight'"[5i], Trachtenberg adds to the agitation with his own psychological and 
philosophical babble on teeth-grindingly inappropriate occasions, such as when 
Benn tells him with some anxiety how sharp Matilda's teeth are>
But you can't fault people for their teeth. If the opening of a beautiful woman's 
mouth is a noteworthy occurrence, that in itself may testify against the observer
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rather than the woman [...] And his first wife proved to have influenced him (Benn) 
with Swedenborgian notions, after all. The correspondence theory, for instance: A 
tree is not merely a natural object, it is a Sign. There are correspondences. Objects, 
beautiful or ugly, are communications. A human face gives information, as do 
colors, shapes, fragrances. So Matilda is opening her mouth, right? And uncle Benn 
notices that a woman of great beauty may have four bulges in the gums, at the base 
of her canine teeth. This defect, if it was a defect and not an indication of perversity 
in the perceiver, an impulse to quarrel with perfection or a quirkiness that indicates 
resistance to the potency of beauty, may be a sign of weakness. High beauty may be 
a torment. It tears at our hearts (some of us), and then we frantically fight it. We 
superimpose a Medusa on the innocent face of a girl.
What's the use of talking! [143-144]
Or when Benn is agonising about having to put some Layamon-instigated pressure 
on 'The Big Heat' Kenneth berates him:-
'Harold showed me disrespect in the Electronic Tower deal.'
'That doesn't mean you have to give him a coronary. In one of our talks, Uncle, one 
of us said that this big money gives you the maximum opportunity to abuse yourself. 
Yet somehow I feel that you want the money. You, for some reason, would like to 
have it!'
He cried, 'That's just not true.'
'Maybe not for the money's sake alone. I don't know. Schopenhauer said that 
money was abstract happiness. Maybe it was Hegel.'
'For the love of God, Kenneth. Not now ...'[259]
The reader does get the impression, however, that for all his dreary rationality and 
'head-culture' gobbledegook (which reaches absurd lengths when Benn is seen 
eagerly transcribing Trachtenberg's latest prescriptions for the former's tangled 
emotional life, the usual mixture of perceptivity and bunk, over the telephone in the 
pitch-dark of the Layamon's laundry room[266]), Trachtenberg is aware that it is the 
emotional and spiritual aspects o f the human being which are in dire need of 
resuscitation.
To this end, Trachtenberg boldly announces his "Project Turning Point", an 
enterprise which demonstrates that "in this day and age you have no reason to exist
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unless you believe that you can make your life a turning point. A turning point for 
everybody - for humankind”[68]; which shows the futility of "joining the general 
march of declining humankind" [98]; and which proclaims that "conscious existence 
might be justified only if it was devoted to the quest for a revelation, a massive 
reversal, an inspired universal change, a new direction, a desperately needed human 
turning point" [315]. Here, it seems, is the great 'humanistic' endeavour to be 
undertaken by the Bellow hero - were it not for the fact that this project seeks its 
answers anywhere but the rational. For the responsibility for initiating this magical 
process, for transforming humankind, is deemed by Trachtenberg to lie on the 
stooped shoulders of none other than Benn Crader.
For Kenneth, Benn represents his "expectations, [his] hopes for significant 
closure" [32], And since he believes that they were "doubly, multiply, 
interlinked"[15], Trachtenberg hopes to bathe in the reflected qualities of his uncle. 
Though Crader is by profession a scientist, it is clear that for Trachtenberg his 
uncle's significance lies beyond science, beyond rationality, beyond technology, in 
an area where communion with the deepest, longest-buried human feelings is 
possible. Crader is saddled by his nephew with the burden of taking Man back to 
essentials, of leading the return to innocence.
It is in botanist Benn's relationship to plants that Trachtenberg sees signs of what 
he terms the "magics" [23], To Kenneth, Benn seems to be a sort of "plant 
mystic"[52], a man whose sensitivity and receptivity make him "a plant 
clairvoyant" [305], "What you have to consider," notes Trachtenberg, "is a Jew who 
moves into the vegetable kingdom, studying leaves, bark, roots, heartwood, 
sapwood, flowers, for their own sake. There was something Druidical about 
this"[27], Deciding that Crader is "a communicant in a green universal church"[305]
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(a judgement which is endorsed by the old Japanese professor who sees "something 
visionary about the distinctness with which 'plants came before him"(Crader)[l05]), 
Kenneth founds the aim of'Project Turning Point' on Benn's ability to transfer these 
properties from the plant world into the realm of human affairs, specifically in the 
domain o f love. As Kenneth describes his uncle: "He was bom with that 
increasingly rare capacity, he could actually fall in love, I thought"[23]. Crader is "a 
man of feeling" [18], "a tme person" who "never deviates from his original, given 
nature" [254]. Indeed, Trachtenberg is given to picturing his uncle as a substitute for 
Henri Rousseau's recumbent nude woman in the forest clearing, attracting the 
lascivious looks o f half-hidden tigers. There any connection with the name of 
Rousseau ends, however, as Benn, it seems, has retained his purity (and naivety) in 
spite of the hostilities of society. Such a paragon of virtue has Crader become that 
Trachtenberg is moved to characterise him as a "Citizen of Eternity":-
To name at random a number of such Citizens will reveal what the word ’Eternity' 
signifies: Moses, Achilles, Odysseus, the Prophets, Socrates, Edgar in King Lear, 
Prospero, Pascal, Mozart, Pushkin, William Blake. These we think about and, if 
possible, make our souls by [...] If Benn was not yet a Citizen, if Eternity was not 
ready to give him his second papers, he was as close to it as I had ever been able to 
come. [69]
Trachtenberg's hunch is that Benn will make the grade, a person "not cut off from 
his inner sources" [141], But if Crader still has access to the most fundamental needs 
of his soul, then his ability to chart their path out into the world must be called into 
question.
It is not just a case of the suitability of Crader's advocacy of, as Trachtenberg puts 
it, "Love, the very essence of the Divine Spirit and the source for humankind of the 
warmth of heaven" [277] in an unaccommodating reality. It is also a case of how far 
Benn's needs are distorted by his involvement in the contemporary sexual lunacies.
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Trachtenberg acknowledges with regret that "Uncle was profoundly upset by a 
succession of sexual miseries"[iil], and that Benn, in his fifties, was "still 
tormented, a full-scale example of the ordeal by desire"[no]. Kenneth mitigates the 
harshness of his judgement with his view that Benn kept "as an inner shrine, a vision 
of an abiding intimacy. Those promises of love and kindness. Only he looked for 
them in the oddest places"[83], These "odd places" invariably take the form of the 
most physical sensuality. The suspicion, as Kenneth articulates it, is that Benn has 
been "acquiescing in the preeminence of sex, putting it at the heart of existence, 
bowing to the consensus"[308]. Trachtenberg feels that Benn "was, or once had 
been, a sensualist. Foolish to say 'once had been'. If you were that, you continued 
for life to be it in some degree ..."[95], Benn's track record, involving two wives and 
goodness knows how many mistresses, amply demonstrates his propensities. And 
when the eminent botanist complains about "things private citizens can't do much 
about - the bomb, for instance. After the atomic one, the orgiastic one was dropped 
on us", Dr.Layamon upbraids him with the highly believable claim that "You didn't 
dive into a shelter" [159].
But it is in his marriage with Matilda where things appear most unusual. No 
doubt Matilda is not the most propitious o f choices for Benn. Yet when Benn talks 
about his deepest feelings for Matilda he seems either to be fighting to convince 
himself of the veracity of his emotions - "I love her" [157] - or dealing in empty 
textbook platitudes: "Through love you penetrate to the essence o f a being" - 
Trachtenberg thinks that Benn is here "talking through his hat"[225]. Moreover, 
Benn's means for penetrating through to the essence of a being seem to involve 
Matilda dressing up in frilly blouses and being dragged to a particular comer of the 
bed[292]. What seems most bizarre, though, is the way in which Crader's unease 
about the marriage manifests itself. As comprehension of the Layamons' plot dawns
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on him, it takes its toll. But more significant for Benn are the portents he receives 
from absurd and incongruous sources. As he watches Hitchcock's Psycho', the 
image of Tony Perkins in drag (and particularly his broad shoulders) is 
instantaneously fused with the body of Matilda. As Trachtenberg gravely observes, 
"this vision in the movie house told him not to marry her"[233], Crader is not 
oblivious to the depressing message being transmitted here, namely that his heart is 
"activated by trash" and "Hollywood ptomaine"[234]. But his irrationality continues 
when he bursts forth in anguish the secret which has been troubling him - Matilda's 
breasts are too far apart. Irrationality in the context of the novel is undoubtedly a 
valuable commodity, and indeed Benn's instincts ultimately triumph over his 
judgement, extricating him from the potentially soulless married life which awaited 
him. But there is an irrationality of the heart and an irrationality of madness and 
mania - Crader seems to teeter between the two.
Moreover, why, in this supposedly 'spiritual' man, does his disquiet become 
actuated by the deeply physical and tangible? (remember also Crader's concern over 
Matilda's teeth). It could be argued that Crader is so concerned with matters of the 
spirit that he is in headlong retreat from physical reality, to the extent that he finds 
the latter a horror. But with a past like his, intensely grounded in the senses, this is 
doubtful. And in any case, Crader's spiritual instincts are badly, perhaps irreparably 
damaged by the shattering revelation ( unpredictable to him if not to the reader) that 
the azalea in the Layamons' apartment with which he has been practising botanical 
clairvoyancy for several weeks, is artificial: "After all these years of unbroken 
rapport, to be taken in," he wails, "The one thing I could always count on. My 
occupation, my instinct, my connection... broken o ff  [300], Small wonder, then, that 
Crader fails to live up to the grossly exaggerated status awarded him by Kenneth.
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Benn's view is that he has "assisted] at the degradation o f love"[277] (doubly 
ironic in that to escape the Layamons' world o f false love, he has to act deceitfully 
himself). But then Benn had never been quite as pure and innocent as 
Trachtenberg's ideal. Trachtenberg himself had owned up to this: Benn "preferred to 
come on innocent - innocent and perplexed, and even dumb-looking. That was 
better for all concerned. This business of deliberate of elected 'innocence' is damn 
curious..."[15]. Moreover, Crader "represented {seemed to represent) the old 
innocence" [16], Which begs the question why Kenneth had assigned such glorious 
credentials to Benn in the first place. Ultimately, it is not so much Crader's fitness 
for the role of culture-transformer which should be called into question but rather 
Trachtenberg's delusions over his uncle's status. Such false impressions lead 
Kenneth to characterize Benn, after the latter's failures in love and relationships 
(specifically with Matilda) as "a man who had lost the privilege o f vision, [and] 
fallen into the opposite and brutal prevailing outlook" [328], Such a judgement is 
skewed because Benn is no fallen angel. He has always, to a certain extent, 
partaken of this outlook. More accurate, and more charitable to Benn, would be the 
reader's acceptance of Crader's sad philosophy on his inability to find something 
meaningful and lasting amidst the chaos o f his existence:-
A newspaperman had me on the phone a few days ago [...] he wanted a statement 
about plant life and the radiation level increasing. Also dioxin and other harmful 
wastes. He was challenging about it. Well - 1 agreed it was bad. But in the end I 
said, 'It's terribly serious, of course, but I think more people die o f heartbreak than of 
radiation.' [87]
As was mentioned earlier, Bellow's animadversions on the deleterious effects of 
contemporary existence reach levels o f ubiquitous and close-to-intolerable intensity 
in More Die o f Heartbreak Were it not for the melancholic risibility of the 
situations such effects produce, their intensity would be unbearable. And yet, for all 
that, Trachtenberg finds himself in the classic Bellovian position of the dangling
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man. For he can find neither satisfaction nor sanctuary whichever direction he 
travels in.
At the heart of Kenneth's (and indeed Benn's) problem is the opposition between 
public, politicized consciousness and the personal, feeling self. Somewhere in the 
middle both men must try to locate their souls. "The main enterprise," notes 
Trachtenberg," was America itself, and the increase of its powers. Submission to 
those powers made something of you"[194], Kenneth had earlier outlined just what 
it took to become a constituted, and importantly, recognised 'self:-
A full-blooded man would be engaged with government, with markets, with 
computers, with law, with war, with virile action - above all with public life and 
politics: the armed might of the superpowers, the ambitions of Stalin's heirs, the 
Middle East, the CIA, the Supreme Court. Or money equivalents of the same. Or 
sexual ones, an eroticism matching superpower politics. [28]
It might be wondered in the light of the foregoing whether Kenneth and Benn are 
indeed "full-blooded" men, bearing in mind the torrents of information (as many 
from the contemporary public sphere as from literature and philosophy) which flow 
in Trachtenberg's mind, and Crader's own disordered version of superpower 
eroticism. But it should be emphasised that the reason why Kenneth's diagnoses of 
the debased modem consciousness are often so acute is that he is so enmeshed in its 
nets. That he can nevertheless see the corruptive effects of the mental vortex 
demonstrates that he is not entirely sunk. And it has already been seen just how 
'contemporary' Benn can be. In the encouraging idiom of counsellors to addicts, 
both men at least realise that they need help. In any case, the two, by their 
predilections of Russian Literature and botany respectively, have effectively 
debarred themselves from 'serious' consideration:-
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...in general, this was a century of hybrids, and [that] if you weren't one, if you 
asserted that you lived by a classical, traditional standard, as some people took 
credit for doing, you were out of it [...] You might be an estimable person, but you 
were living 'elsewhere' - pre-1914, even pre-eighteenth century. That might feel 
nice, certainly, but it meant that you had excused yourself from the present age, you 
had opted out. [190]
Even with Trachtenberg's self-serving pomposity taken into account, it is quite true 
to suggest that neither he nor Benn are as submerged in the present age as the likes 
of Harold, Matilda and Dr.Layamon. Trachtenberg and Crader are men both in and 
out of time. As Kenneth recalls the "high-serious stuff' of Kojeve's historical 
sketches - "no porno, sadomasochistic or pederastic lewdness for table talk" - he 
formulates the reason for modem decay thus:-
Unless your thinking is deduced from a correct conception of history, unless you 
live in your time, thinking will only confuse you - it will drive you nuts. The terrible 
result of hyperactive but unfocused consciousness is a cause of our decline. [36]
This may seem a bit rich coming from Trachtenberg, but at least his focus (such as it 
is) is on something ennobling and timeless, and not on the mad, nihilistic whirlpools 
of sex, money and death. Kenneth is horrified by the constant bombardment on the 
individual by the detritus of public 'experience', insanely desultory and stupefying. 
He talks of "the proliferation of a multitude of false worlds to whose rules people 
were earnestly committed. They could draw you along because they seemed to 
know what they were doing. All the while they were in a deep trance but still spoke 
authoritatively for the 'real"'[187], And he gives an analysis of this phenomenon, as 
purveyed by the likes of Spangler in The Dean's December-
All of this, not to beat around the bush, refers to the fallen state in which our 
species finds itself. A profusion of made-up events is supposed to divert us from it 
in order to compensate us. The profusion, often passing for 'information', is really a 
disguise for kitsch entertainment. Death also, while you enjoy a viewer's immunity 
from it, is entertaining, as it was in imperial Rome, or in 1793. As, today, Sadat is 
murdered, Indira Gandhi is assassinated, the Pope himself is gunned down in
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St.Peter's Square, while personally unharmed, you live to see more and more and 
more, until after many deferrals death gets personal even with you. The jumpmaster 
says, 'You bail out next.' [...] Events are profuse, but (and this is what 'a fallen state' 
signifies) the personal space for their accommodation is very limited. [19]
The pressure on the self from the incessant flurry of external events entails a glum 
corollary for those things which necessarily belong in the domain of the personal:-
Your soul had its work cut out for it in this extraordinary country [...] There seems 
to be a huge force that advances, propels and this propellant increases its power by 
drawing value away from personal life and fitting us for its colossal purpose. It 
demands the abolition of such things as love and a r t ... of gifts like uncle's, which it 
can tolerate intermittently if they don't get in the way. [301]
Ultimately, the value of the self and its familiars withers away, the private sphere 
becomes odious in the face of omnipresent 'actuality'. For Benn, the self of love 
decays, for Kenneth, the self of art>
As for types like my own, obscurely motivated by the conviction that our existence 
was worthless if we didn't make a turning point of it, we were assigned to the 
humanities, to poetry, philosophy, painting - the nursery games of humankind, 
which had to be left behind when the age of science began. The humanities would 
be called upon to choose a wallpaper for the crypt, as the end drew near. And if 
there is no turning point, it will soon be time for the 'esthetic' call. [246-247]
But, as ever for the Bellow hero, "personal freedom is beset by choice-torments"[6i]. 
For if the turmoil of gargantuan public reality limits the development and 
significance of qualities dependent on the definition of the self, then doubts, as they 
have done throughout Bellow's novelistic canon, persist over the viability and 
genuineness of individual constructs. Kenneth's caution can be traced to his reading 
of Admiral Richard Byrd's book, Alone ( significantly recommended to him by 
Benn). Byrd describes the "claustrophobia of consciousness" [33] resultant from 
small groups being bound together during the long Antarctic night. What is revealed 
to Kenneth is the bleakness and fragility of the self:-
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Byrd says that under such conditions it didn't take them long to find each other out. 
And what was it that they so quickly found out? 'The time comes when one has 
nothing to reveal to the other, when even his unformed thoughts can be anticipated, 
his pet ideas become a meaningless drool.' [...] 'There is no escape anywhere. You 
are hemmed in on every side by your inadequacies and the crowding pressures of 
your associates.' So in the coldest cold on the face of the earth, X-rays are struck 
off, showing in gray and white the deformities and diseases of civilised 
personalities, and your own are at the center. If you had to spend six months in 
solitude on the dark side of the moon rummaging your bosom, what rich materials 
do you suppose you would turn up? [20]
This horror both of one's own emptiness and that of others extends into 
Trachtenberg's own private circumstances, which he describes as "almost always a 
bouquet of sores with a garnish of trivialities or downright trash" [39]. Finding 
himself to be "knee-deep in the garbage of a pesonal life, the ordeal o f the 
West! "[312], Kenneth ends, not so much with the revelation, as with the acceptance 
that his ex-wife Treckie "didn't really care a damn about me. For her, I didn't even 
exist":-
That was nothing to get excited about, as it was one of the commoner human 
experiences - neither to give a damn nor be given a damn about. In practice it was 
accepted as a matter of course, though at heart nobody quite came to terms with 
it. [319]
What has supplanted authentic feeling in the self in the contemporary world is a 
powerful force which seems to carry meaning and significance solely in terms of an 
erotic and manipulatory vanity:-
Blood is charged with longing. The red blood is egotistical, with terrible powers, 
with desire and perverse impulses, and carrying strange wastes that demand 
purgation. Blood is that in which the Self lives. [128]
Trachtenberg himself is not immune to the persuasive wiles of the fallen self, noting 
that, "for the sake of self-esteem"[174], he welcomes the muddled erotic 
supplications of Dita, although he concludes, not totally convincingly, that:-
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...it's a tiresome preoccupation, self-esteem. Something has to be done to limit the 
number of people whose opinions can affect us. Unless they care for us, or have 
done us some good, or hold out some promise, why should their views matter? [174]
On top of the fact that Trachtenberg's question seems to court flattery and self­
esteem, self-effacement does not appear to be high on the list of priorities of a man 
who traffics in pompous theorizing and views his own existence as a potential 
’turning point' (as the interpreter of Crader's 'magics'). Nevertheless, Kenneth avers 
that he intends to recover the true self, something like the 'decent self of Kipling as 
outlined in the earlier chapter on The Victim:-
I have a weakness for the big issues. The meaning of human love. The sacrifice of 
egoism for the salvation of individuality [...] The egoist valuing himself so highly 
and crediting himself with absolute significance is in a sense correct because every 
human being as a center of living powers and as a possibility of infinite perfection is 
capable of possessing absolute significance and worth and one can't value oneself 
too highly. But it is unjust and evil to refuse significance to others. [292]
The problem is that Kenneth, although by no means as destructively egocentric as 
such as Harold or Dr.Layamon, is still reluctant to concede a significance on 
anything like the grand scale outlined above to those whom he perceives to be 
agents of the fallen world - in short, to those whom he feels are not like him. And 
one easily understands how much self-esteem is involved in this! Kenneth, though, 
is most honest when he comes to identify the reason for the void in the personal 
space:-
There are people who advise you to leave the heart out of it altogether. It shouldn't 
figure, it's untrustworthy. In some cases the heart takes early retirement [...] 
Everybody pays the heart lip service of course, but everybody is more familiar with 
the absence of love than with its presence and gets so used to the feeling of 
emptiness that it becomes 'normal'. You don't miss the foundation of feeling until 
you begin to look for your self and can't find a support in the affects for a self. [241]
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Trachtenberg has identified what is most horrible of all, particularly to his 
beleaguered uncle. The corruption of consciousness, the corruption of the self - 
both entail the corruption of love.
Despite Benn's being embedded in the world of sensuality, there is no reason to 
doubt that his despair is rooted in the absence of an underlying and cementing love. 
He talks sadly of what he terms his "pain schedule"
Towards the end of your life you have something like a pain schedule to fill out - a 
long schedule like a federal document, only it's your pain schedule. Endless 
categories. First, physical causes - like arthritis, gallstones, menstrual cramps. Next 
category, injured vanity, betrayal, swindle, injustice. But the hardest items of all 
have to do with love, [l l]
Benn's pain in this last category is acutely felt, for if love is not being degraded for 
financial and social gain (as it is in his marriage to Matilda), it is being substituted 
by a frantic, self-justifying and profoundly nihilistic carnality. This earth, "the 
mundane egg where all creatures, all beings, lived on death, infected by death in the 
very desire for love, the only force that held out a hope against being devoured 
altogether" [89], holds no place where escape from the prevailing sexual totemism 
can be effected. In a memorable scene, Benn and Kenneth's vacation in Kyoto is 
interrupted by a trip to a strip club. There, the fetish worlds of business, scientific 
technology, money and power converge in a grotesque nexus, unified by dominant 
sexuality:-
Then each of the girls in turn stooped, opened her knees, and dilated herself with 
her fingers. Dead silence. A kind of static insanity descended on the house [...] 
Everybody had to see, to see, to see the thing of things, the small organ red as a satin 
pincushion [...] All these business and laboratory wizards rivaling the Germans, the 
British, and the Americans, these high-tech and management types, not one of them 
drunk, not one opening his mouth, had come to see what these girls were displaying 
[...] All these botanists, engineers, inventors of miraculous visual instruments from
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electron microscopes to equipment that sent back pictures of the moons of Saturn, 
cared for nothing but these slow openings. They couldn't look enough. [107-108]
As Trachtenberg had earlier opined, "this literalness, from a sexual standpoint, is 
lethal. When it comes to a matter of limbs, members and organs, Eros faces 
annihilation" [90],
Kenneth is familiar with the emptiness behind the mad sensuality from the figure 
of his father, "the premise of [whose] eroticism was mortality"[69], and both he and 
Benn encounter it in the shapes o f Treckie's mother (whose "sexual craziness" is 
entirely due to her advancing years, to her refusal "to join the census o f the 
dead"[211]), and the forlorn appeals of Della Bedell. Small wonder that "once you 
get into the erotic life modem style, you are accelerated until your minutest particles 
fly apart"[240], Significantly, in the light o f the delusive nature o f public 
consciousness, it is the creation of crisis mentalities which acts as a cover for 
"lasciviousness and libertinage"[4i]. And there is no more twisted an example o f the 
hallucinatory nature o f public experience than the Cusper rape case. Described by 
Trachtenberg as a "sex show"[252] and as "lewd communications with the 
public"[275], the hearing is "a big hit on TV"[252]. Truth is obscured in an obscene 
farrago of show business rot, as bom-again victim makes lachrymose public 
atonement for her (perhaps) sending the wrong man to jail at the original case three 
years previously. Batteries o f lawyers and movie agents move in for their piece of 
the action. And in front o f the ubiquitous camera, the corrupt State Governor 
wallows in titillation as he dredges up the sexually explicit details and evidence 
pertaining (and not pertaining) to the case. Most appalling to Benn in this sexual 
maelstrom is the appearance of the word 'LOV' carved into the victim's belly with a 
broken bottle, an illiterate testament to where Crader's most cherished concern now 
finds itself. This type o f public nadir would be absurd if  it were not already an
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entirely familiar sight on American television. But it is from this kind of example of 
stupefied de-consciousness that Trachtenberg is led to greater and greater 
appreciation of the mystical and metaphysical, evidenced in his theory (again!) 
about what happens to love in the modem world, a theory first enunciated by 
Kenneth's old Russian teacher, M. Yermelov:-
He told me that each of us had his angel, a being charged with preparing us for a 
higher evolution of the spirit [...] we were aware, each of us, of a small glacier in the 
breast [...] This glacier must be thawed and the necessary warmth for that must, to 
begin with, be willed. Thinking begins with willing, and thinking must be warmed 
and colored with feeling. The task of angels is to instil warmth into our souls [...] 
Here the difficulty is that waking consciousness is so very meager. The noise of the 
world is so terrible that we can endure it only by being coated with sleep. We can 
give the angels little help from within when they try to instill warmth into us - the 
warmth of love. And the angels are also fallible [...] And, said Yermelov, they goof. 
Our waking consciousness louses up their efforts, and since they have orders to 
transmit their impulse at all costs, they send it when we're sleeping. What happens 
then is terrible [...] Denied access to the soul, the angels work directly on the 
sleeping body. In the physical body this angelic love is corrupted into human 
carnality. Such is the source of all the disturbed sexuality of the present age.
Trachtenberg continues:-
The prise de courant led directly into the flesh and the instincts, whereas the 
current should have gone into the sentient soul. Instead, planetary demons of 
electricity were entering us from beneath, coming from the interior of the earth [...] 
As the millenium approached its end, this was the true picture of human sexuality. 
Eros himself was assailed by electricity and at the same time by sclerosis. Pure love 
is overcome by perversity. We become fixated on the sexual members [...] Erotic 
obsessions, concupiscence, lewdness - the sexual furies - are streaming after us. 
You have to pity the angels too. By their failure to penetrate our sodden sleep they 
also degenerate. M. Yermelov would insist on this. [72-73]
According to Kenneth, your only ground for refusing to consider the corruption of 
love into carnality an ordeal (the ordeal of the West, as so incongruously elaborated 
earlier) is that "you aren't conscious of it"[l 11]. But what this essentially means is 
that Trachtenberg is unable to resolve the problem of love. Cast as he is as one of
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the unhappy few who are conscious of love's debasement, albeit in a typically 
vitiated way, such knowledge does not avail him much when dealing with those who 
are quite content to stew in a "sodden sleep". And it is the buzz of modem 
consciousness, amply demonstrated by Kenneth, which is the enemy of the angelic 
forces of warmth and love. Trachtenberg realises as much:-
The secret of our being still asks to be unfolded. Only now we understand that 
worrying at it and ragging it is no use. The first step is to stop these oscillations of 
consciousness that are keeping me awake. Only, before you command the 
oscillations to stop, before you check out, you must maneuver yourself into a 
position in which metaphysical aid can approach. [331]
Trachtenberg can no more stop these mental tremors than he can form satisfactory 
relationships. And if he were to "check out", and invite the attention of his angelic 
abstractions, then he would surely end up passive, isolated, and deprived of that very 
love he seeks to revive. Consequently, he finds himself in the position of a man 
who must continue to seek love in a fallen and graceless world. Though he sees sex 
as the analgesic to every conceivable trouble - "the act by which love would be 
transmitted if there were any" [86] - Trachtenberg's faith in love ultimately remains 
unimpaired:-
It's love that makes the difference, Uncle. These defects jump out at you because 
love punishes you for drafting it against its will; it's one of those powers of the soul 
that won't be conscripted. It makes beauty, it makes strength; sometimes for special 
purposes, when really inspired, it even produces new organs. Without it, critical 
consciousness simply reduces all comers to their separate parts, it disintegrates 
them. [265]
The parallel condition to that of love is found in the form of Benn's research into 
Arctic lichens:-
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Those Arctic lichens are frozen through and through. Ninety-five percent of their 
existence is solid ice. But at the slightest warming they revive and even grow a bit. 
This can go on for thousands of years. [315]
Like the plants, love in the contemporary world exists, but exists in a state of 
suspended animation, buried under layers o f ice. That neither Trachtenberg nor 
Crader finally succeed in thawing it out does not negate the fact of its continuation. 
It merely emphasise how arduous and troublesome is the quest for love in modem 
circumstances - but then that has ever been the case with any precious commodity.
Crader's "survival measure" is to place himself in suspended animation, by fleeing 
from the Layamons into the frozen wastes of the Arctic. There he can apply "global 
masses o f ice and hyperborean darkness" to himself - "Night so that I can't see 
myself. Ice as a corrective. Ice for the rigor" [3 34], As Kenneth locates the envelope 
containing Benn's forwarding address (which the former is instructed not to give to 
Matilda), the chill o f the conclusion becomes apparent:-
The envelope contained, neatly printed in his own scientific hand, the unfamiliar 
name of the research group and the address of a Finnish prof in Helsinki (home and 
office), plus the box number of an incomprehensible location in reindeer country, 
far out on the tundra. Probably near Novaya Zemlya. Even that was not remote 
enough. [335]
Crader, a victim of the conundrum that says "when you come down into 
contemporary life you can really get it in the neck. If on the other hand you decline 
to come down into it, you'll never understand a thing" [277], seems to have opted for 
the latter choice as a palliative to his woes. In doing so, he appears to embody the 
most bitter and defeatist settlement of a Bellow novel, the man of love withdrawing 
into gloom, granite and ice. Perhaps this is the bleakest picture with which Bellow 
has presented us. But it is still not so clear-cut. True, one recalls Dr.Layamon's 
judgement that "a man who likes people doesn't wind up in the Antarctic"[i63], a
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judgement which could have equal validity at the other pole. But since Crader 
owned that the alternative to his Arctic expedition was to "go and drown myself 
right here, off Miami Beach"[334], his self-refrigeration might seem less grim. And 
past history suggests that Crader is not completely done for, in that Kenneth's 
characterisation of Benn as "a phoenix who runs after arsonists [...] Burnt to the 
ground, reincarnated from the ashes"[198-99] rings true. Crader's life has been 
defined by the succession of encounters and entanglements with women, inevitably 
ending in failure, or in bereavement (his first wife). Benn's deepest instinct is to 
continue the crazy search for love, to return to the fray, and there is a hint that he 
will do just this in his acknowledgement of his phoenix-like status in his closing 
words to Kenneth. Whether he has been so demoralised by his involvement with the 
Layamons that he can never return is a moot point. Perhaps Crader has mitigated 
some of his 'dangling' by his withershins course, but he still seems to be a man 
spinning between a vain (in the current climate) longing for a pure, spiritual love, 
and a simultaneous attraction to and repulsion from the fallen world of sensuality. 
Until the moment (if it should ever come) when Crader's potential for true love can 
again be activated (and bearing in mind the possible consequences for him in view 
of his knowledge of Admiral Byrd's book), he must lie dormant in his ice lair, a 
confused and compromised sleeping beauty.
As for Trachtenberg, he is if anything even more confused than Benn, dangling as 
he still is between the attractive-destructive Idea-madness and the wreckage of his 
private life, between the politicised and the personal, between governance by the 
mental and submersion in the emotional. Seeing his grandiose 'Project Turning 
Point' put, at the very least, on hold by the flight of Benn, Kenneth will continue to 
seek spiritual balm in the writings of his Russian masters, whilst at the same time 
being unable to break with the frenzied pursuits of modem society. As a man with a
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heart in the past and a consciousness in the present, Kenneth would make a fitting 
novelistic end-product to Saul Bellow's narrative imagination.
"We leave Bellow's novel," says Michael Glenday, "with the clear sense that there 
is no cure for the spiritual and emotional haemorrhage of our time, and that deaths 
from heartbreak will go on increasing."11 Moreover, he further opines that if 
Kenneth "in all his feeble personality and tedious speechifying is humanism's 
defendant, then that hope will remain unregenerate",12 before concluding that "in 
More Die o f Heartbreak Bellow reveals the futility of trying to hold to a humanist 
ideology in contemporary times."13 I do not agree with these statements. For 
neither Trachtenberg nor Crader are suited , either by temperament or by character, 
to carry the burden of 'humanist ideology'. It would be possible to view 'Project 
Turning Point* as some sort of humanistic endeavour, but in the hands of a man like 
Trachtenberg, a purveyor of rationality gone mad - and which, importantly, often 
leads to his isolation - such a scheme was bound to flounder. And Crader's simple 
goal of having two people joined together in love by no means equips him for any 
vast design encompassing mankind. Indeed, both men, as has been shown, 
continually move in the direction of the emotional, sometimes towards the mystical. 
The fact is that the novel does not relate the defeat of humanism, as it was never 
intended to be constructed on this premise. What we see is two men who are 
involved in what is ultimately a deep personal search for what every Bellow hero 
has sought to some extent or another. It is a search which involves no ideology, no 
prescriptions, no spurious edicts or requisitions, and which charts its path along a 
primary, pure and essential route. What Bellow had written thirty years before More 
Die o f Heartbreak still holds true, for it is here that the remedy to the "spiritual and 
emotional haemorrhage" of our, or of any time, can be found:-
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A book, any book, may easily be superfluous. But to manifest love - can that be 
superfluous? Is there so much of it about us? Not so much. It is still rare, still 
wonderful. It is still effective against distraction.14
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Conclusion - A joumev inwards - and Inwards
"Between extremities 
Man runs his course ..."
Yeats, 'Vacillation'.
"I might have said, if I hadn't been excited to the point of sickness, that I didn't ride 
around the city on the cars to make a buck or be useful to the family but to take a 
reading of this boring, depressed, ugly, endless, rotting city. I couldn't have thought 
it then, but my purpose was to interpret this place. Its power was tremendous. But 
so was mine, potentially. I refused absolutely to believe that people here were doing 
what they thought they were doing. Beneath the apparent life of these streets was 
their real life, beneath each face the real face, beneath each voice and its words the 
true tone and the real message."
Saul Bellow, 'Something to remember me by'.
In the years following the appearance of More Die o f  Heartbreak, Saul Bellow, if 
not exactly fleeing Crader-like into his own personal Novaya Zemlya, has certainly 
backtracked from the relentless gaze of both critic and public alike - or perhaps it 
might be more accurate to say that the author would desire to do so if such a thing 
were still possible. His works, for better or worse, are now irretrievably 'public' 
property - and so is the author himself. It is surely the supreme irony that that 
consciousness which Bellow has so strikingly represented in his works - that of the 
overfull, hideously public and profoundly flimsy mind - threatens to be the force 
which ultimately impoverishes not only his art, but all art. In Bellow's particular 
case, his trademark usages of ambiguity and character complexity in his novels are 
anathema to the vast whirlpools of false public experience. Amidst images that 
alternately thrill and bore us, stupefying us into surrender, amidst mental pollution 
which masquerades as 'information' or 'education', in all the gigantic turbulence of 
the omnipresent external, we have no room left for deep consideration of the artist 
and his art. We have too much on our minds. When we pick up a novel like The 
Dean's December, we say, 'Here is a book which warns us of the enervating effects 
of a ravenous, outwardly-directed intelligence' - perhaps we say this - before moving
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quickly on to the next necessary, unnecessary thought (not so much 'thought' as 
stimulation). Our appreciation of the novel flies off into the ether. For ease of 
storage in our saturated consciousness, for the purposes of a dreadful utility, the 
words 'Saul Bellow' themselves become transmuted into the nothingness lexicon of 
buzzwords which lack any real depth or significance with regard to the complexity 
of art - 'humanism', 'pessimism', 'conservative', 'liberal'. By means o f associating the 
author -any author - with certain key words in our limited public vocabulary of 
platitudes and debased terms, we can feel satisfied that we have accounted for this 
author. Like workmen who finish their job two hours before they should because 
they have started half an hour earlier, we can move on with a clear conscience - we 
are ahead of the game. To a certain extent this practice is unavoidable. But when 
the essentially private experience o f the artist is wilfully converted into the 
universally-owned banal formulae by which creativity and subtlety are overwhelmed 
then art degenerates into discourse.
Saul Bellow's adoption in most recent times of the novella form appears not only 
as a reaction against endless external noise, but as a confirmation that our minds are 
ill-equipped, or ill-disposed , to cope with the full artistry of the novel. It appears to 
certify that the private sphere which we allocate (or do not allocate) to ourselves for 
a consideration of what were once spoken o f approvingly as the 'humanities' has 
shrunk nearly to vanishing point. In its very make-up the novella reflects a drawing 
in of the reins, a condensation o f experience, a journey inwards and inwards. It is 
not a particularly encouraging view, but few would argue that it is unrealistic. 
When things are pared down to essentials like this, there is so much that seems 
superfluous. Thus it is that the author of such weighty tomes as The Adventures o f  
Augie March and Humboldt's Gift can advance the following view:-
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...in my early years I wrote more than one fat book. It's difficult for me now to 
read those early novels, not because they lack interest but because I find myself 
editing them, slimming down my sentences and cutting whole paragraphs.1
Bellow crystallizes the problem for the modem writer; a diagnosis which is well 
worth quoting at length:-
What I do say is that we (we writers, I mean) must cope with a plethora of 
attractions and excitements - world crises, hot and cold wars, threats to survival, 
famines, unspeakable crimes. To conceive of these as 'rivals’ would be absurd - 
even monstrous. I say no more than that these crises produce states o f mind and 
attitudes towards existence that artists must take into account [...] The modem 
reader (or viewer, or listener: let's include everybody) is perilously overloaded. His 
attention is, to use the latest lingo, 'targeted' by powerful forces [...] True, we are at 
liberty to think our own thoughts, but our independent ideas, such as they may be, 
must live with thousand o f ideas and notions inculcated by influential teachers or 
floated by 'idea men' advertisers, communications people, columnists, anchormen, et 
cetera. Better-regulated (educated) minds are less easily overcome by these gas 
clouds of opinion. But no one can have an easy time of it [...] A part of every mind, 
perhaps the major portion, is open to public matters. Without being actively 
conscious of it, we somehow keep track of the Middle East, Japan, South Africa, 
reunified Germany, oil, munitions, the New York subways, the homeless, the 
markets, the banks, the major leagues, news from Washington; and also, pell-mell, 
films, trials, medical discoveries, rap-groups, racial clashes, congressional scandals, 
the spread of AIDS, child murders - a crowd of horrors. Public life in the United 
States is a mass o f distractions. By some this is seen as a challenge to their ability to 
maintain internal order. Others have acquired a taste for distraction, and they freely 
consent to be addled.2
Like so many Kenneth Trachtenbergs, our heads abuzz with vicarious experience, 
we may turn to our most private being and discover only wreckage and debris. The 
novel cannot, under present conditions, compensate for this gap. Its terms of  
reference are different from those in which we are steeped in everyday life; it 
appeals to faculties which are eroding ever more quickly. The novel is not 
'important'. To conceive then of the novella as a kind of literary 'sound-byte', an 
artistic equivalent of the empty utterances of the media types whose sole function is 
to hold our interest for a few seconds, may be going too far. Indeed, the novella 
could easily be viewed in a positive light, as an art which we can experience in our
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lunch break, and which will not interfere with a modem lifestyle. But in the context 
of Bellow's oeuvre, there seems to me to be something intrinsically sad, not so much 
in content as in form, in his move towards brevity. It might be characterised as an 
acceptance of the necessity to write short.
The first thing that must be said about the novellas A Theft and The Bellarosa 
Collection is that they are not really germane to the present study - namely that of 
demonstrating the complex dangling nature o f the central characters in Bellow's 
novels. For not only does the form of the novellas limit expression, it also curtails 
the development o f character.3 And the very insubstantiality o f the characters does 
not permit of any deep exploration of their motives, their traits, their desires and 
fears. What we have are pale and diluted manifestations o f the more vibrant 
characters of the novels - in effect, a shadow play. True, Seize the day is technically 
a novella. And we have already seen how characters such as Citrine and Corde 
seem to fade away. But nowhere in either of the novellas is there a character to 
match the depth and range of Wilhelm's dramatization, nor is there any evidence to 
show that the concerns of those in the novellas can rival the extent o f those of 
Charlie and Albert. It is perhaps unfair to judge the novellas in the vast shadow of 
the novels - yet it is virtually impossible not to do so.
In commenting on A Theft, Robert Boyers is, I think, correct in his view that "the 
book is most accurately understood as a work o f deliberate self-limitation".4 But it 
is difficult to disagree with the judgement of Paul Taylor who complains o f the 
failure "to dramatize [...] the relationships" of the three main characters in A Theft.5 
Similarly tough to dispute is the belief of Robert Towers that "instead of a realized 
work of fiction, A Theft suggests only the armature for an uncompleted and much 
weightier work [...] it serves mainly as a reminder of how much more we have come
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to expect from this writer".6 Boyers himself admits that Clara Velde, the heroine o f  
A Theft, "never emits more than vaguely portentous metaphysical noises".7 And 
here is the crux of the matter. When a character's experience is tailored to accord 
with the form of the novella, when we are furnished with the minimum of material 
on which to base our view, then it would be foolish indeed to award this character a 
significance or a complexity disproportionate to their status. Do the novellas then 
signify an end to the 'dangling' of Bellow's central characters? Perhaps - but it 
would be more accurate to own up that we cannot (and should not) say for certain. 
For both Clara Velde and the unnamed memory-man of The Bellarosa Connection 
should be distinguished, as far as possible, from the ten previous heroes. Only if  
Bellow returns to the form of the novel can the above question be answered, fn the 
meantime, the novellas should be viewed as being o f interest more in terms of the 
significance of their form, along the lines argued at the beginning o f this chapter, 
than in terms of the significance of their content.
And yet, for all the fact that Clara Velde represents a diminution of 
characterisation, she is nevertheless (apart from her sex) a recognisable Bellow 
protagonist. Glimpsed under the frugal light thrown upon her are the ambiguities 
which surround and define her existence. In her purest desires, she seems to 
constitute something of a carry-over from Benn Crader in More Die o f  Heartbreak. 
For Clara too is in pursuit of the deepest unspoilt love - her "one and only subject"8 - 
a woman who believes passionately in the inviolate "Human Pair" forged together 
by the most genuine of attachments[20]. Her own chosen partner in this "rescue 
operation" [30] is Ithiel Regler, a kind of watered-down Spangler, "a man who 
thought world politics continually"[25], in his job as an adviser to power-brokers in 
Washington. In the terrible decay and isolation of New York, styled apocalyptically 
as "Gogmagogsville"[i2] (although Clara herself seems divorced from the terror,
196
shut up in her plush Park Avenue apartment), the ring which she had received from 
Ithiel as a younger woman takes on the proportions of a talisman, warding off the 
forces of dissolution, and embodying the undying bond between the two. But it is as 
if  their feelings have been stored away with the ring during the intervening years, 
for not only has Ithiel married, divorced, and had several mistresses, but Clara 
herself is currently on husband number four, the insensate Wilder Velde, who 
immures himself in pulp thrillers as an antidote to outside reality ( a reality which, 
in line with the compression of experience o f the novella, is hinted at only in very 
vague terms - it is from the sense o f personal isolation in the story that we deduce 
that outside reality is unaccommodating). Moreover, Clara admits that she had 
bullied Ithiel into buying her the ring, and then sentimentalized its value[80]. Still, 
the ring, for Clara, does seem to act as a "life-support"[70], a symbol of an 
unrealised and unattainable love amidst the compromises and submissions o f life, 
for when it disappears it provokes a personal crisis in her. But on the first occasion 
that the ring vanishes, Clara does not baulk at vitiating its sentimental purity by 
making a fraudulent insurance claim, for which she is massively rewarded. Indeed, 
when she eventually discovers the ring under her bed, she realises that in fumbling 
for a tissue on her bedside table she had inadvertently dislodged the object. Hints of  
a dark, even bestial sexuality accompany this revelation - "For what purpose she had 
been groping now that it was discovered, she did not care to guess"[43], The second 
disappearance of the ring, this time stolen by the black boyfriend of Clara's Austrian 
au pair, actuates the main thread of the story, as Clara searches desperately, not so 
much for the ring itself, but for signs that a common bond o f feeling can still exist 
between people; that an appreciation of the spiritual value of the jewel, its love- 
invested significance, can yet be present. As Clara explains to Viennese Gina, who 
returns the ring with the incongruous aid o f Clara's daughter Lucy, her belief is that
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although the finest qualities of the soul are smothered, struggling for articulation in 
Gogmagogsville, they can nevertheless be detected and coaxed out>
'Let me tell you quickly,' said Clara, 'since it has to be quick, what I've been 
thinking of the stages a woman like me has gone through in her life. Stage one: 
Everyone is kindly, basically good; you treat 'em right, they'll treat you right - that's 
baby time. Stage two: Everybody is a brute, butcher, barbarian, rapist, crook, liar 
killer and monster. Stage three: Cynicism also is unacceptable, and you begin to put 
together an improved judgement based on minimal leads or certain selected 
instances.' [105]
Like Crader's Arctic lichens, the spirit can be revived from cold storage, its warmth 
finding expression in what, for Clara, constitutes a confirmation o f her sense that 
there was "something major in Lucy"[47], and that Gina "was a deep one"[67]. Yet 
there is much justice in Paul Taylor's acerbic comment that "we are required to 
interpret this (the return o f the ring) as an almost preternatural feat of moral 
insight",9 and in his view that "the morals Bellow draws [...] seem [...] so out of 
scale with the slightness of the story".10 Taylor suspects a satirical intent on 
Bellow's behalf, but I think the problem with interpretation lies more in the limits of 
the novella form. True, Clara is the subject of a gentle humour on occasions - her 
backwoods 'hellfire and damnation' religion is juxtaposed with the supposed 
sophistication of her role as a high-fashion queen, and her quest for love in an 
unfriendly environment is slightly compromised by her tendency to consult the 
superficial remedies o f quack psychiatrists. Moreover, her suicide attempts show 
her to be somewhat neurotic, and her bizarre eugenics scheme involving her and 
Ithiel[32] is more than a touch eccentric. But essentially Clara, like Crader, is not to 
be doubted when it comes to the utterance of her deepest feelings. And herein we 
find the problem. When Clara comments that she loves Ithiel with her soul[33], or 
defends the value of personal life ("I never feel so bad as when the life I lead stops 
being characteristic - when it could be anybody else's life" [83]), or laments the
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spiritual poverty of modem man (’’I'm beginning to see it [...] as the conduct of life 
without input from your soul. Essential parts of people getting mislaid or crowded 
out."[89]), we straightaway recognise the legitimate concerns of the Bellovian 
protagonist. But these are only lent credence by our knowledge o f what has gone 
before in the Bellow canon. In the context of the novella, where there are little or 
no events to connect with these utterances, such statements seem detached and 
contrived. The insubstantiality of the characters is directly responsible for this 
feeling. Lucy, for example, appears as nothing more than an absurd deus ex 
machina. And Ithiel seems to do anything but "think world-politics continually". 
Clara herself is endowed with "an anti-rest character", having too much "basic 
discord"[90] in her "confused inner life" [48] - a description which one might apply to 
any of Bellow's dangling men, but which in Clara's case seems only to be an 
unearned appurtenance. Clara can only provide us with one of those "minimal leads" 
she herself talked of earlier. We should not hurry into overreactions to A Theft, 
which would have us believe that Bellow's "indignation [has turned into] the 
acknowledgement of unstoppable decay".11 Rather, we should realise that the desire 
for love is there in the ambiguous ending which has Clara crying tears of hope for 
her child and for the realisation of Gina's qualities; and tears of sadness at her failure 
to pair off Ithiel and Gina, and her own continuing frustration and loneliness. But it 
is a love which is indeed "down in the catacombs"[73], a fitting repository for the 
skeletal creatures and events of the novella.
Superior to A Theft, but still evincing the same basic traits as its predecessor, is 
The Bellarosa Connection. Paul Ableman's view is that "at the level of ideas, and 
also of tender character evocation, the present work strikes me as the equal of 
anything that Bellow has yet written".12 One can agree with this judgement only up 
to a point. The novella's central question of what has befallen the Jews in America
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is certainly a challenging and controversial one. And in Sorella Fonstein, described 
as "an Everest o f lipoids",13 we have the nearest thing in the novellas to (excuse the 
pun) a fully-fleshed out character. The Jewish narrator's presence, however, is very 
sketchy indeed. Never given a name, he is the founder of the Mnemosyne Institute 
in Philadelphia, and as such is given a basic Bellovian duality in that his powerful 
memory acts as both a vitalising and debilitating faculty. His philosophy, "Memory 
is life"[2], could stand as a maxim for numerous Bellow heroes, in particular 
Tommy Wilhelm. Yet the deadening effects of a highly retentive memory are clear 
in that the narrator, in the manner of a Herzog or Trachtenberg, has accumulated a 
"burden of so much useless information" [34]. Using his gifts to train "executives, 
politicians, and members of the defence establishment"[l] in the logistics of  
technological capitalism, the narrator would now like to "forget about 
remembering" [2] - at least in so far as that memory involves the excrescences of the 
bureaucratic-military machine. For, as the years have advanced, he has come to 
appreciate that it is recollection in the realm of affects which is o f prime, indeed 
sole, importance - "I am preoccupied with feelings and longings, and emotional 
memory is nothing like rocketry or gross national products"[3].
His most moving remembrances are associated with Harry and Sorella Fonstein, 
and particularly with the latter's attempts to secure a meeting for her husband with 
the showbiz entrepreneur Billy Rose. Rose (a real person in name though not in his 
actions) had organised a network in Italy through some Mafia connections, for the 
purposes of smuggling Jews out of Europe and thus saving them from the death 
camps. Harry Fonstein was one such fortunate recipient o f Rose's attention. 
Mysteriously, though, Rose refuses to meet with or be thanked by any o f those he 
has delivered. Billy, incidentally, is, like Regler in A Theft, a recognisable 
attenuation of a fuller character that has gone before - this time Valentine Gersbach
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(although he also possesses shades o f the scarcely more realised Max Detillion in 
The Dean's December). A man with a debased private life ("streaks of sexual 
weakness, sexual humiliation"[i3]) and a chaotic public existence ("he had a bug­
like tropism for publicity" [13]), there are nonetheless "spots o f deep feeling in flimsy 
Billy. The God o f his fathers still mattered" [13], The fact that Rose liberated his 
fellow Jews from the clutches of the Nazis shows that something was operating on 
his obscure soul - but it is something which appears bereft of genuine personal 
feeling, and more in line with a hideous publicity game (Rose also stages a rally in 
Madison Square Garden with the theme, 'We will never die'[28]). What emerges is 
that the Americanization of the Jews appears to have robbed them oj the personal 
connection, of the ability to express (in private at least) their deepest emotions. Just 
as old Artur had mourned the passing of Elya's 'Old system', his 'Old World feelings', 
in Mr.Sammler's Planet, so the Fonsteins speculate on the effects o f the New 
World:-
The Jews could survive everything that Europe threw at them. I mean the lucky 
remnant. But now comes the next test - America. Can they hold their ground, or 
will the USA be too much for them? [65]
Rose's staunch unwillingness to have any kind o f personal contact with the rescued, 
even in the face of Sorella's attempts to blackmail him by exposing his sexual 
inadequacies, makes the cry "Something is due from every man to every man"[57] 
seem a forlorn one. Which is why the narrator, in his fond reveries, styles Sorella, in 
spite of her peccadilloes, as a "higher type"[66], a woman of deep spiritual 
significance: "In this world o f liars and cowards there are people like Sorella. One 
waits for them in the blind faith that they do exist" [56], The narrator's treasuring of 
Sorella as the means to restore personal values and private emotions to their status 
as the bridge between human beings is, however, undermined by the fact that he has 
not seen, nor bothered to contact, either she or Harry for thirty years. In fact, he has
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been a millionaire recluse since the death of his wife, a man who "avoid[s] giving 
[his] unlisted [telephone] number" [74], His personal connection has been severed, 
so that in many ways he all too closely resembles Billy Rose. Real people merely 
form part of his mind's dreamscape:-
Maybe the power of memory was to blame. Remembering them so well, did I need 
actually to see them? To keep them in a mental suspension was enough. They were 
a part of the permanent cast of characters, in absentia permanently. There wasn't a 
thing for them to do. [67]
Though the narrator denies being an assimilationist, he admits he is "an avoider of 
uncomfortable mixtures"[79], and it is only when his memory begins to fail (if 
memory is life, then the lack of it is evidently death) that he is shaken out of the 
chloroformed complacency of his gloriously successful pursuit o f the American 
Dream, and directed towards a recognition of the more durable gifts o f his heritage 
(it should be noted that his memory is seen to fail on one occasion when he cannot 
remember the words to a song, and, more disturbingly, seems to fail on the occasion 
of his belated attempts to contact the Fonsteins - Sorella is described by relatives as 
aloof and stand-offish, and not at all in the way the narrator pictures her[78]).
Most damaging of all to the narrator's comfort is the nightmare he experiences 
wherein his futile struggles to extricate himself from a ditch are watched by a 
sadistic onlooker: "I was being shown - and I was aware of this in sleep - that I had 
made a mistake, a lifelong mistake: something wrong, false, now fully manifest"[87], 
What comes to him is a realisation both of pitiless brutality (of the sort that 
European Jewry had suffered from) and of the folly of digging himselj into his own 
private insulated hole. In his resolve to make good his error, he decides to try to 
locate the Fonsteins. But instead of a reunion with them, he encounters only the 
mocking hostility and sinister psychology of the friend of the Fonsteins' son, who
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casually informs the narrator that Harry and Sorella have recently been killed in a 
car smash. Perversely, they were chasing after their mathematical genius of a son, 
who judged that his gifts would be put to best use in the casinos of Atlantic City, the 
degraded New Jerusalem. Significantly, the ideological interlocutor of the narrator 
is also a Jew, a representative of nihilistic assimilation, taunting the latter over his 
"Jewish sentiments" [101]: "People withdraw into themselves, and then they work up 
imaginary affections. It's a common American condition. "[94] (a diagnosis which 
accurately reflects the narrator's propensities).
We leave the narrator with an elegaic sense of an age fading away, its only station 
ironically in memory, and of his own regret at failing to establish his own 
connection, a thing which must necessarily belong to the past:-
Suppose I were to talk to him about the roots of memory in feeling - about the 
themes that collect and hold the memory; if I were to tell him what retention of the 
past really means. Things like: 'If sleep is forgetting, forgetting is also sleep, and 
sleep is to consciousness what death is to life. So that the Jews ask even God to 
remember, "Yiskor Elohim'". God doesn't forget, but your prayer requests him 
particularly to remember your dead ...[102]
If the novellas seem the logical extension of the process of character depletion in 
Bellow's later novels, then it will be equally evident that the central characters of the 
novellas, although weakened in representation, nevertheless display the same basic 
ambiguity evinced by their novelistic forebears. As was mentioned earlier, we 
cannot ultimately group them with their ancestors - but it is interesting that there 
remains something which is essential and unchanging in Bellow's work. This holds 
true even in the case of Something to Remember Me By, which collects the two 
novellas and the eponymous short story14 into one publication. For in this brief tale 
is crystallised what has increasingly become the typical Bellovian dilemma. As the 
old narrator reminisces about a particular incident some sixty years before, it
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becomes clear that even as an adolescent the dichotomy which defined his life had 
already been set out. He is tom between the lower, material world of sex and death, 
and the higher, spiritual world beyond. Unsettled by the dead little girl he 
encounters on his travels as an errand-boy, and oppressed by the knowledge of his 
mother's impending doom, his lust ensures that he is snared by an opportunistic 
prostitute, robbed, and left to struggle comically back through the winter streets of 
Chicago to discover whether she who bore him is still alive. Throughout his 
escapade, he persistently gives vent to what has now become a "lifelong absorption 
in or craze for further worlds".15 Sentences from an arcane book outline his 
philosophy:-
Nature cannot suffer the human form within her system of laws. When given to 
her charge, the human being before us is reduced to dust. Ours is the most perfect 
form to be found on earth. The visible world sustains us until life leaves, and then it 
must utterly destroy us. Where, then, is the world from which the human form 
comes?
If you swallowed some food and then died, that morsel of food that would have 
nourished you in life would hasten your disintegration in death. This meant that 
nature didn't make life; it only housed it. [193]
He sums up what is revealed to him by these words:-
They told me that the truth of the universe was inscribed into our very bones. That 
the human skeleton was itself a hieroglyph. That everything we had ever known on 
earth was shown to us in the first few days after death. That our experience of the 
world was desired by the cosmos, and needed by it for its own renewal. [221-222]
before adding the proviso:-
I do not think that these pages, if I hadn't lost them, would have persuaded me 
forever or made the life I led a different one. [222]
Attracted to and repulsed by the material world, drawn to yet unable to embrace the 
spiritual world - this surely is the dangling man reduced to barest constituents. As
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the narrator now faces his own death, these alternatives grow ever more stark. And 
in his valediction there is a tentative appraisal of the value of both worlds, the 
blandishments of materialism versus the spiritual power of art>
Well, they're all gone now, and I have made my preparations. I haven't left a large 
estate and that is why I have written this memoir, a sort of addition to your legacy. 
[222]
"It is hard", writes Nicholas Lezard, "to shake off the feeling that Bellow is quietly 
shutting up shop."16
Bellow's very latest publication17 might seem to confirm this impression. A 
collection of his essays and non-fiction writing hardly seems to betoken a new 
direction. But such a book comes as little surprise. For in the options presented to 
the narrator in 'Something to Remember Me By' we seem to have reached the 
fictional end point of the gradual narrowing and compression of the dangling 
process. It appears that from Herzog onwards that this aspect of the central 
characters has become more and more defined by the boundaries of the material and 
the spiritual.18 Even other features of the characters' dangling, such as that between 
a sense of self and a sense of fraternity, seems to have been conducted on this basis. 
Think of Sammler's or Charlie's longing for brotherhood which perforce belongs to 
the realm of the immaterial. Or Citrine's and Corde's pursuit of a genuine self which 
involves ever more nebulous concepts. Is it because the palpability of the characters 
has slowly lessened that we arrive at this judgement? Or is it because their desires, 
though unachieved, have headed ever more in the direction of the transcendent and 
mystical? Perhaps a bit of both. But mainly, I think it is due to the fact that the 
interests of Bellow himself have been reduced to a very private conception of the 
world which might be, as opposed to the world which is - and of this latter he is 
tired. Not tired in the sense of wishing to leave it as quickly as possible, but in the
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sense that it is a world which threatens to explain everything, to rationalise 
everything, to yield up everything - a gargantuan, fixed and indissoluble weight 
crushing against the ever-decreasing space for the spirit..
And yet that space is not so small - for it is the only realm in which vast and 
endless possibilities still exist. It is, I think, fascinating for Bellow because of the 
inherent mysteries contained in this inner world. A man in his eightieth year might 
well be fatigued by the external - but be captivated by the immense vistas o f the 
internal. This is not to say that Bellow has collapsed into himself - he is not on a 
mission o f aloofness or exclusivity. Rather, his perspectives emphasise what lies at 
the heart of all o f us. Though these take too mystical a form to be apprehended 
through 'humanism', they need not be the preserve o f only a few. It is something to 
which we can all address ourselves. The joke about General Eisenhower in More 
Die o f  Heartbreak is that Ike had "no inner theater corresponding to the European 
theater of war"[MDH, 44], Or, as Bellow puts it>
We have concentrated with immense determination on what forms us externally, 
but that need not actually govern us internally. It can only do that if  we grant it the 
right.19
And it is this facet of Bellow's fiction, accentuated in his later works, although 
ever present to some degree, which can help to account for the 'anti-humanist' strain 
of criticism. Interpreting Bellow's exploration of the inner world solely in terms of 
flight from the outer leads to an unearned imputation of isolation and rejection to 
the author. Such analyses are essentially flawed because they operate on the very 
premises Bellow has warned us against. When confronted in Bellow's fiction by the 
terrors of reality on one side, which undoubtedly do exist, and the irrational, 
unscientific and 'unrespectable' concepts on the other - 'soul', 'imagination', 'spirit' - 
about which there is something fundamentally ungraspable, the tendency is to lend
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greater weight and significance - greater import - to that which we know. After all, 
we can read about those terrors of reality every day in the papers. It seems clear to 
me that many critics have paid lip service to an examination of the mysteries of 
Bellow's fiction, and have conducted their inquiries on a basis which necessarily 
renders these qualities obscure, absurd or spurious - and consequently the preserve 
of a minority. It should also be clear from the preceding chapters of this study that 
no Bellow hero is ever divorced from his surroundings, however horrible or sordid 
those surroundings might be. Many critics may like to wallow in alienation and 
despair, in the sort of apocalypse-crises generated by the likes of Spangler (and 
Corde!) but it is not Bellow's way. Dare one say that it is the artistic value of 
Bellow's works, those terms which belong to the artist - which put these critics off? 
A politicized criticism is powerless when dealing with true art. In any case, as 
Bellow has noted, "Candor should not be mistaken for defeatism".20
As for the humanist criticism of Bellow, the best of these judges have always 
been uncomfortably conscious of the weak foundation underpinning their positions. 
Tony Tanner notes of the fictional heroes that they all "have tasks and journeys 
unfinished, problems unsolved, resolutions untested. These endings are vivid 
pictures - momentary gestures of hope , readiness and reconciliation; they are often 
vibrantly, emotionally 'right' - but from another point of view they could also be 
called 'conclusions in which nothing is concluded'". Tanner is also uneasy about the 
style of the language: "At times it seems to be straining too hard, trying to create by 
sheer richness and intensity of language beliefs and emotions which are not actually 
there".21
And John J.Clayton makes a perceptive comment on Herzog: "Bellow has to 
persuade us of Herzog's potential loving kindness and sociality by style".12 There is
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a straining of language and style in many of the conclusions to the novels (one 
thinks particularly of Seize the Day and Henderson the Rain King), but I view this 
feature not so much as an attempt of the author to convince us of a particular view, 
but as adding to the complexity and ambiguity surrounding any interpretation we 
might make - in effect, a challenge. The desire to demonstrate what might be 
termed loosely as 'humanistic' qualities (concern for brotherhood, rational progress, 
lasting self-enlightenment) may very well be present in the heroes. But Bellow has 
admitted that not only has he not "represented any good men, no one is thoroughly 
admirable in any of my novels", but, more significantly, that "I often represent men 
who desire such qualities but seem unable to achieve them on any significant 
scale" 23 This has become even more the case the more Bellow's fiction has 
gravitated away from the rational, from the readily apprehensible, and toward the 
mystical. Essentially, what is revealed to us by Bellow’s work is that we must take 
account of the dangling of his characters, of their ambivalence, of the complexity of 
their situations and must not try to prescribe for his art. In its texture, in its 
ambiguity, it remains vibrant, strong and rich in meaning.
If Bellow is truly winding down his fictional enterprise, and if the air of finality 
permeating his later short works is to be confirmed, what does this say about the 
author's attitude to his craft? In truth it appears to be as ambivalent as his art itself is 
ambiguous. In his darker moments, he can state that "the era of the writer as public 
sage and as dependable informant has ended,"24 conceding that "here and there I am 
probably hard to read and I am likely to become harder as the illiteracy of the public 
increases".25 Faced with the chaotic eddies of modem public experience, with an 
endless conveyor-belt of trivia and trash damaging the fabric of existence, and with 
a 'culture' which actively despises anything which cannot be put to so-called 
'practical' use, the portents do not appear rosy. Yet I do not believe for one moment
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that Bellow has lost his faith in the power of art. If anything, that faith has grown 
stronger with the passing years, despite the ostensible message the novellas send to 
us. For it is only in art that we can find the means to effect the necessary changes in 
our inward existences, in our penurious spirits. Bellow's argument for the 
abandonment of the novel is a convincing one:-
It's perfectly plain that we are astray in forests of printed matter. The daily papers 
are thick. Giant newsstands are virtually thatched with magazines. As for books - 
well, the English scholar F.L.Lucas wrote in the fifties: 'With nearly twenty thousand 
volumes published yearly in Britain alone, there is a danger of good books, both new 
and old, being buried under the bad. If the process went on indefinitely we should 
finally be pushed into the sea by our libraries. Yet there are few of these books that 
might not at least be shorter, and all the better for being shorter; and most of them 
could, I believe, be most effectively shortened, not by cutting out whole chapters but 
by purging their sentences of useless words and paragraphs of their useless 
sentences.' Answer the problem of quality with improved quality - a touching idea, 
but Utopian. Too late, thirty years ago we had already been pushed into the sea.26
but the fact is that this 'touching, Utopian idea' is nonetheless a true one, and the 
only real answer to bad writing and masses of irrelevant nonsense. If we are to 
sacrifice the vitality of Henderson the Rain King, the pain of Mr.Sammler's Planet 
or the wit of More Die o f  Heartbreak on the altar of public inattention then it is a 
sad day indeed. I suspect that we have not yet seen the last of Saul Bellow in the 
novel for the very reason that he too believes in this 'touching, Utopian idea'. For it 
is only in the novel that the dualities which drive and animate his heroes can 
properly be represented. It is only the novel that can fully arrest our attention, which 
can allow of our immersion in what Bellow calls the "quiet zone". In this area we 
can appreciate the real value of literature, in the essence of what Proust and Tolstoi 
styled "true impressions" >
This essence reveals, and then conceals itself. When it goes away it leaves us 
again in doubt. But we never seem to lose our connection with the depths from 
which these glimpses come. The sense of our real powers, powers we seem to
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derive from the universe itself, also comes and goes [...] The value of literature lies 
in these intermittent 'true impressions'.27
It is these 'true impressions' in the form of their epiphanies of memory, feeling, 
transcendence and timelessness which flit by every Bellovian central figure from 
Joseph to Trachtenberg, and provide not only the heroes with a window to the soul, 
but grant us access too. And it is the action upon this "hounded, mutilated, not 
wholly obliterated soul"28 wherein the writer finds his strength. From his view that 
"what can make a writer truly interesting is an inadmissable resource, something we 
all hesitate to mention though we all know it intimately - the soul",29 that he 
"cultivates certain permanent human impulses and capacities [...] good for the 
soul",30 that the writer's job [is] to remind people of [...] the fact [...] that they have 
souls",31 Bellow reinforces the belief that "the power of a true work of art is such 
that it induces a temporary suspension of activities. It lead to contemplative states, 
to wonderful, and, to my mind, sacred states of the soul".32 It is a process of inward 
experimentation, a hesitant rearing of uncertain feelings, a blundering, groping path 
towards the truth. But the powers of the soul should not be confined to the realms 
of fiction, for, as Bellow knows:-
There would be no point in continuing at all if many writers did not feel the 
existence of these unrecognised qualities. They are present and they demand release 
and expression [...] We must see them in flesh and blood.33
Saul Bellow's dangling men are not flesh and blood, but in that contradictory, 
fluctuating and anomalous area which defines their existence, we may just discover 
that distilled and indispensible requirement.
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